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Abstract 
 
In most mature welfare states, policy evaluations are sponsored by the very 
organisations that designed and implemented the intervention in the first 
place. Research in the area of clinical trials has consistently shown that this 
type of arrangement creates a moral hazard and may lead to overestimates 
of the effect of the treatment. Yet, no one so far has investigated whether 
social interventions were subject to such ‘confirmation bias’.    
 
The objective of this study was twofold. Firstly, it assessed the scientific 
credibility of a sample of government-sponsored pilot evaluations. Three 
common research prescriptions were considered: (a) the proportionality of 
timescales, (b) the representativeness of pilot sites; and (c) the completeness 
of outcome reporting. Secondly, it examined whether the known 
commitment of the government to a reform was associated with less 
credible evaluations.  
 
These questions were answered using a ‘meta-research’ methodology, 
which departs from the traditional interviews and surveys of agents that 
have dominated the literature so far. I developed the new PILOT dataset for 
that specific purpose. PILOT includes data systematically collected from 
over 230 pilot and experimental evaluations spanning 13 years of 
government-commissioned research in the UK (1997-2010) and four 
government departments (Department for Work and Pensions, Department 
for Education, Home Office and Ministry of Justice). PILOT was 
instrumental in (a) modeling pilot duration using event history analysis; (b) 
modeling pilot site selection using logistic regression; and (c) the systematic 
selection of six evaluation reports for qualitative content analysis. A total of 
17 interviews with policy researchers were also conducted to inform the 
case study and the overall research design.  
 
The results show little overt evidence of crude bias or ‘bad’ design. On 
average, government-sponsored pilots (a) were based on timescales that 
were proportional to the scope of the research; (b) were not primarily 
designed with the aim of warranting representativeness; and (c) were rather 
comprehensively analysed in evaluation reports. In addition, the results 
indicate that the known commitment of the government to a reform had no 
significant effect on the selection of pilot sites and on the reporting of 
outcomes. However, it was associated with significantly shorter pilots.  
 
In conclusion, there is some evidence that the known commitment of a 
government to a reform is associated with less credible evaluations; 
however this effect is only tangible in the earlier stages of the research 
cycle. In this respect, sponsorship bias would appear to be more limited than 
in the context of industry-sponsored clinical trials. Policy recommendations 
are provided, as this project was severely hindered by important ‘black box’ 
issues and by the poor quality of evaluation reports. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“We need social scientists to help determine what works and why, and 
what policy initiatives are likely to be most effective, and we need 
better ways of ensuring that those who need such information can get 
it quickly and easily” – David Blunkett MP1. 
 
“It is my experience that in terms of studies you can probably get an 
academic to do anything you want” – Eric Pickles MP2. 
 
 
1.1. Background   
 
1.1.1. Evidence-based policy vs. policy-based evidence  
 
Governments the world over increasingly monitor and evaluate their 
policies. Are these evaluations driven by policy-makers’ will to learn about 
the effectiveness of their reforms and make ‘better’ policies – as suggested 
by David Blunkett? Or are they conducted to legitimate decisions that have 
already been made – as suggested by Eric Pickles? This is the question I 
will be addressing in the following pages.    
 
Theoretically, the case is unclear. Some, pointing to the rhetorical continuity 
between the 1997 New Labour Manifesto, pledging to implement ‘what 
works’ and the recent What Works Initiative launched by the Coalition 
government, have concluded to a rationalisation and a depoliticisation of 
policy-making (Winner, 1997). This policy framework is underpinned by 
the idea of ‘instrumental rationality’ (Dryzek, 1990) whereby more and 
better evidence leads to more and better policy. In the UK, the belief in this 
framework was entrenched by a number of core New Labour documents in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s including Modernising Government White 
Paper (Cabinet Office, 1999a), and Professional Policy Making for the 
Twenty First Century (Cabinet Office, 1999b) and institutionalised through 
the creation of a number of new units including the Performance and 
Innovation Unit, Social Exclusion Unit and Centre for Management and 
Policy Studies. However, some have argued that this framework was not 
just a development of New Labour but was deeply entrenched in the 
positivist worldview of many policy professionals (Morçöl, 2001).  
 
Others also argued that, in a political system still structured by elections, 
evaluation was the “continuation of politics by other means” (Bovens, ’t 
Hart, & Kuipers, 2008). Through the evaluation of policies, so the argument 
                                                        
1
 Secretary of State for Education (1997-2001), speech to the ESRC, 2 February 2000.  
2
 Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (2010-), oral evidence given to 
the Communities and Local Government Committee, 12 September 2011.  
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goes, politicians have found a way to maintain their legitimacy in times of 
ambiguity, risk and insecurity, coupled with descriptions of government as 
no longer in control or even entirely legitimate. Doubt and uncertainty 
increasingly permeate relationships between citizens and politicians, 
citizens and state professionals and even citizens and the market (Beck, 
1992). This is recorded in opinion surveys that report a loss of trust in 
government and politicians in the latter part of the 20th century, reductions 
in voter turnout at UK general elections in the early 21st century, as well as 
media reports about the diminishing authority of professionals among 
service users, for example the lack of respect shown to teachers in the 
classroom (Keat, Whiteley, & Abercrombie, 1994; Pharr & Putnam, 2000). 
In the UK, New Labour sought to deal with this creeping doubt by explicitly 
acknowledging the conditions of the ‘new governance’ and its challenges, 
but presenting them as opportunities to ‘modernise’ public services and key 
institutions and ‘renew’ democratic practice. 
 
 
1.1.2. Overarching Research Question 
 
Individual opinions, however, often lean strongly towards the latter theory. 
Examples of ‘misuses’ of scientific advice by British governments abound 
and often make for popular news stories and scholarly case studies. They 
include decisions such as the multiple reclassifications of cannabis, the 
culling of badgers, the introduction of a minimum pricing for alcohol, the 
abolition of the Education Maintenance Allowance or the increase of the 
number of police-on-the-beat. Far fewer have been the examples of ‘good’ 
uses of scientific advice during the same period.  
 
In mentioning these examples, my point is not to take a position but to warn 
against negativity bias and hasty conclusions. First, these accounts are 
mainly based on single case studies and case studies are not meant to be 
widely generalizable. Second, these examples tend to be referred to 
specifically because they fit the cynical and widely held view that 
politicians put their interests before those of the people they serve.  
 
The idea that underpins this thesis is that we have now accumulated a large 
number of case studies and individual accounts of the role of research in 
public policy. Many of them are discussed in this thesis. However, we are 
still missing ‘the big picture’, i.e. the typical use of research across a wide 
range of conditions. To paraphrase Brint, we need to shift the discussion 
“from an analysis of variations to a general characterisation” of the role of 
research in policy (Brint 1990). To get to this point, as I will show 
throughout this thesis, we need different theories and methods that those 
which have been used so far.   
 
Thus, this thesis contributes to the following Overarching Research 
Question: To what extent do political institutions influence policy 
evaluation? (See Exhibit 1).  
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1.1.3. Audiences 
 
I believe that this question is relevant to at least three audiences. Readers 
with an interest in research methods (including statistics, economics, and 
epidemiology) might find it interesting to see how the scientific norms 
withstand the test of ‘real-world research’. Colleagues working in the broad 
fields of political science, economics and management will be offered a new 
approach to study research decisions in an organisational context. In 
addition, policy analysts and evaluators will hopefully get a better 
understanding of some of the implications of contract research.      
 
This thesis focuses on the UK, therefore British researchers and all 
researchers interested in Britain constitute its primary audience. However, I 
believe that the appeal of this dissertation goes beyond these borders. There 
is a growing – if recent – interest in policy evaluation at all levels of 
government and in all corners of the world. This thesis has some relevance 
for other countries and scientific disciplines as well.   
 
 
1.2. Theoretical contribution   
 
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the literature; some of them 
are direct, others are indirect. The first contribution is theoretical and 
concerns the way the effect of institutions on policy research should be 
approached.  
 
Our collective knowledge of the effect of institutions on policy evaluation is 
scattered across different disciplines. Useful contributions have been made 
in philosophy, sociology, research methods, political science (including 
public policy and public administration) as well as in the professional 
literature (mainly education and nursing). However, none of them is in itself 
sufficient to understand the phenomena at hand. There is still no dominant 
theory of the effect of institutions on policy research, which might explain 
why progress has been slow so far, as shown in section 2.  
 
This thesis approaches the question as an example of ‘confirmation bias’. 
Confirmation bias is the tendency of individuals and organisations to favour 
information that supports their prior hypotheses, beliefs or commitments 
(Plous, 1993). This theory, which was developed in social psychology, is an 
important addition to the political science literature. Indeed, it brings 
together a myriad of existing concepts – agency, blame, reputation, 
utilisation – in a more parsimonious and widely applicable concept.  
 
Thus, the central question in this thesis can be formulated as follows: To 
what extent is the research conducted or commissioned by political 
institutions subject to confirmation bias? 
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The notion of confirmation bias illustrates the trade-off that researchers 
must resolve between their commitment to the scientific method and their 
commitment to the intervention they are asked to evaluate (which can be 
spontaneous or imposed). This tension can be observed in at least three 
research decisions; each of which forms a separate empirical chapter in this 
thesis (see below and Exhibit 1). These questions are: 
– The time afforded to research;  
– The sampling of units;  
– The reporting of evaluation outcomes.  
 
 
1.3. Methodological contribution   
 
This thesis offers a new tool for the analysis of policy evaluation activities: 
the PILOT dataset.   
 
 
1.3.1. Approach 
 
Studies into the role of research in policy-making have essentially relied on 
small-N designs, looking at cases or pairs of cases in isolation but with a 
view to foster a deep understanding of the underlying social phenomena. 
Besides, the data has mainly been based on subjective data, including 
interviews and surveys of policy-makers as well as self-reported anecdotes 
from researchers. To be sure, small-N studies and subjective data have 
significantly fostered our understanding of policy research decisions by 
exploring the subject and identifying key variables. 
 
This being said, the existing methodological toolbox is not adapted to find 
out the extent to which policy research decisions accommodate institutional 
constraints. There are two reasons behind this. Firstly, a limited number of 
cases does not allow analysing the prevalence of the phenomenon. What is 
needed instead is a quantitative analysis accompanied by relevant 
inferences. Secondly, I need reliable and factual data that is comparable 
across a maximum of cases. Interviews and surveys are not the most 
appropriate methods.    
 
Here again, the medical research literature provides a useful example of 
how this can be achieved. Research on scientific integrity has relied on 
structured data (studies) to see if, for example, clinical trials were more 
favourable to test drugs when those trials were funded by the drug 
manufacturer rather than by the regulator.  
 
Noting that an ever larger number of policy studies have been conducted 
over the past 20 years and that the vast majority of these studies are now 
available online, this thesis tries, for the first time on this issue, to replicate 
this research design with the PILOT dataset. 
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As a preliminary step, I also conducted a series of 17 interviews with policy 
researchers, with the aim of better understanding the decision-making 
process in British ministerial departments and to identify the key variables 
to be included in the dataset as well the availability of data.    
 
 
1.3.2. The PILOT dataset  
 
I developed the PILOT dataset for that specific purpose. It focuses on the 
pilot schemes launched in the UK between May 1997 and May 2010, which 
corresponds to the Labour governments. Pilot schemes are policies trialled 
for a limited period on a fraction of the territory on which they are meant to 
be rolled out. They were chosen as unit of analysis for two reasons. First, 
the availability of a control group not receiving the new intervention means 
that more methodologies can be used for the evaluation of outcomes. 
Second, ex post evaluations of national programmes often take place too late 
in the policy cycle, when new policies are already in place and the interest 
in the old policy has vanished. PILOT includes 233 pilot schemes 
systematically identified in three policy areas: (1) employment and welfare; 
(2) education and parenting; and (3) crime and justice.  
 
PILOT includes three categories of variables. Firstly, variables pertaining to 
the research design of each study. The duration of the research is one of 
them, as well as the locations and the reported outcomes of each pilot. 
Secondly, the dataset provides information related to the type of policy 
intervention being piloted. Those include the target group of the 
intervention and the type of policy instrument tested (spend vs. regulatory 
interventions). It also contains policy-specific variables. For example, 
labour market programmes have been classified as mandatory or voluntary. 
Thirdly, the dataset offers data related to the political context of each pilot. 
It includes both straightforward facts, such as the time between the start of 
the pilot and the next general election and whether or not the pilot 
implements a manifesto pledge.  
 
PILOT was instrumental in (a) modeling pilot duration using event history 
analysis; (b) modeling pilot site selection using logistic regression; and (c) 
the systematic selection of six evaluation reports for qualitative content 
analysis. 
 
 
1.4. Empirical contribution  
 
This new theoretical and methodological framework helped me answer a 
series of specific questions, which can be put under two ‘empirical strands’.   
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1.4.1. Scientific credibility of government-sponsored 
evaluations (Empirical Strand 1) 
 
A key assumptions underpinning this thesis is that research is subject to 
strict professional norms. Thus, we have an idea of the type of research 
decision that an organisation committed to scientific norms would make. 
 
The first empirical contribution of this thesis is thus fairly descriptive; but I 
believe that it has a substantive interest. Bearing in mind the different 
prescriptions associated with the three research decisions mentioned in 
section 1.2 and presented in Exhibit 1, my thesis brings an answer to the 
following questions:    
– Is the duration of pilots proportional to the complexity of the 
intervention and the evaluation? (Specific Question 1a); 
– Are pilot sites representative of the population? (Specific Question 1b); 
– Are the intervention outcomes comprehensively reported in pilot 
evaluation reports? (Specific Question 1c). 
 
 
1.4.2. Effect of policy commitments on the scientific 
credibility of evaluations (Empirical Strand 2)   
 
The second empirical contribution of my thesis is to analyse the effect of 
policy commitments on the scientific credibility of the research decisions of 
interest. An observable effect would bring evidence of confirmation bias.  
 
The first of these decisions is the time afforded to an evaluation. Time is a 
precious resource for both the evaluator and the policy-maker, but for 
opposite reasons. Whereas the former tend to press for longer evaluations, 
which will allow her to collect more and more robust data, the latter often 
advocate shorter evaluations, most of them imposed by the political agenda. 
Against this background, I formulated the following specific question: Are 
interventions to which the government is strongly committed subject to 
shorter evaluations? (Specific Question 2a). 
 
Previous studies have shown that research duration could be affected by the 
salience of the intervention (Carpenter, 2002, 2004; Dranove & Meltzer, 
1994; Olson, 1997). However, the evidence base is limited to clinical trials 
and drug approval processes.  
 
The contribution of this thesis is to provide a new model capturing the effect 
of policy commitment on the duration of evaluations.   
 
The second research decision likely to reflect confirmation bias is the 
sampling of the units to be included in the evaluation. Whereas a 
commitment to scientific norms will lead evaluators to select samples that 
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are representative of the wider population, a commitment to the intervention 
is more likely to favour samples perceived as exemplary. To address this 
question, I had to focus on a specific policy area, namely employment and 
welfare programmes. The following question was formulated: Are high-
performing Jobcentre Plus districts more likely to be selected as pilot sites? 
(Specific Question 2b).  
 
Previous studies have pointed to the limited external validity of some 
investigations (Keitner, Posternak, & Ryan, 2003; Pratt & Moyé, 1995; 
Rothwell, 2005). However, the evidence base is limited to clinical trials.  
 
This thesis provides a new model capturing the effect of a district’s 
performance on its probability of being selected as pilot site.    
 
The third research decision which might indicate confirmation bias if the 
reporting of the findings of the evaluation. It is expected that an evaluation 
influenced by scientific norms will report outcomes fully and completely, 
whereas an evaluation influenced by policy commitments will report these 
findings selectively. Against this background, I formulated the following 
specific question: Are interventions to which the government is strongly 
committed subject to more spin? (Specific Question 2c). 
 
Previous studies have attempted to define and operationalise the notion of 
spin (Boutron, Dutton, Ravaud & Altman, 2010). Some of them have shown 
that studies sponsored by an organisation having a vested interest in the 
intervention were more spun than others (Bourgeois, Murthy, & Mandl, 
2010). A recent study has shown that policy-makers could be at times guilty 
of ‘leaning’ on evaluators to influence the reporting of results (The LSE 
GV314 Group, 2014). However, it was based on a survey, which means that 
these accounts can be subject to desirability bias.   
 
This thesis contributes to the literature by providing a qualitative content 
analysis of six evaluation reports.   
 
 
Exhibit 1 – Expected effects of commitments on research decisions   
 
 Commitment to the 
intervention 
Research decisions 
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Exhibit 2 – Operationalisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specific question 2a: 
Are interventions to which the 
government is strongly 
committed subject to shorter 
evaluations? 
Specific question 2b: 
Are ‘exemplary’ areas more 
likely to be selected as pilot 
sites? 
Specific question 1c: 
Are the intervention outcomes 
comprehensively reported in 
pilot evaluation reports? 
Central Thesis Question: 
To what extent are government-funded policy 
evaluations subject to confirmation bias? 
Specific question 1a: 
Is the duration of pilots 
proportional to the complexity 
of the intervention and the 
evaluation? 
 
Specific question 1b: 
Are pilot sites representative 
of the population? 
Specific question 2c: 
Are interventions to which the 
government is strongly 
committed subject to more 
selective reporting?  
Empirical Strand 1: 
Research credibility 
Empirical Strand 2: 
Effect of policy commitments 
Overarching  
Research Question:  
What is the effect of 
political institutions on 
research? 
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1.5. Relevance  
 
The findings of this thesis matter for several reasons. First, policy research 
absorbs an ever larger amount of public resources across the world. Yet, as 
discussed earlier, very few studies have looked at the prevalence and 
severity of confirmation bias in this research. Second, biased policy research 
decisions have social implications that need to be publicly discussed.     
 
 
1.5.1. The growing influence of research in government: the 
British case  
 
The social relevance of this thesis can be best understood in the light of the 
recent evolution of the role of science in policy-making. This role can be 
seen through a myriad of indicators. The following section focuses on the 
UK only.  
 
The government’s commitment to research between has been most obvious 
in the number of research outputs. Exhibit 3 shows the evolution of the 
number of policy studies published by the DWP between 1990 and 2012.  
 
 
Exhibit 3 – Number of DWP research publications per year (N=825)* 
 
 
 
(*)Number of reports published on the DWP website under the series ‘Research Reports’   
 
 
This upward trend in output was made possible by increasing financial 
resources for research activities. It is very difficult to give accurate and 
comparable estimates of how much each government department in the UK 
spends on policy research. This is due to gaps between sums allocated to 
research and sums actually spent, with large variations due to accounting 
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and programme reasons. Furthermore, these budgets are typically not 
consolidated. For example, between 2005 and 2010, the Department for 
Education spent £11-12 million each year on core external social and 
economic research. In addition, the policy directorates have directed 
significant expenditure over the same period, around £15-20 million each 
year to policy evaluations, which is higher than the core research 
expenditure. Overall, the Department’s spending on policy evaluation 
typically represents about 0,05% of total departmental spend” (Science and 
Analysis Review of the Department for Children, Schools & Families (now 
Department for Education), 2010). 
 
A final indicator of the influence of science in government is the number of 
staff belonging to a ‘research profession’ within the civil service. However, 
the definition of who belongs to this profession and who does not is not 
always consistent and thus, results vary from one source to another. 
According to the network of Heads of Science and Engineering Profession, 
there were about 12,000 specialist science or engineering posts across the 
Civil Service. According to the ONS Annual Civil Service Employment 
Survey, there are about 10,000 people who identify science and engineering 
as their primary profession. 3600 of them are members of the Government 
Science and Engineering (GSE) network (The future of the Civil Service: 
Making the most of scientists and engineers in government, 2013). 
Importantly, whichever indicator is used, the proportion of scientists and 
engineers within the Civil Service has grown between 2007 and 2012, due 
to both a growth in their recruitment and a drop in the total number of staff 
(see Exhibits 4 and 5).   
 
 
Exhibit 4 – Evolution of the number of the different scientific 
professions in the Civil Service  
 
 
 
Source: ONS (Annual Civil Service Employment Survey) 
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Not only are scientists and engineers increasingly numerous within the Civil 
Service, they also tend to get more top jobs. In 1968, the Fulton Report on 
the Management of the Civil Service found that many scientists, engineers 
and other professional specialists were not given the responsibility or 
authority they deserved. The Committee therefore recommended that these 
specialists be given more policy-making and management opportunities, 
and training to equip them for their new work. Four decades later, that 
recommendation seems to have largely been taken on board. In 2011 for 
example, over half (56%) of the members of the GSE were in the 
grade/range HEO to grade 7, which is the highest in the civil service (The 
future of the Civil Service: Making the most of scientists and engineers in 
government, 2013). Furthermore, three of the four Cabinet Secretaries since 
1998 have been trained economists, and the last two entered the civil service 
through the Government Economic Service.  
 
 
Exhibit 5 – Evolution of the number of scientists and engineers in the 
Civil Service and of the total staff in the Civil Service (100 = year 2007)  
 
 
 
Source: ONS (Annual Civil Service Employment Survey) 
 
 
1.5.2. Trustworthiness of scientific results   
 
The findings of this thesis have also important implications for the scientific 
profession.  
 
On one level, confirmation bias leads researchers to make decisions that are 
sub-standard from a scientific viewpoint and thus are likely to be contested 
by the rest of the scientific community. On another level, confirmation bias 
will lead to overestimate the effect of the intervention and lift any doubt 
regarding its possible inefficacy. Confirmation bias has been found in very 
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different disciplines and research areas, including in studies on the effects of 
nicotine (Turner & Spilich, 1997); antidepressants (Becker-Brüser W, 2010; 
Bruce Baker, Johnsrud, Crismon, Rosenheck, & Woods, 2003); and cell 
phone use (Huss, Egger, Hug, Huwiler-Müntener, & Röösli, 2007). 
Ultimately, confirmation bias might lead to poor policy decisions.  
 
In the long run, biased policy research could damage the authority of 
science. This authority rests on two important aspects. First, it rests on the 
belief that science can provide true and useful accounts of the ‘real world’ 
(Bocking, 2004). Related to this view has been the notion that science is 
most authoritative when it speaks with unanimity (Bocking, 2004).   
 
 
1.5.3. Legitimacy of public institutions 
 
In addition to damaging the authority of scientists, biased policy research 
could also undermine the legitimacy of democratic governments. Evidence 
(presented in Exhibit 6) shows that there is a strong positive correlation 
between the perceived quality of government (i.e. the perceived fairness and 
efficiency of the implementing agencies) and attitudes to taxes and social 
spending (Svallfors, 2012). This result emerges in spite of the fact that 
countries with a high quality of government are also countries that already 
spend more on the welfare state than countries with lower quality of 
government (Rothstein, Samanni, & Teorell, 2012).  
 
 
Exhibit 6 – Perceived quality of government and attitudes to social 
spending across European countries (1 unit = 1 country) 
 
 
 
Source: European Social Survey Round 4, 2008 
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1.6. Thesis outline 
 
The rest of this thesis is divided into three parts. Chapters 2 to 4 provide 
background, summing up what we have learned about the factors shaping 
research decisions and how similar questions have been addressed in the 
past. Chapters 5 to 7 are the empirical part of this thesis and present my 
findings using different approaches to the research question. Chapter 8 
concludes by highlighting the contribution of this thesis and examining its 
broader implications for the research and policy-making communities. 
 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of this thesis. It starts with a 
review of the literature on the effect of political institutions on policy 
research, emphasising the key contributions of philosophy, sociology, 
political science, research methods and of the professional literature. It will 
then offer an alternative approach using the confirmation bias theory and 
justify such an approach. The rest of this chapter is devoted to the 
operationalisation of this approach with a special focus on research design 
and variables.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the institutional context of this study. I will first describe 
the decision-making process that led me to focus on the pilots and 
experiments conducted by the British government between May 1997 and 
May 2010 in four ministerial departments. I will then introduce the main 
actors, organisations and processes that underpin this study with a view to 
familiarise the reader. I will finally discuss the implications of the case 
study in relation to the research questions.  
 
Chapter 4 approaches the research question from a methodological angle 
and presents the new PILOT dataset developed for the purpose of this study. 
I will first review how research questions similar to mine have been 
addressed in the past as well as the relative merits of these methodologies. 
The rest of the chapter will define the scope of the study, the sources of 
information used for the building of the dataset. It will also present the main 
variables available and the kind of questions the dataset can potentially 
answer.   
 
Chapter 5 is the first in a series of three empirical chapters. It focuses on the 
duration of pilots. In this chapter, I will first analyse whether, on average, 
the duration of pilots is proportional to the scope of the research (Specific 
Question 1a). I will then examine whether the known commitment of the 
government to a reform is associated with shorter pilots, based on the data 
provided by PILOT (Specific Question 2a).  
 
Chapter 6 looks at the selection of pilot sites in employment programmes. 
As in the previous chapter, I will first analyse whether all regions have the 
same chance of being selected as pilot site – which would be expected from 
a study claiming external validity (Specific Question 1b). I will then analyse 
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the influence of policy commitments on the selection of pilot sites (Specific 
Question 2b).  
 
Chapter 7 is concerned with the reporting of evaluation outcomes. In this 
chapter, I will review the content of six evaluation reports systematically 
selected from the PILOT dataset. These six reports were selected with a 
view to maximise the contrast between policy interventions showing a 
strong/weak commitment. I will first assess the prevalence of outcome 
reporting bias (or ‘spin’) in these reports, using seven criteria developed by 
clinicians (Specific Question 1c). I will then examine possible ‘associations’ 
between the level of spin and the existence of a commitment to the policy 
(Specific Question 2c).  
 
The conclusion (chapter 8) will develop three points. First, it will review 
how the evidence presented in earlier chapters supports my overall 
argument, and how this evidence fits with the rest of the literature. Second, 
it will take stock of the PILOT dataset and discuss the strengths and 
weakness of the research design used in this study. Thirdly, it will discuss 
the broader implications of my findings, both from an academic and policy 
point of view. A future research agenda will be proposed.   
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates a little-understood question in political science: to 
what extent do political institutions influence policy evaluation?  
 
A large literature has flourished in recent years to analyse how institutions 
affect each stage of the policy cycle, which commonly includes (1) agenda 
setting, (2) policy formulation, (3) implementation, and (4) evaluation. 
Thanks to these contributions, we have learned much about the reasons and 
the ways in which institutions produce sub-optimal policies or ‘policy bias’ 
by favouring one group or issue to the detriment of others (Ehrlich, 2011; 
Schattschneider, 1960). For instance, agenda-setting theories have shown 
how these institutions compete for turning private issues into public policy. 
Other theories have emphasised the key role played by these different 
institutions in the formulation of policy. We have also learned much about 
how institutions can affect the implementation of reforms.  
 
Comparatively, our knowledge of what influences the way policy 
evaluations are conducted appears limited. Binder, Rhodes, Rockman and 
colleagues (2008) barely address the issue in The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Institutions. Other textbooks are equally succinct (Greenwood, 
Oliver, Suddaby, & Sahlin-Andersson, 2008; Lowndes & Roberts, 2013; 
Peters, 2011). Yet, policy evaluations raise important questions, mainly 
because they tend to be conducted or commissioned by the very 
organisations that designed and implemented the intervention in the first 
place. The assumption of independence, which underpins scientific research, 
is often violated. 
 
Political institutions typically include formal democratic bodies 
(parliaments, governments, bureaucracies, political parties, presidents, etc.), 
however, institutional theories have also scrutinised the role groups and 
organisations without a constitutional mandate but nevertheless influential 
(interest groups, media, pollsters). The institutions I will be referring to in 
this chapter are essentially government departments and agencies (see 
chapter 3 for a more detailed justification and description).  
 
I define policy evaluation as “the ex post assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of public programs and projects” (Bovens et al., 2008). The 
emphasis on ex post means that this chapter does not address the literature 
on ex ante analysis, where methods to evaluate policy alternatives are used 
as decision-making aids (Bovens et al., 2008; Dunn, 2004; Nagel, 2002). 
Policy evaluation is akin to research and development (R&D) in the social 
sphere; with the difference that policy research is non-proprietary and can 
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be conducted and replicated outside of government. Both policy evaluation 
and R&D differ from basic research, which is experimental or theoretical 
work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying 
foundation of phenomena and observable facts, without any particular 
application or use in view (OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms).  
 
It should be said right away that political institutions influence research in 
two capacities. First, as regulators of scientific activities: throughout the 20
th
 
century, political institutions have increasingly influenced research notably 
through public funding, the sanctioning of research misconduct and the 
definition of the research agenda. Second, institutions influence research as 
clients of scientific organisations. This chapter focuses on this second aspect 
only.   
 
The goal of this chapter is to lay the foundations for an empirical research 
agenda assessing the effect of political institutions on policy evaluation. 
Three specific objectives have been assigned to it. First, this chapter reviews 
the theoretical and empirical literature on the interaction between science 
and institutions – the last review dating back from 1998 (Weiss, 1998). This 
review will in turn help me identify the type of issues that would make a 
significant contribution to this scholarship. The second objective of this 
chapter is to come up with a ‘better’ theory. The third objective is to 
operationalise the research question.   
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 synthesises what 
we know about the effect of political institutions on research and identifies 
gaps in the literature. Section 2.3 offers an alternative approach to this 
scholarship based on the idea of ‘confirmation bias’ and briefly introduces 
this idea. Section 2.4 operationalises this approach. Section 2.5 considers 
different independent variables whereas section 2.6 focuses on dependent 
variables. Section 2.7 discusses the specificities of social research compared 
with other types of applied research such as clinical trials. Section 2.8 
concludes.     
 
 
2.2. Review of the literature    
 
The literature on the effect of political institutions on policy research spans 
several disciplines, including philosophy, research methods, political 
science, sociology and diverse ‘professional’ literatures including education 
and nursing (see Exhibit 7). A systematic review of the literature would be a 
difficult exercise. Rather, the following section reviews the literature in a 
narrative fashion, focusing on what I considered to be the most significant 
contributions and highlighting points of consensus and disagreement.     
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Exhibit 7 – Map of the literature  
 
 
 
 
2.2.1. Research without institutions  
 
Assessing the effect of political institutions on policy research requires a 
thought experiment, namely the identification of the principles guiding 
research in a state of nature, or more realistically, in a context where 
scientists would work with minimum constraints. Other things remaining 
equal, any deviation from these principles occurring in an institutional 
context can be attributed to these very institutions.   
 
The history and philosophy of science argue that these principles have been 
defined in two phases. Until the Enlightenment, science was primarily 
defined by its purpose, namely the advancement of knowledge. As such, it 
was virtually undistinguishable from philosophy. In a state of nature, 
research would be conducted by free individuals pursuing neither private 
gain nor political ideology, but simply the truth (Bocking, 2004). The 
advent of the ‘scientific revolution’ – between the Renaissance and the 18th 
century – has led to a redefinition of science based on its methods. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines the scientific method as “a method or 
procedure that has characterized natural science since the 17th century, 
consisting in systematic observation, measurement, and experiment, and the 
formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses”3. The emphasis here is 
on the procedure: what makes a claim scientific is not its substance but the 
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way the information was gathered, analysed and interpreted. Thus, 
theoretically, disagreements among scientists are not concerned with the 
relevance of the findings but with the credibility of the research process and 
the assumptions underpinning it (Bocking, 2004).   
 
In addition to these ‘technical prescriptions’, science is based on a number 
of ‘moral prescriptions’, which are equally binding, not because they are 
procedurally efficient, but because they are believed right and good 
(Merton, 1942). These moral norms all relate to scientists’ attitudes and 
behaviours in relation to each other and their research (Zuckerman, 1988). 
According to Merton, these norms include:  
– Communality (“communism” in the original text), i.e. the common 
ownership of scientific results and methods and the consequent 
imperative to share both freely.  
– Universalism specifies that scientific work and findings should be 
evaluated on the basis of “pre-established impersonal criteria: 
consonance with observation and with previously confirmed 
knowledge”, and not on the personal, social or cultural attributes of the 
scientists involved.  
– The principle of organised scepticism refers to the “detached scrutiny of 
beliefs in terms of empirical and logical criteria”. This principle has 
implications for both producers and consumers of scientific findings: the 
former need to present their findings and methods transparently so that 
their value can be assessed, and the latter need to suspend judgement 
until they have examined findings and methods according to accepted 
standards and criteria.  
– Finally, disinterestedness demands that scientists’ work remain 
uncorrupted by self-interested motivations. It precludes the pursuit of 
science for the sake of riches, though Merton recognised the powerful 
influence of competition for scientific priority. 
 
Thus, the assumption in much of the literature is that, in a state of nature, or 
in a state of minimum constraints, science would be independent and 
pursued for the sole purpose of human enlightenment. It would also 
scrupulously apply the scientific method and follow the moral norms of 
science. It is also the assumption that underpins the rest of this thesis.  
 
 
2.2.2. Political institutions as ‘consumers’ of scientific advice   
 
The fundamental difference between research undertaken in a state of nature 
and research undertaken in an institutional or professional context is that, in 
the latter situation, scientists are employed (or commissioned or 
compensated) and that their research is actually utilised.   
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The literature on ‘research utilisation’ has shed light on the three properties 
that make evidence a highly sought after resource (Beyer & Trice, 1982; 
Innvaer, Vist, & Trommald, 2002; Lavis, Robertson, Woodside, & et al., 
2003; Weiss, 1980). The conceptual property of research is the closest to the 
purpose of science in a state of nature. It emphasises its capacity to 
enlighten individuals and organisations by articulating concepts and 
changing their understanding of natural and social phenomena. The 
instrumental property of research makes it capable of assisting decision-
making by bringing answers to clearly predefined problems. Lastly, the 
symbolic property of research involves using research results and processes 
to legitimate and sustain pre-determined positions. This typology is now 
widely accepted in the literature and has been applied to many different 
policy areas including drug policy (Ritter & Lancaster, 2013), urban health 
(Murphy & Fafard, 2012) and education (Luke, 2011). 
 
Which form of utilization is most prevalent is difficult to establish given the 
lack of commonly agreed indicators as well as the normative aspect of the 
question which might bias survey responses. Though very limited, the 
evidence would suggest that the conceptual use of research is more 
prevalent in the day-to-day professional activity of professionals and 
managers in government agencies than symbolic utilization, which, in turn, 
is more important than instrumental utilization (Amara, Ouimet, & Landry, 
2004). Importantly, research shows that the three types of research 
utilization are not mutually exclusive and are in fact frequently combined 
(Amara et al., 2004).  
 
The type of research utilization (or the type of combination) depends on a 
number of factors. One of them is the policy area. For example, Carpenter 
has shown that bureaucratic agencies of state were more involved in the 
provision and regulation of health policy than in other policy areas 
(Carpenter, 2012). The type of research utilisation depends also on the 
reputation that a given agency wants to enhance. Indeed, agency reputation 
shapes administrative decisions (Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Carpenter, 
2001, 2010). The literature has also convincingly shown that policy-makers 
are more likely to make an instrumental use of scientific advice when there 
is a consensus among experts on a causal theory (Boehmer-Christiansen, 
1994; Hood & Jones, 1996; Lavertu & Weimer, 2011).  
 
Lastly, the literature has shed light on the aspects of research that can be 
used (Weiss, 1998). The findings are at the core of the instrumental type. In 
the conceptual type, utilization extends to the general ideas and 
generalizations from evaluation, even if they do not serve a specific and 
immediate purpose. In addition to the above, a policymaker using research 
symbolically can also take advantage of other parts of the research process. 
The sheer fact that an evaluation is being conducted can be used to 
demonstrate policy-makers’ rationality and sound management (Feldman & 
March, 1981). Likewise, the definition of the scope of the research can be 
an indicator of symbolic use of evidence. Excluding inconvenient questions, 
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areas or stakeholders from a study can help producing ‘congenial’ results. 
There is some evidence that governments can ‘play it safe’ when they 
commission an evaluation (The LSE GV314 Group, 2014). Similarly, the 
design of the study and the choice of measures can also be the subject of 
political struggles among different agencies (Breslau, 1997; Weiss, 1998).  
 
 
2.2.3. Research as a “shadow institution” 
 
The public policy literature argues that research primarily benefits elected 
policy-makers (e.g. ministers). Thus, these policy-makers will seek to 
influence the course of research. This literature makes extensive references 
to ‘politicians’, ‘political actors’ and ‘interest groups’. According to this 
scholarship, political actors tend to frame evidence in a way that supports 
their agenda. This is evident is statements such as “evaluation is the 
continuation of politics by other means” (Bovens et al., 2008).   
 
Public policy scholars argue that democratic institutions provide incentives 
to successfully pass reforms. When the enactment of legislation or the 
implementation of a decision looks difficult, the authority of the 
government gets undermined, which in turn jeopardizes future reforms. The 
moral authority of science can, on occasions, facilitate reforms. Some have 
mentioned that in the US, pilot evaluations were used as “shadow 
institutions” used to legitimate contentious reforms (Brodkin & Kaufman, 
2000; Rogers-Dillon, 2004). Thus, many have empirically sought 
associations between the degree of salience of an issue and the way research 
will be used to support policy. Some have argued that “on the small issues, 
evidence sometimes counts”; however, when it comes to the big issues, 
“politics is the order of the day” (Tonry, 2004). Heavily politicised policy 
areas are characterised by more ad-hoc or muddled-through policy-making 
(Lindblom, 1959). In such instances, there is intense media scrutiny of 
decision-making and prolonged conflict between competing interest groups 
and a permeating sense of crisis. Typical example would be drugs, where 
evidence is used symbolically (Monaghan, 2010) and schools (Henig, 2008, 
2009).  
 
Others have shown that political institutions reward politicians not so much 
for what they have achieved but rather for ‘winning the argument’. A less 
demanding version of this theory suggests that policy-makers are driven less 
by the desire to get credit for what they have done than by the desire to 
avoid blame (Hood, 2011; Weaver, 1986). The ominous label of ‘failure’ or 
‘fiasco’ that hovers over policies that failed to deliver entails a political 
statement (Bovens et al., 2008). Thus ‘cherry-picked’ information can be 
used as ‘political ammunition’ in the political debate.   
 
Regardless of the initial motivation, political institutions will occasionally 
lead politicians to use research symbolically, or to ‘frame’ it in a way that 
suits their aims. “They will produce – or engage others to produce – 
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accounts of policy episodes that are, however subtly, framed and timed to 
convey certain ideas about what happened, why and how to judge this, and 
to obscure or downplay others” (Bovens et al., 2008). Methodologically, 
these accounts have mainly relied on individual case studies. Some of these 
case studies have considerably improved our understanding of the 
interaction between science and political institutions in areas such as drugs 
(Monaghan, 2010), education (Henig, 2008, 2009). There have been 
occasional reports of ministers stepping in the middle of a research project 
and ‘leaning on’ researchers (The LSE GV314 Group, 2014). 
 
 
2.2.4. Research and bureaucracy  
 
Public administration specialists diverge from their public policy colleagues 
in four important ways.  
 
First, they object the idea of a direct interest of elected policy-makers in 
research. According to them, elected policy-makers frame public policy, but 
do not carry it out. Their hypothesis is that the effect of political institutions 
on research is in fact mediated by government agencies and their 
employees. This is supported by numerous accounts of the role of expertise 
in the development of national agencies including the Forest Service, the 
Department of Agriculture (Bocking, 2004) and the FDA (Carpenter, 2001, 
2002, 2010). In this context, civil servants sometimes invoke ministers to 
deflect blame. Some evaluators reported that opposition to evaluation would 
typically come from civil servants, even though they might have pretended 
there was opposition from ministers (Ettelt & Mays, 2013).   
 
Second, public administration scholars contend that research is not used 
with a view to secure a reform or for argumentative purposes, but to 
enhance the power and the legitimacy of the agency. As demonstrated by 
Weber, bureaucracies assert power through specialised expertise and control 
of information, justified by their claim to be the only means by which the 
complexities of modern society can be managed (Bocking, 2004; Weber, 
1946). According to Carpenter, the technical-scientific reputation of an 
agency is one of four reputational strategies used by public administrators to 
face the challenges of modern governance (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). The 
result has been an ever-expanding application of administrative rationalism: 
seeking, with the guidance of technical expertise, rational and efficient 
solutions to the problems of society (Bocking, 2004). 
 
Third, the public administration literature is more specific when it comes to 
defining the effect of political institutions. At a ‘macro’ level, reputation 
gives agencies more autonomy, in the sense of being able to sway the 
wishes of elected officials on particular matters of policy and to secure 
deference from these elected officials (Carpenter, 2001; MacDonald & 
Franko, 2007; MacDonald, 2010). Political institutions also impact the 
research process in very specific ways. For example, several studies have 
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shown the timing of new drug approval by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration was influenced by the type of reputation of the agency 
(Carpenter, 2002, 2004) as well as the relative importance of the drug, 
measured in terms of therapeutic novelty and expected return on investment 
(Dranove & Meltzer, 1994). Political institutions also influence the 
methodologies used in programme evaluations (Breslau, 1997).   
 
The fourth difference of the public administration literature is on methods. 
Whereas interviews, survey and desk reviews dominate the public policy 
literature, a more systematic approach based on administrative data has been 
used in public administration (Carpenter, 2001, 2002, 2004; Krause & 
Douglas, 2005; MacDonald, 2010). This is a key difference, given that only 
a systematic approach can reliably assess the long-term effect of political 
institutions on policy research.    
 
 
2.2.5. The norms of science  
 
It would be incomplete to review the literature on the effect of institutions 
on research without mentioning the response of the scientific community to 
the uses and misuses of science. Sociologists of science and sociologists of 
professions contend that the professionalization of science has led to the 
creation of scientific institutions. These institutions include universities, 
academic journals and professional societies, which all play an important 
role in diffusing and enforcing scientific norms.  
 
The ‘optimistic’ view is that these institutions play a key role in repressing 
research misconduct and questionable research practices (Steneck, 2003). 
Research is a professional activity. As such it is subject to norms, i.e. 
prescriptions commonly known and used by practitioners (Andersen, 2007; 
Ostrom, 1986). These prescriptions refer to which actions are required, 
prohibited or permitted in specific situation. The existence of such norms is 
a vital part being a profession. Their enforcement depends on the provision 
of incentives, which are reflected in the criteria used to appoint, evaluate, 
and promote individual faculty members. Today, the rewards of a successful 
academic career typically include the personal gratification derived from 
scholarship and discovery, recognition by peers, and academic promotion 
and tenure, as well as enhanced responsibility and outside financial 
opportunities.  
 
A more pessimistic view is that these institutions defend the vested interests 
of researchers. According to sociology of scientific knowledge, science is 
neither exceptional nor immune from the forces that affect other human 
activities. Mitroff (1974) for example, showed that for each of the 
Mertonian norms there exists counternorms that play equally important 
roles in the practice of science. Social and historic studies demonstrate 
science to be an enterprise consisting of individuals who passionately 
engage in value-laden activities to demonstrate their correctness and depend 
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upon the socio-cultural context from which their work emanates (Hull, 
1988; Pinch, 1986; Sapp, 1990). The practice of science also includes 
fraudulent activity, sometimes involving even mainstream scientists (Sapp, 
1990). Eventually, sociologists of science concluded that Merton’s case 
cannot be convincingly made and that his norms might be better viewed as 
an ideology of science (Mulkay, 1976). The studies of scientific practice 
cited above corroborate Mulkay’s assertion that the Mertonian norms are an 
ideology that serves the interests of the scientific community in at least three 
ways. The norms (1) enhance the epistemic status of scientific knowledge; 
(2) increase the political power of scientists; and (3) elevate the social status 
of scientists. Functionally, they work at the interface between the scientific 
community and the general population and provide justification for the 
continued support of science in society. 
 
 
2.3. Confirmation bias 
 
Despite the above-mentioned merits, the current theoretical framework 
available to explain the effect of institutions on policy research is too 
fragmented to allow progress. There is scope for a more parsimonious and 
‘universal’ theory.    
 
A promising way of bridging the above-mentioned gap can be found in two 
related literatures. The research methods literature has approached the 
question as an example of ‘experimenter’s bias’. The experimenter’s bias – 
also known as research bias – has been defined as “a subjective bias towards 
a result expected by the human experimenter” (Sackett, 1979). The social 
psychology literature has developed the related concept of ‘confirmation 
bias’ (also called confirmatory bias or ‘myside’ bias) which is attributed to 
English psychologist Peter Wason (Gale & Ball, 2002) and describes the 
tendency of people to favour information that confirms prior beliefs or 
hypotheses, regardless of whether the information is true (Plous, 1993). The 
following section outlines the causes and the consequences of confirmation 
bias, which is the term I will use throughout this thesis. The variables 
mediating this effect are also presented.   
 
 
2.3.1. Causes 
 
Confirmation bias is often described as a result of automatic, unintentional 
strategies rather than deliberate deception (Hergovich, Schott, & Burger, 
2010; Oswald & Grosjean, 2004). It results from the supposed inability of a 
human being to be objective, and more specifically from (1) the desire to 
appear consistent and/or to fulfil public commitments; and (2) reciprocation.  
 
A first cause of bias is commitment. A commitment is a public engagement 
or obligation to take a specific course of action. Its normative power is such 
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that individuals will often stick to the original deal even though it has 
changed for the worse. The reason people stick to their commitment is that 
they want to maintain a positive self-image. People strengthen their original 
commitment by the addition of supportive new thoughts and feelings 
(Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, & Miller, 1978). This is particularly relevant 
in political contexts, where reasoning can be subconsciously biased, 
favouring conclusions that governments have already committed to. A two-
decade study of political pundits by Tetlock found that, on the whole, their 
predictions were not much better than chance. Tetlock divided experts into 
‘foxes’ who maintained multiple hypotheses, and ‘hedgehogs’ who were 
more dogmatic. In general, the hedgehogs were much less accurate. Tetlock 
blamed their failure on confirmation bias – specifically, their inability to 
make use of new information that contradicted their existing theories 
(Tetlock, 2005). Evidence of confirmation bias has also been found in 
scientific decisions (Hergovich et al., 2010; Koehler, 1993; Mahoney, 1977; 
Nickerson, 1998). 
 
Another cause of bias is reciprocity. As a social construct, reciprocity means 
that in response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and 
much more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model. 
Conversely, in response to hostile actions they are frequently much more 
nasty and even brutal (Cialdini, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Reciprocity is 
so strong that people tend to reciprocate regardless of whether they like the 
person who originally gave the favour and even if they did not want the 
favour, as was demonstrated in Regan’s experiment (Regan, 1971). 
Reciprocation can be genuine and unconscious (Cialdini, 2003). The 
problem is a growing concern in the medical research community, where a 
vast majority of pharmaceutical companies resort to ‘friendly actions’. 
Those include free drug samples, meals, continued medical education, 
financial incentives to participate in clinical trials, honoraria for delivering 
lectures, leisure trips, expensive text books and items of low monetary value 
such as pens and notepads. Reciprocity can extend to any action perceived 
as a ‘favour’ such as a job offer, a promotion, a bonus, professional honours 
and the sponsorship of research projects and scientific meetings (Institute of 
Medicine, 2009).  
 
There is no direct evidence of reciprocation; however there is strong 
evidence that scientists attitude towards industry-funded research becomes 
more positive as the amount of interactions between the two spheres 
increases (Austad, Avorn, & Kesselheim, 2011). A review of 17 surveys on 
the attitudes of researchers to financial ties in research revealed that 
investigators are concerned about the impact of financial ties on choice of 
research topic, research conduct and publication, but this concern is less 
among investigators already involved with industry. Researchers approve of 
industry collaboration and financial ties when the ties are indirectly related 
to the research, disclosure is up front, and results and ideas are freely 
publicized. However, their trust in disclosure as a way to manage conflicts 
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may reveal a lack of awareness of the actual impact of financial incentives 
on themselves and other researchers (Glaser & Bero, 2005). 
 
 
2.3.2. Consequences 
 
Confirmation bias leads to unconventional or sub-standard decisions. In a 
research context, this means decisions – and thus, potentially, findings – that 
are likely to be controversial within the scientific community and portrayed 
as not credible (Bocking, 2004). Opposing interests will highlight 
uncertainties in the evidence, discrepancies and ambiguities in the 
interpretation, ties between researchers and business or political interests, 
and any other technical aspects of the problem that can provide an 
opportunity to question the credibility of the research process. In other 
words, confirmation bias can damage scientific credibility, understood as 
the extent to which science in general is recognized as a source of reliable 
information about the world (Bocking, 2004). Empirically, confirmation 
bias has been found to affect the way we process information, report results 
and interpret findings.  
 
First, confirmation bias impairs the way we process information.  
Experiments have found repeatedly that people tend to test hypotheses in a 
one-sided way, by searching for evidence consistent with their current 
hypothesis (Kunda, 1999; Nickerson, 1998). More specifically, 
confirmation bias has been invoked to explain ‘illusory correlations’, which 
is the tendency to see non-existent correlations in a set of data (Fine, 2006). 
For example, a study recorded the symptoms experienced by arthritic 
patients, along with weather conditions over a 15-month period. Nearly all 
the patients reported that their pains were correlated with weather 
conditions, although the real correlation was zero (Redelmeier & Tversky, 
1996).  
 
Second, confirmation bias skews analyses towards an outcome that is 
favourable to the experimenter. The most striking case of confirmation bias 
is when two opposing experimenters find themselves at odds with the 
published findings of research they sponsor. But the Experimenter’s bias is 
not always that spectacular. Often, it will lead to overestimate the effect of 
the intervention and lift any doubt regarding its possible inefficacy. 
Experimenter’s bias has been found in very different disciplines and 
research areas, including in studies on the effects of nicotine (C. Turner & 
Spilich, 1997); antidepressants (Becker-Brüser W, 2010; Bruce Baker et al., 
2003).  
 
Confirmation biases are not limited to the search and collection of evidence. 
Even when two individuals are given the same information, the way they 
interpret it can be biased. This has been recently demonstrated in a study on 
the neural responses of 30 committed partisans during the U.S. Presidential 
election of 2004. The authors presented subjects with reasoning tasks 
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involving judgments about information threatening to their own candidate, 
the opposing candidate, or neutral control targets (Westen, Blagov, 
Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006).  
 
 
2.3.3. Mediating variables 
 
Research shows that the strength of confirmation bias depends on the issue 
being considered, but not on personal differences such as cognitive abilities.  
 
First, confirmation bias is stronger for emotionally charged issues and for 
deeply entrenched beliefs. This was exemplified in the Stanford Biased 
Interpretation Experiment in which participants with strong opinions about 
the death penalty read about mixed experimental evidence. Twenty-three 
percent of the participants reported that their views had become more 
extreme, and this self-reported shift correlated strongly with their initial 
attitudes (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). More recently, Taber and Lodge 
conducted a similar study using the emotionally charged topics of gun 
control and affirmative action. They measured the attitudes of their 
participants towards these issues before and after reading arguments on each 
side of the debate. Two groups of participants showed attitude polarization: 
those with strong prior opinions and those who were politically 
knowledgeable (Taber & Lodge, 2006).  
 
Second, individual characteristics do not seem to have an effect on the 
severity of confirmation bias as previously thought. Empirical research has 
consistently shown that confirmation bias is persistent, regardless of 
intelligence level. In two experiments involving a total of over 1400 
university students and eight different comparisons, the authors found very 
little evidence that participants of higher cognitive ability displayed less 
confirmation bias (Stanovich & West, 2007). There is moderate correlations 
between cognitive ability and the ability to avoid such biases (Gilinsky & 
Judd, 1994; Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 2004; Kokis, 
Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002). 
 
 
2.3.4. Confirmation bias in policy research 
 
The above shows that the question of the effect of institutions on policy 
research would be more effectively addressed by analysing the prevalence 
and severity of confirmation bias in policy research. This entails two 
interesting questions. The first question is normative and relates to the ideal 
of research. It could be formulated as follows: To what extent is institutional 
policy research scientifically credible? The second question is positivist and 
relates to the effect of confirmation bias: Are evaluations of interventions to 
which institutions are committed less credible?  
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Framing the problem in such a way would provide a number of benefits. 
First, confirmation bias offers a more parsimonious explanation of the effect 
of institutions on policy research than existing theories. It simply implies 
that commitments and reciprocation lead to substandard or unconventional 
research decisions. Second, confirmation bias works with a broad range of 
institutions (scientific institutions, government institutions, political 
institutions, private-sector companies, etc.) and policy areas. Third, as will 
become evident in the rest of this thesis, it allows more accurate 
explanations and predictions than the idea of ‘research utilisation’ which 
many authors have struggled to operationalise.   
 
Conveniently, the concept of confirmation bias sits comfortably with 
existing political science theories. First, confirmation bias leads to use 
research symbolically, i.e. for confirming the idea that the experimenter 
wishes to promote (Beyer & Trice, 1982; Knorr, 1977; Lavis et al., 2003; 
Pelz, 1978; Weiss, 1979). However, the concept of confirmation bias is 
more complete than that of research utilisation, since it offers an entire 
causal theory regarding the effect of political institutions on policy research. 
Second, confirmation bias can be seen as a type of agency cost. 
Governments evaluate policies on behalf of the citizenry (the principal). 
However, because the two parties have different interests and the 
government has more information (policy and research expertise), citizens 
cannot directly ensure that their agent is always acting their best interests 
(Fama, 1980). Third, confirmation bias is motivated by the desire to avoid 
blame (Hood, 2011). Were governments not sanctioned for their 
performance in office (in terms of curbing crime, unemployment, illiteracy, 
etc.), it can be argued that ‘inconvenient’ evaluation findings would not be a 
problem. Likewise, confirmation bias can be seen as the expected behaviour 
of organisations seeking to enhance their performative reputation 
(Carpenter, 2010).     
 
 
2.4. Policy commitment and confirmation bias 
  
Estimating the risk of confirmation bias can be done in different ways. The 
following section first describes what the sponsorship of a study can tell us 
about the objectivity of the researcher. It argues that the strength of the 
government’s commitment to the intervention might be a better option.  
 
 
2.4.1. Specifications for a correlational study 
 
Identifying causal mechanisms – provided they exist – is methodologically 
challenging as it requires an experimental setup. In an ideal experiment, a 
sample of researchers would be selected from the population and a fraction 
of this group – randomly selected – would be placed in political institutions. 
Conversely, the rest of the group would conduct the same research 
Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? 
 
 
 
 
Arnaud Vaganay  44 
 
independently. Because the two groups are comparable by virtue of the 
random assignment, any systematic difference in the ways both sub-groups 
make policy research decisions could be attributable to political institutions. 
No significant difference between the incentivised group and the non-
incentivised one would confirm the dominance of the professional logic, 
whereas a significant difference would disprove it. Whereas controlled 
experiments are hardly ever possible, comparable circumstances sometimes 
occur naturally. This is the case for example when very similar research 
projects are carried out by different teams, one working in conditions close 
to those provided by the treatment, the other not.   
 
The second best design implies thus to observe and record the partial effect 
of political institutions on research decisions as they appear to the 
researcher. In the absence of formal ‘treatment’ – the presence of political 
institutions cannot be contrasted with their absence – I am left with 
comparing situations where the effect of the performative logic is relatively 
stronger or weaker. Such variations have in the past provided an interesting 
setting for the study of the relations between democratic institutions and the 
enforcement of air pollution legislation in the US (Wood, 1988). 
 
 
2.4.2. Study sponsorship  
 
The first strategy consists in identifying the sponsor of the study. 
Confirmation bias estimated in this way is better known in the literature as 
‘funding bias’ or ‘sponsorship bias’, however these terms are synonymous 
(Lexchin, 2012). Empirical studies of funding bias have mainly been 
undertaken in the area of biomedical research, where drug manufacturers, 
regulators and patient groups often perform similar studies.  
 
The results of this research are rather unambiguous and consistent: research 
findings are influenced by the logic of the sponsoring organisation. In one 
study, for example, researchers looked into every trial of psychiatric drugs 
in four academic journals over a ten-year period, finding 542 trial outcomes 
in total. Industry sponsors got favourable outcomes for their own drugs 78% 
of the time, while independently-funded trials only gave a positive result in 
48% of cases. Competing drugs put up against the sponsor’s drug in a trial 
were more effective only in 28% of cases (Kelly, Cohen, Semple, & et al., 
2006). 
 
The underlying assumption is that studies funded by organisations that do 
not have a vested interest in the outcome of the trial show a lower risk of 
confirmation bias. The credibility of this assumption rests on the idea that 
regulators and patient groups have no vested interest in the drug, which is 
highly questionable. Government funding can result in bias if the aim is to 
minimise the cost of therapy that it pays for. Likewise, patient organisations 
may want what they see as the newest and best medications made available 
to their membership (Lexchin, 2012). 
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In the case of policy research, this design would involve comparing similar 
studies, some sponsored by governmental organisations, others sponsored 
by non-governmental organisations. This is possible provided two 
conditions are met. The first condition is that there are enough studies 
sponsored by non-governmental organisations to warrant statistical power. 
This is possible in medical research, which is a highly regulated market – 
and thus subjected to multiple controls and investigations (from regulators 
and patient groups). A similar design might prove difficult with social 
interventions for the opposite reason: policy evaluations are rarely 
conducted outside government. The second condition is that the studies 
funded by governmental and non-governmental organisations be reasonably 
comparable, not only in terms of the intervention, but also in terms of scope, 
design, timing, etc. This could also be challenging.  
 
 
2.4.3. Commitment to the intervention   
 
The second strategy consists in contrasting interventions to which the 
experimenter is strongly committed with interventions to which the 
experimenter is weakly committed. In political economy, the notion of 
commitment has mainly been applied in relation to central banks and 
monetary policy, where predictability and stability are key performance 
indicators (Nakazono & Ueda, 2013). A number of empirical studies exist 
regarding the effects of monetary policy commitment (Baba et al., 2005). 
The notion has been more rarely applied to the executive branch. Uses have 
been limited so far to the notion of compliance to international 
commitments (Kelley, 2007) and to issues of fiscal policy. Yet, the inability 
of governments to tolerate an open outcome and accept genuine uncertainty 
as stipulated in the idea of experimentation resonates with earlier 
observations by Campbell (1969) who had noted that governments tend to 
commit to policy politically and thus find it difficult to be seen at fault. 
 
Going back to the area of medical research, a drug manufacturer could be 
committed to a drug because it represents a radical new breakthrough in 
treatment. A drug manufacturer is also more likely to be committed to drugs 
that are expected to generate high economic returns. Thus, confirmation bias 
could be estimated by comparing the effect of drugs with different levels of 
FDA ranking of therapeutic novelty or drugs with different sales prospects 
(Dranove & Meltzer, 1994). Likewise, FDA review times were found to be 
decreasing in (a) the wealth of the richest organisation representing the 
disease treated by the drug; and (b) media coverage given to this disease. 
These results suggest that ‘political influence over drug approval operates 
primarily through ‘salience signals’ transmitted by groups and media 
(Carpenter, 2002).   
 
In the policy context, the financial cost of an intervention is certainly a 
factor, however it can be difficult to get the information in a reliable and 
consistent way. The cost can be measured in terms of political capital. 
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Reforms to which the government is strongly committed would be subject 
to a higher risk of bias than reforms to which the government is weakly 
committed.    
 
 
2.5. Independent variables 
 
The rest of this chapter is dedicated to the operationalization of the research 
question. I will start with the independent variable, namely the 
government’s commitment to a given reform. Government is largely a black 
box, which means that the strength of policy commitments can only be 
estimated. The following section offers three possible strategies.  
 
 
2.5.1. Pilots and phased introductions    
 
The first strategy consists in comparing the decisions made in two different 
research contexts. The first context is that of a policy pilot, i.e. an 
intervention trialled for a limited period on a fraction of the territory on 
which it is meant to be rolled out. In principle, the probability that a pilot 
will be rolled out nationally is unknown at the time of its launch and 
contingent on the results of the evaluation. The second context is that of the 
phased introduction of a reform, i.e. a reform for which the probability to be 
fully implemented is known (and close to 1), but for which setup is similar 
to that of a pilot. Like pilots, phased introductions – which are known in the 
UK as pathfinder pilots – are evaluated on a small scale and over a limited 
period. They can be evaluated using the exact same designs and 
methodology. The only difference is in the government’s intention and this 
intention is usually clearly stated.  
 
The extent to which formal pilots and pathfinder pilots are strictly 
comparable has been debated. Some have mentioned that the term ‘pilot’ 
encompassed vastly different projects (Ettelt & Mays, 2013; Jowell, 2003). 
According to Ettelt and Mays, pilots can be used for experimentation, for 
early implementation, for demonstration and for learning how to 
operationalise a policy (Ettelt & Mays, 2013). I would argue that these 
categories are difficult to apply and not mutually exclusive. Indeed, many of 
the pilots launched by the Labour government tested new ways of delivering 
social services. It was assumed that the effectiveness of social policy was 
hampered by inefficient agencies and organisations. In other words, these 
were public service reforms as much as they were social policy reforms. 
Furthermore, these categories indistinctly apply to both formal and 
pathfinder pilots and can be controlled for.     
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2.5.2. Manifesto pledges  
 
Comparing pilots and phased introductions is a compelling way of 
estimating policy commitment; however it is not the most frequent type of 
policy-making. Another, more widely applicable, way of assessing a 
government’s commitment to a specific reform is to check whether it was 
announced in the ruling party’s manifesto for the previous election (Rose, 
1980). Manifestos may not be something voters care about, however the 
media have specialised in this activity. The multiplication of ‘pledge 
trackers’ (such as The Guardian’s) shows how crucial it is for a party to 
implement its pledges once in government. Against this background, it is 
unlikely that an office-seeking government will commit large resources to 
pilot a measure that contributed to its electoral success. 
 
Previous research on electoral pledges finds that politicians fulfil most of 
their electoral promises when they are in power. Pomper and Lederman 
(1980) find that from 1944–1976, 79% of the pledges proposed by the 
winning party in the US were fulfilled. Rallings (1987) concludes that 64 of 
the British pledges from 1945 to 1979 were implemented. Royed (1996) 
studied British and US electoral pledges during the 1980s. She finds that the 
British Conservative party implemented more than 80% of its electoral 
pledges while in government. She also studied British parties in opposition 
and finds that they obtain much lower fulfilment rates. Only 15% and 32% 
of the pledges proposed by the Labour party in Britain in 1979 and 1983, 
respectively, were fulfilled. Royed (1996) also studied the US case during 
the 1980 and 1984 electoral cycles and found that even though the 
Democrats had a majority of seats in at least one of the houses during these 
years, the Reagan administration was able to act upon 60% of its electoral 
pledges. See also Artes (2013) and Chaney (2013). 
 
In looking at the effect that parties have on policy, manifestos offer a good 
prediction of what parties will do when in office. This claim is supported by 
Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge (1994), who find that government party 
programmes are remarkably well reflected in post-election priorities, 
measured as percentages of central government spending in major areas, 
that is to say that their expenditure reflects the differential issue saliency 
written into their party manifestos. Based on data from 1970-1979, Rose 
found that contrary to popular belief governments implemented a large 
proportion of their manifesto pledges, noting that Labour governments 
‘acted upon’ 55% of their manifesto pledges whilst Conservative 
governments ‘acted upon’ 80% of theirs. 
 
 
2.5.3. Seniority of the ‘reform champion’   
 
The problem with manifesto pledges is that they are better suited for studies 
comparing a large number of heterogeneous policies.    
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An alternative consists in identifying the ‘champion’ of the reform. Policy 
reforms are often introduced by a member of the government; and the 
seniority of the endorser can be taken as an indication of the salience of the 
reform. The announcement of a reform can be seen as a delegation issue, 
whereby each principal, from the Prime minister to the mid-level bureaucrat 
can decide whether to be the ‘manager’, taking direct responsibility for the 
outcome, or the ‘chair of the board’ overlooking operations (Hood, 2011). 
Given politicians’ propensity to avoid blame even when that implies not 
getting credit (Hood, 2011; Weaver, 1986), a reform announced by the 
Prime minister can be considered more salient than a reform announced by a 
senior minister. Likewise, a reform announced by a senior minister is 
considered more salient than a reform introduced by a junior minister. It 
follows from this that the reforms for which no public announcement is 
made (which might occur when the reform can be implemented through 
secondary legislation or statutes) are the least salient.    
 
Using the champion of the reform as independent variable has an additional 
benefit: it allows more contrast and thus greater measurement validity than 
dichotomous variables on phased introductions and manifesto pledges. 
Indeed, there is no reason to believe that such a commitment be so clear-cut.   
Ordinal variables measuring government policy preferences have been used 
in studies analysing governments’ responsiveness to public opinion (Hobolt 
& Klemmemsen, 2005).  
 
 
2.6. Dependent variables  
 
The following section is concerned with the research decisions that are most 
likely to reflect confirmation bias. According to Sackett (1979), 
confirmation bias can occur in any one of seven stages of the research cycle, 
from the formulation of the research question to the reporting of findings. 
Three of these stages are reviewed below as they offer an interesting 
window for the study of confirmation bias.     
 
 
2.6.1. Research duration 
 
The first such window is the duration of the research project. Time is a 
precious resource for both the researcher and the policymaker, but for 
opposite reasons.  
 
On the one hand, researchers committed to scientific norms will often push 
for longer research projects. First, repeated measurements are recommended 
to reduce the statistical phenomenon of regression to the mean which 
happens when unusually large or small measurements are followed by 
measurements that are closer to the mean (Barnett, Van der Pols, & Dobson, 
2005; Stiegler, 1997). Second, the psychological literature shows that 
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individuals display different behaviours to novel and usual signals, for 
example in an experimental context (Gillespie, 1991). Thus an individual’s 
response to a new policy is likely to be different as he gets used to it. Third, 
setting up a research project often takes time; especially when it involves 
the training of the policy implementers. Researchers eager to generate high-
quality evidence are thus more likely to report on the long-term effect of the 
treatment.  
 
On the other hand, a commitment to the intervention will lead to speedier 
research. Waiting is politically costly. People suffering from unemployment 
or crime want a solution to their problems, and incentivised policy-makers 
want to deliver it as early as possible. There is ample evidence that 
politicians and business leaders are hard-pressed to deliver before the next 
election or generate a rapid return on investment. Research within the 
finance and accounting literatures finds that managers do sacrifice (at least 
some) long-term investments in response to pressure from the capital 
markets (Graham et al's (2005)). Similarly Bartov (1993), Bushee (1998), 
Dechow & Sloan (1991), and Penman & Zjang (2002), all report evidence 
consistent with the idea that managers sell assets, cut R&D or reduce 
earnings to meet earnings targets. More recently Benner (2007, 2010) has 
suggested that firms going through significant technological transitions face 
particularly intense pressure, causing them to reduce capital investment and 
investment in R&D (Repenning & Henderson, 2010). 
 
In light of the above, I argue that, other things being equal, shorter research 
projects denote confirmation bias. The literature on industry-sponsored 
clinical trials provides evidence to support this claim (Carpenter, 2002; 
Dranove & Meltzer, 1994; Olson, 1997). A 2010 review compared around a 
hundred truncated clinical trials and four hundred matched trials that ran 
their natural course to the end: the truncated trials reported much bigger 
benefits, overstating the usefulness of the treatments they were testing by 
about a quarter (Bassler, Briel, Montori, & et al., 2010) (Montori, 
Devereaux, Adhikari, & et al., 2005), (Trotta, Apolone, Garattini S, & 
Tafuri, 2008). Evidence from the policy area is thinner but highlights a 
similar phenomenon. Anecdotes and interviews have concurred to stress that 
the greatest source of incompatibility between research and policy rested on 
the conflict between their respective cycles (Boa, Johnson, & King, 2010; 
Coleman, 1979; Hallsworth, Parker, & Rutter, 2011; Jowell, 2003). 
 
 
2.6.2. Sampling decisions 
 
Another important decision likely to be affected by confirmation bias is the 
sampling of the units who will be part of the study.  
 
From a scientific viewpoint, this decision is dominated by the need to have a 
sample that is as representative of the population at large as possible. A 
study which conclusions hold over variations in persons, settings, treatments 
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and outcomes is said to have external validity. The method most often 
recommended for achieving this close fit is the use of formal probability 
sampling (Rossi, Wright, & Anderson, 1983; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 
2002). Regardless of the method used, sampling is usually seen as a difficult 
decision to make, with uncertain results. Using the examples of the 
Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Project and the California Class-Size 
Reduction Program which both failed in replicating effective interventions 
evaluated with RCTs, (Cartwright & Hardie, 2012) have argued that 
experiments could not alone support the expectation that a policy will work 
outside the testbed, given the importance of logistical and contextual factors 
in the success of a social policy. Whether or not a ‘sufficient’ level of 
external validity can be achieved, it is safe to say that researchers committed 
to the scientific logic will choose their samples in a way that guarantees 
generalizability.  
 
A sample put together with a view to favour the intervention is expected to 
be exemplary rather than random, heterogeneous or typical. The first reason 
has to do with the fact that research in a political or market context is 
skewed towards application. Thus, when the research is carried out ex post, 
it can be tempting for the principal to focus the evaluation on the individuals 
or groups who seem to have better responded to the intervention. When the 
research is carried out ex ante, the principal may also have an interest in 
testing the intervention on atypical individuals or groups, for example with a 
view to increase the probability of generating flattering results. The other 
reason is basic risk aversion. Research has shown that politicians are 
motivated primarily by the desire to avoid blame rather than by seeking to 
claim credit for their decisions (Weaver, 1986). 
 
Against this background, I claim that, other things being equal, the 
representativeness of research samples can be seen as a test for the relation 
between the researcher and the policy-maker. Here again, the literature on 
clinical trials suggests that this claim is not unfounded. There is a fairly 
large – and growing – number of studies pointing to the flimsiness of 
medical trials’ external validity (Keitner et al., 2003; Pratt & Moyé, 1995; 
Rothwell, 2005; van Staa, Leufkens, Zhang B, & et al., 2009; Zimmerman, 
Chelminski, & Posternak, 2004). For example, one such study took 179 
representative asthma patients from the general population and looked at 
how many would have been eligible to participate in a selection of asthma 
treatment trials (Travers, Marsh, Williams, & et al., 2007). The answer was 
6% on average. Flimsy external validity means that a trial is irrelevant to 
real-world populations.  
 
 
2.6.3. Outcome reporting 
 
The third decision that is most likely to reflect confirmation bias is the 
reporting of evaluation outcomes.  
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A researcher committed to scientific norms is expected to report findings in 
full, according to pre-specified research questions, theories and variables. 
Specifying the method from the outset of the research process means that 
outcomes cannot be manipulated, for example, in order to present positive 
outcomes. Therefore, provided they apply similar methods, different 
researchers are likely to report the same results, whether these results are 
positive, negative or null. The recent years have witnessed the 
multiplication of initiatives meant to standardise reporting such as 
CONSORT or COMET.  
 
Conversely, a researcher committed to the intervention is expected to report 
outcomes selectively. Research findings are anything but neutral. In highly 
regulated industries such as pharmaceutics, an inconclusive trial means that 
a new drug will not be approved by the regulator. The medical literature 
highlights a number of recurrent strategies to present these findings in 
accordance with the interest of the principal. One of them consists in 
measuring uninformative surrogate outcomes (such as blood pressure or 
cholesterol rather than the prevalence of specific events such as heart attack 
or death) or in changing the outcome once the trial is finished (Chan, 
Hróbjartsson, Haahr, & et al., 2004; Jureidini, McHenry, & Mansfield, 
2008; Vedula, Bero, & Scherer, 2009). Another strategy consists in 
bundling outcomes in a way that changes the presentation of results from 
negative to positive or from insignificant to significant, for example through 
the use of composite health indicators (Montori, Jaeschke, Schünemann, & 
et al., 2004; Shaughnessy, 2003). A third strategy implies ignoring the drop-
outs that inevitably occur during a trial, which can result in dramatically 
overstating the benefit of a treatment (Melander, Ahlqvist-Rastad, Meijer, & 
et al., 2003).  
 
As with the two previous outcomes discussed in this chapter, evidence of 
the effect of the performative logic on the reporting of outcomes is scarce. 
Although there is no evidence that a stronger performative logic is 
positively correlated with a more selective reporting of outcomes, the 
literature suggests that it will create pressure on evaluators. A recent web 
survey of some 200 academics having done policy research for the British 
government since 2005 indicates that government officials were more likely 
to propose changes affecting the interpretation of findings or their weight 
than not. However, it is less clear from the survey whether the requested 
changes did help produce supportive reports (The LSE GV314 Group, 
2014). Beyond this survey, the evidence base consists mostly of some 
anecdotes, such as Metcalf’s report of the pressure exerted by the US 
Department of Agriculture during the evaluation of the National School 
Lunch Program (Metcalf, 2008).  
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2.7. Relevance of the analogy between medical 
research and policy evaluation  
 
Throughout this chapter, I have shown that the literature on the influence of 
industry sponsorship on the scientific credibility of clinical trials could serve 
as a useful guide for the study of policy evaluations. Indeed, this literature 
has very effectively analysed the conundrum which researchers face when 
they become agents. Many more references to the medical literature will be 
made in the remainder of this thesis. However, the comparison has also 
important limitations, which need to be fully understood before we move on 
to the empirical part of this work. The following section briefly discusses 
the similarities and differences between medical research and social policy 
research.    
 
The main similarity between clinical trials and social policy evaluation is 
that they are both a type of applied research. In other words, neither is 
conducted with the primary purpose of advancing knowledge. Rather, they 
are meant to inform important decisions about the development of a product 
or policy, which the organisation is already committed to launch (to varying 
degrees). This change makes the conduct of research somehow more 
complex. Each decision not only needs to satisfy the norms of science, it 
also needs to support the aims of the organisation. Thus, both clinicians and 
policy researchers have to find the right balance between professionalism 
and loyalty to their employer – or reciprocation of ‘favours’ in the case of 
contract research (Hood & Lodge 2006).  
 
However, there are also important differences between these two types of 
research. The first difference is in their purpose. Clinical research is 
essentially confirmatory, i.e. it quantifies the extent to which deviations 
from a model could be expected to occur by chance (Gelman 2004). This is 
due to the fact that (i) health-related variables are easily quantifiable and (ii) 
medical treatments entail a risk. Medical treatments can not only fail to cure 
life-threatening diseases, they can also create other diseases and even kill. 
This is why new drugs have to undergo a series of four consecutive clinical 
trials
4
, all using randomised controlled trials (RCTs). It is commonly 
admitted in the medical community that RCTs are the most robust way of 
evaluating the efficacy of a new treatment.  
 
Conversely, social policy research is essentially exploratory, i.e. meant to 
isolate patterns and features of the data (Hoaglin, Mosteller & Tukey 1983). 
There is no restriction regarding the type of research that can be used to 
evaluate the effect of a social intervention. Impact evaluations can be 
conducted using any kind of design (experimental, quasi-experimental or 
                                                        
4
 Phase 1: Screening for safety; Phase 2: testing the efficacy of the drug, usually against a 
placebo; Phase 3: confirmatory study; Phase 4: post-marketing studies delineating 
additional information on the drug’s benefits, risks and optimal uses.  
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non-experimental) and any kind of data. Indeed, the idea of a ‘gold 
standard’ in social policy evaluation is a highly contested one (Hollister 
2008, 2009; Nathan 2008a, 2008b, 2009). Thus, social policy reforms are 
frequently rolled out based on evidence that the intervention was properly 
implemented, or that beneficiaries were satisfied with the intervention. This 
‘flexible’ approach to research means that there is little consistency across 
studies in terms of research questions, data and design. Furthermore, the 
absence of research protocols means that the risk of spin is high (see chapter 
7 for an empirical study of spin in policy evaluation).  
 
The second difference is that in medical research, evidence of the cost-
effectiveness of a drug has an instrumental use: it is the single most 
important piece of information that will be considered by regulators in their 
decision to authorise the drug. When such information is clear and 
unambiguous, the approval process can be relatively straightforward 
(Lavertu & Weimer, 2010). In contrast, policy evaluation results have a 
more conceptual use: governments are free to use results as they see fit and 
are by no means bound to the conclusions and recommendations of 
evaluators. Other, non-scientific considerations play an equally, and perhaps 
greater, role in shaping social policy. Those include ethics, morality, 
legality, policy commitments and political support. For all these matters, the 
‘expert’ is the elected politician, not the scientist. Unlike medicines and 
healthcare products regulators, social policy-makers can legitimately discard 
evaluation results that are found unacceptable or undesirable. Importantly, 
such a decision implies that an evaluation was conducted in the first place. 
This is a strong assumption given that no government in the world is subject 
to a formal obligation to evaluate social interventions.    
 
Financial stakes are a third, major difference. The development process 
from patent filing to product launch has been estimated to take an average of 
12 years at a total cost of some £200 million (BMJ 1996). In contrast, the 
costs related to the development of social interventions seem to be much 
lower. For example, a 2008 Report from the NAO found that, between 2002 
and 2006, the DWP had spent about £40 million on initiatives targeted 
specifically at ethnic minority employment. These included the Ethnic 
Minority Outreach pilot (£31 million spent between April 2002 and 
September 2006), the Ethnic Minority Flexible Fund (£6.8 million spent 
between April 2004 and March 2006) and the Specialist Employment 
Advisers pilot (£1.5 million spent in 2004-2006). Other initiatives were 
trialled for a fraction of these costs (for example, the Mental Health Court 
pilot and the Virtual Court Pilots were both implemented by the Ministry of 
Justice for an average cost of £400,000). 
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2.8. Conclusion  
 
This chapter was set out to propose a theoretical framework for the study of 
the influence of political institutions on policy research decisions.  
 
The first objective of this chapter was to identify the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the existing literature, as well as possible research gaps. The 
review has shown that, collectively, we know a lot about the influence of 
institutions on policy research. However, this knowledge is fragmented 
across disciplines and supported by an excessive number of concepts and 
theories. This chapter was unable to review the literature in a systematic 
way but identified the most significant contributions in research methods, 
sociology, public policy and public administration. It recommended 
carrying out more research to identify the key decision-makers and to 
formulate a more parsimonious theory that would be applicable to a broad 
range of countries and policy areas.   
 
The second objective of this chapter was to lay the foundations an empirical 
strategy for future research in this area. The notion of confirmation bias, 
used in research methods and social psychology to qualify the tendency of 
individuals to favour information that supports prior beliefs and hypotheses, 
emerged as the most desirable option. There is an abundant literature 
looking at confirmation bias at the individual level and at the organisational 
level, particularly in medical research. Thus, the question of the effect of 
political institutions on policy research would be most effectively addressed 
by questioning the prevalence of confirmation bias in government-funded 
research. This entails a two-step approach. First, the scientific credibility of 
the research decisions made by the relevant government(s) must be 
systematically investigated, based on a number of common research 
prescriptions. Second, the effect if policy commitments on the scientific 
credibility of these research decisions must be assessed.   
 
There are many questions that remained unanswered. I will mention three. 
First, to the extent that political institutions do influence research, this 
influence must be context-specific. So we need to understand the contexts in 
which the effect of political institutions is relatively stronger/weaker. 
Second, we need to know what happens at the individual level. In particular, 
we need to understand who the actors are and the type of incentives they are 
subject to. I have shown that the public policy and the public administration 
literatures disagree on that point; however this could also be due to the fact 
that they tend to investigate separate policy areas. More detailed accounts in 
this area would help researchers make credible assumptions regarding 
decision-making processes. These two questions will be addressed in 
chapter 3. Thirdly, we need to identify the type of research design and data 
needed to answer the question of the effect. This question will be addressed 
in chapter 4.   
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3. Institutional context 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the effect of political institutions on 
policy evaluation could best be analysed using the ‘confirmation bias’ 
theory. According to this theory, the scientific credibility of an evaluation is 
negatively associated with the strength of the government’s commitment to 
the intervention being evaluated.  
 
Importantly, these phenomena do not take place in a vacuum. Considering 
that different contexts are likely to strengthen or weaken any association 
between policy commitments and research decisions, the scoping of the data 
matters to a large extent. A deep understanding of the singularity of the 
selected case is essential to assess the credibility and the strength of these 
associations and to make correct inferences about other places and times.  
 
This chapter serves three purposes. First, it describes the case selection 
process, with a special emphasis on how constraints and opportunities were 
handled. Second, it ‘sets the scene’ by presenting the different ministries, 
actors and processes which constitute the context of my empirical work. 
Third, it discusses the substantive implications of the case and defines a 
number of expectations. The focus on the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) in some parts of the document is for convenience only, as 
it is the government department on which we had the most evidence.  
 
The evidence in this chapter comes from two main sources. First, I reviewed 
the administrative and scientific literature to gather a maximum of 
background information on the organisation and the management of British 
ministerial departments in general and on research decision-making 
processes in particular. In addition to this review, I interviewed 15 policy 
researchers between October 2011 and February 2012 (See Annex II). Two 
types of interviews were conducted, all using semi-structured 
questionnaires. The first five interviews were meant to clarify the research 
process at the DWP and the role of the different actors. Each of the ten other 
interviews focused on one pilot in particular and addressed the effect of 
policy commitments and political salience. Pilots were chosen with a view 
of having some diversity in terms of sizes, levels of complexity and political 
salience. Interviewees were asked to comment primarily on that case. What 
follows is a thematic analysis of the evidence collected from the 
documentary review and interviews. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 describes and 
justifies the case selection process, highlighting the numerous trade-offs 
between scientific rigour and efficiency. Section 3.2 provides a ‘negative’ 
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description of the case itself, contrasting the observed units of analysis with 
the unobserved ones (in different countries, at different times), notably to 
inform the upcoming discussion on external validity. Section 3.3 ‘sets the 
scene’: it presents the organisations where research decisions are made, the 
actors involved in these decisions as well as the decision-making process. 
Section 3.4 sheds light on various incentives explaining why one might 
expect an influence of policy commitments on research decisions.  
   
 
3.2. Case selection 
 
The case selection was constrained by two factors, namely the nature of the 
dependent variables and the availability of data. 
 
The first constraint was imposed by the dependent variables identified in 
chapter 2. The need for a proper sequencing between the research phase and 
the policy decision, for clear sampling mechanisms and for outcome 
measures unambiguously implied a focus on experimental or quasi-
experimental policy-making (‘piloting’). This is an important restriction, 
given the small amount of policy interventions evaluated in this way across 
the world. There is unfortunately no systematic data on the number and 
location of these research projects
5
. A quick scan of this data shows that 
experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations are concentrated in two 
types of countries: a few high-income countries (US, UK, Canada, France, 
Netherlands, Denmark to varying degrees) and some low-income countries, 
where experimental methods have been used to evaluate development aid 
programmes. The latter countries, however, do not offer a suitable context 
to answer my research question. Most of the interventions that have been 
experimented on there were not sponsored by the local government and thus 
were not necessarily linked to any sort of policy commitment. Rather, they 
were commissioned by donors or lenders such as the World Bank or grant-
making foundations such the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Therefore, 
the choice was limited to the above-mentioned high-income countries, 
which have the additional benefit of enjoying stable institutions and more 
‘traceable’ bureaucratic procedures.   
 
The second most pressing constraint was the availability of data. Two 
criteria had to be borne in mind during the scoping of the study. The first 
criterion was the quantity of the relevant research projects. It quickly 
appeared that the US and the UK were the only two countries that could 
provide the data I needed. Unlike in other countries, experimental and 
                                                        
5
 Some databases of experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations are available online. 
See for example: 
– The J-PAL databse: http://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluations 
– The American Economic Association’s registry for randomised controlled trials: 
https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/ 
– 3ie’s Registry for International Development Impact Evaluations: 
http://ridie.3ieimpact.org/ 
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quasi-experimental policy-making have been used extensively and almost 
routinely in those two countries in recent history. The second criterion was 
the need for to keep the level of institutional complexity to a minimum. 
Using a country with a centralised system as opposed to a federal one made 
the data collection much easier as the concentration of powers considerably 
restricted the number of potential evaluation commissioners. The UK thus 
appeared to be the best choice. I must also acknowledge that, being a UK 
resident, I knew that I would have an easier access to information and a 
better understanding of the phenomena described in this than in any other 
country. This personal consideration certainly influenced the case selection.  
   
The decision regarding the timeframe was equally pragmatic, i.e. with a 
view to provide enough data without introducing too much heterogeneity in 
terms of policies and governments. In the end, I focused on research 
projects commissioned between May 1997 and May 2010. This period 
corresponds to the Labour governments led by Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown. Finally, and with a view to maximise the number of observations, I 
included the four government departments offering the largest number of 
observations, namely the Department for Work and Pensions (and its 
predecessors, Department of Social Security and Employment Service), the 
Department for Education (and its predecessor the Department for Children, 
Schools and Families); the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice (and its 
predecessor (the Department for Constitutional Affairs). 
 
Further specifications will be added in chapter 4, which deals with data and 
methods. At this stage, it is sufficient for the reader to know that this thesis 
investigates the effect of policy commitments on the research decisions 
made by four British ministerial departments (Department for Work and 
Pensions, Department for Education; Home Office and Ministry of Justice) 
between May 1997 and May 2010.   
 
 
3.3. Generalisability  
 
Selecting a specific case out of convenience as opposed to randomly 
sampling it from a whole population has a number of implications for this 
thesis. The first of these implications concerns the generalisability of the 
conclusions to other situations. Understanding the situations which the case 
better represents is instrumental to making meaningful inferences. The 
following section shows that the chosen case is more representative of (1) 
countries with a strong evaluation culture than countries with a weak 
evaluation culture; (2) post-Labour Britain than pre-Labour Britain; and (3) 
research in ministerial departments than research in non-ministerial 
departments.   
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3.3.1. Evaluation outside the UK  
 
Using the UK as location calls to reflect on its specificities in terms of 
evaluation culture and capacity.  
 
The operationalisation of these concepts is not without difficulty. Attempts 
to rank countries based on their evaluation capacity have been made in the 
past. For example, the authors of the International Atlas of Evaluation, 
scored 21 high-income countries based on a set of nine institutional criteria 
including the supply of domestic evaluators, institutional arrangements in 
government for conducting evaluation, and pluralism of institutions and 
actors conducting evaluation (Furubo, Rist, & Sandahl, 2002). Out of these 
21 countries, the United States came first and the UK fifth, equally placed 
with the Netherlands. According to the authors, countries with a high score, 
such as the UK, have both internal and external incentives to evaluate their 
policies. This said, by the authors’ own admission, the instrument is not 
highly scientific and thus one should refrain from trying to over-interpret 
these findings. More importantly, the above ranking does not say anything 
about the scientific rigour of the evaluations conducted in these countries.  
  
Another way of analysing the position of the UK in terms of evaluation 
culture is to identify a surrogate indicator that would be both objective and 
comparable across countries, such as the presence of a high-level 
commitment to publish all evaluation findings regardless of the results. 
Publication is a central feature of the scientific approach; indeed it is a pre-
condition to the falsification of results. In the UK, such commitment can be 
found on three levels. Firstly, the right to access information held by public 
authorities has been granted to British citizens in 2000 with the Freedom of 
Information Act. Although information relating to the “formation of 
government policy” is exempted from the Act, evaluation results are usually 
not considered as such. Secondly, self-regulation requires that online 
publication of evaluation studies be considered the default option across 
government departments (Government Social Research Unit, 2010b). 
Thirdly, the Labour Party, which had the majority in the UK Parliament 
between May 1997 and May 2010, expressed its commitment to 
transparency and access to information on several occasions when it was in 
government (Cabinet Office, 1997). This commitment explains why a vast 
majority of research outputs is published in the UK.  
 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to collect data in a way that would allow 
for systematic cross-national comparisons. However, selected comparisons 
would indicate that the UK is one of a few countries where the government 
is committed to the publication of its evaluations. In the US, this decision is 
left to the discretion of each department. For example, the website of the US 
Department of Labour indicates that the Department will release results “of 
all evaluations that are not specifically focused on internal management, 
legal, or enforcement procedures or that are not otherwise prohibited from 
disclosure. Evaluation reports will present all results, including favorable, 
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unfavorable, and null findings
6”. In France, the Department of Labour 
publishes every year an activity report presenting all studies commissioned 
by the Department. However, in-house research project are not mentioned 
and the reports are not available online.  
 
Against this background, I would expect the case to be more representative 
of high-income countries with strong evaluation capacity (such as the US, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, Sweden, etc.) than of other 
countries.   
 
 
3.3.2. Evaluation before and after New Labour 
 
The second important characteristic of the case at hand pertains to the 
chosen timeframe, which is that of the Labour government (May 1997 – 
May 2010). Such a timeframe allows comparisons with this government’s 
predecessor and successor.   
 
The governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown have often been 
presented as a ‘golden age’ of policy evaluation (Furubo et al., 2002). Their 
strategy was set out in the 1999 White Paper ‘Modernising Government’, 
which offered a strong commitment to more evaluation, the modernisation 
of evaluation standards and tools, and an enhancement of the evaluative 
capacity of government (Cabinet Office, 1999a). One should not conclude 
too hastily that evaluation under New Labour was transformed ‘from famine 
to feast’; indeed the reality was often less rosy than policy documents 
painted it (see Maguire (2004) for a case study). However, the New Labour 
era was marked by more evaluative activity directly commissioned by and 
for government. Whether this was the outcome of the substantial growth in 
public spending (between 1999 and 2007), or an attempted to fill an 
ideological gap within New Labour (as suggested by Furubo et al.) is open 
to discussion. 
 
Labour contrasts sharply with the previous Conservative government (May 
1979 to May 1997). Furubo and colleagues report that under Thatcher and 
Major, UK evaluation was essentially fragmentary and linked closely to 
resource management. There was little by way of either an established 
community devoted to policy evaluation or formalised procedures for 
initiating, conducting and utilising evaluations in the policy process. 
Evaluation was seen as marginal to departmental interests and overlooked 
by ministers other than as a tool for expenditure reduction. The idea that it 
might inform policy effectiveness was limited to a few enthusiasts (Furubo 
et al., 2002). 
 
Whereas the victory of New Labour in the 1997 election marked a radical 
change in the UK government’s approach to policy evaluation, the contrast 
                                                        
6
 http://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/EvaluationPolicy.htm 
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with the post-Labour era is much less obvious. It is still early to assess the 
Coalition’s commitment to evidence-based policy and rigorous evaluation. 
The decisions made so far by the new government have sent mixed 
messages. On the one hand, many stakeholders have criticized the £3 
million cut in spending on evaluation between 2010 and 2013 (National 
Audit Office, 2013). Furthermore, the NAO established in its report that 
there was a lack of evaluation in progress or planned for the major projects 
identified by each department in their business plans. On the other hand, 
there have been some positive developments as well (Rutter, 2012). Those 
include the setup of a ‘What Works’ network  - which makes the UK one of 
the first countries to allocate resources to evidence synthesis on such a scale 
– as well as the creation of the Cabinet Office’s behavioural insights team 
with the aim of promoting randomised controlled trials and cost-benefit 
analyses in policy-making.   
 
In light of the above, I would expect the case to be more representative of 
the Labour and post-Labour era than of the pre-Labour era.    
 
 
3.3.3. Evaluation outside ministerial departments 
 
The third characteristic of the case at hand pertains to the fact that it focuses 
on ministerial departments and deliberately leaves aside non-ministerial 
departments, also known in the UK as non-departmental public bodies 
(NDPBs).  
 
This distinction is important. Ministerial departments such as those included 
in my case are led politically by a government minister, normally a member 
of the Cabinet and cover matters that require direct political oversight, such 
as the formulation of new policies and their implementation. They also 
increasingly evaluate public policies and programmes. In contrast, NDPBs 
generally cover matters for which direct political oversight is judged 
unnecessary or inappropriate. A typical NDPB is established under statute 
and is accountable to Parliament rather than to the government. Research 
Councils are an example of NDPB in the UK. Those include inter alia the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), the Medical Research 
Council (MRC) and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). It 
can be argued that ministerial departments are essentially concerned with 
their performative reputation, whereas research councils will promote their 
technical-scientific reputation (Carpenter 2010).  
 
These crucial differences justify different public service bargains (PSBs) 
between the government and the personnel of these organisations (Hood & 
Lodge, 2006). Researchers working in ministerial departments are likely to 
be agents and, as such, to follow the instructions given by the principal. The 
principal is in turn held to be responsible for the actions of the agent. 
Conversely, researchers working in non-ministerial departments are likely 
to be in a relation of trusteeship with the government. Trustees are subject 
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to fewer controls. Under a PSB of the trustee type, the tenure and rewards of 
public servants are not under the direct control of those for whom they act; 
the skills and competencies they are expected to show are not determined by 
the instrumental interests of elected politicians and loyalty lies to an entity 
that is broader than the government of the day (Hood & Lodge, 2006). 
 
The distinction between trustees and agents is helpful to understand the 
different degrees of autonomy that staffs working in ministerial departments 
and NDPBs can enjoy; however one should not see these two concepts as 
mutually exclusive. Aspects of trusteeship may apply to Whitehall civil 
servants, even though the PSB they operate under is often described by 
scholars and officials as if it were purely of an agency type of responding to 
or anticipating ministers’ decisions (Hood & Lodge, 2006).  
 
Against this background, I would expect the case to be more representative 
of research carried out in ministerial departments than in NDPBs.  
 
 
3.4. Research decision-makers in UK 
ministerial departments 
 
Understanding what shapes policy research decisions first requires 
identifying the decision-makers. The following section shows that, contrary 
to popular wisdom and some previous accounts (notably the public policy 
literature, see section 2.2.3), policy research decisions are not made by 
elected or senior policy-makers. Evaluation is the responsibility of middle 
managers (Wilson, 1989) or “first floor bureaucrats” (Page & Jenkins, 
2005). Among them, two types of officials have an extensive responsibility 
on research decisions: the ‘analyst’ and the ‘policy-maker’.  
 
The following section is supported by Exhibit 8 (courtesy of Boa et al., 
2010), which describes the annual research cycle at the DWP’s Work 
Welfare and Employment Group (WWEG). It shows that although analysts 
are present at all steps, the process is actually dominated by individuals 
having a vested interest in the success of the reform. 
 
 
3.4.1. Ministers  
 
Whilst the idea that ministers can use their position to influence research 
decisions cannot be ruled out given the high levels of political legitimacy 
and political acumen that most of them have, it comes with too many 
assumptions to be really credible.  
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Exhibit 8 – Programming research at the DWP 
 
Time Action Who’s involved  
September to 
October 
Discussions with policy colleagues  
about research priorities 
Analysts and policy 
makers – occasionally  
external stakeholders 
November Presentation to EASG of short research 
priorities papers. EASG identify synergies 
and take an initial view on the prioritisation of 
research priorities for WWEG next year. 
Analysts 
November to 
December 
Detailed Project Initiation Documents  
(PIDs) are drafted for all proposed projects. 
These are peer reviewed by other WWEG 
analysts. 
Analysts and policy 
colleagues 
December Shortened PIDs are prepared for projects 
previously approved for current year but not 
yet started. 
Analysts 
January Detailed PIDs are considered by EASG. 
EASG focus on expensive projects or those 
with reservations expressed at peer review. 
Previously approved projects are reconsidered 
at same time rather than being automatically 
approved. 
Representatives from 
policy and finance, 
along with analysts. 
 
February Submission to ministers outlining the 
proposed programme – including major 
evaluations funded from programme budgets. 
Ministers 
After April Research projects are given funding approval.  
 
Source: DWP; Boa, Johnson and King (2010).  
 
 
Firstly, the assumption that ministers have a direct interest in research 
decisions is a far-fetched one. The wide range of roles that ministers have to 
perform is rarely understood outside Whitehall. The diverse constitutional 
and political constraints they are subject to means that they are dependent 
for their standing on the need to satisfy a wide range of people and groups, 
and, above all, the prime minister (Riddell, Gruhn, & Carolan, 2011). 
Comparisons, often erroneous, are made with the heads of private sector 
organisations. In fact, as noted by Rhodes in its observation, the diversity of 
issues and audiences that ministers face means that there is no obvious 
reason to prioritize economic rationality over political rationality, rather the 
converse (Rhodes, 2013). So, much government is not about strategy and 
priorities but the appearance of rule: “Keeping things going, preventing 
anarchy, stopping society falling to bits. Still being here tomorrow” (Lynn 
& Jay, 1984). 
 
Secondly, the assumption that ministers know how to make a research 
decision bears little credibility. Some have underlined how ill-suited and 
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under-prepared most ministers are for their posts (Riddell et al., 2011). Most 
come to the role without adequate training and experience, often with little 
expertise in the subject matter of their department, knowing that the insights 
required performing the job effectively may only be gained through 
experience. It is hard to think of another profession or career where an 
individual could rise to the very top, and assume a position of heavy 
responsibility, having had no previous acquaintance with that line of work.  
 
Even assuming that some ministers had an interest in policy research 
decisions, it is unlikely that they would have a ‘political base’ within their 
department to pull strings. The high ministerial turnover in the UK – as 
shown in Exhibit 9 – has often been pointed as impeding the effectiveness 
of ministers (Riddell et al., 2011). The unusual nature of the rapid turnover 
in some posts in the UK is vividly illustrated by a comparison with 
Germany. Riddell et al. showed that, since 1949, Germany (including the 
former West Germany) has had just 15 ministers for the economy 
(excluding finance), while the UK has had 35 ministers in the equivalent 
position (in the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills and its 
predecessors). 
 
Descriptions of the research process in ministerial departments have 
mentioned that ministers usually step in quite late to formally approve the 
evaluation programme and authorise funding (Boa et al., 2010). This 
suggests that, to the extent that ministers influence research decisions 
directly, it is more as veto players than decision makers.  
 
 
3.4.2. Permanent secretaries 
 
The second actor who might be thought to play a role in research decision-
making is the department’s permanent secretary. The permanent secretary is 
the most senior civil servant of a British government department, charged 
with running the organisation on a day-to-day basis. His role includes: 
policy advice, securing policy implementation, the management of the ‘day-
to-day business, financial management and a role as ‘guardians of propriety’ 
and of the rules and conventions of how government should operate (Paun 
& Harris, 2013). As noted by Rhodes, the roles and responsibilities of 
permanent secretaries overlap to a large extent with those of ministers, so 
much so that it would be more accurate to talk about a “class of political-
administrators” to describe the politicians and administrators at the top of 
the Civil Service (Rhodes, 2013). Against this background, expecting 
permanent secretaries to play a direct role in the making of research 
decisions is unrealistic, for the same reasons as ministers. This claim is in 
line with the findings of Page and Jenkins, according to whom senior civil 
servants have a wide range of responsibilities and cannot be closely 
involved in the work of them all. Also, they often do not possess the 
technical expertise needed to understand the work middle-ranking officials 
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do. Their contribution to the work of middle-ranging policy officials is 
mostly indirect and informal (Page & Jenkins, 2005).  
 
 
Exhibit 9 – Turnover of UK secretaries of state and permanent 
secretaries between May 1997 and May 2010 
 
 
 
Notes: 
– Secretary of State for Work and Pensions: Average tenure between June 2001 and May 
2010; 
– Secretary of State for Education: Average tenure between June 2001 and June 2007; 
– Minister of Justice: Average tenure between  June 2003 and May 2010; 
– Permanent Secretary to the DWP: Average tenure between May 2002 and May 2011; 
– Permanent Secretary to the Department of Education: Average tenure between 2001 
and 2012 (includes Department for Education and Skills); 
– Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Justice: Average tenure from 2003 to 2012 
(includes the Department for Constitutional Affairs).  
 
 
3.4.3. Policy teams 
 
The first group of officials shaping policy research decisions includes the 
respective ‘policy teams’ of each department. As noted by Page and 
Jenkins, policy-making is not only a political activity – involving the 
manoeuvring of different politicians, groups and individuals to shape policy 
– but also a bureaucratic one. Policy teams shape policies into a form that 
can be put to ministers and a wider audience and turned into a set of policy 
instruments in the form of a law, plan, budget, consultation document, etc. 
Politicians need bureaucrats to develop and maintain policy, not simply for 
‘advice’ on how to do it (Page & Jenkins, 2005).  
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The role of policy teams in policy research decisions is evidence in several 
documents. First, the description of the research process at DWP shows that, 
formally, policy teams are involved in all research decisions that might 
affect the government’s agenda (Boa et al., 2010). This includes the 
identification of ‘research priorities’ as well as the drafting of Project 
Initiation Documents, which the blueprint of the study to be conducted 
(scope, research question, timing, budget, division of tasks, etc.).  The 
reader should assume that this description is an adequate representation of 
other departments as well. 
 
Second, the role of policy-makers in the British Civil Service is outlined in 
the Policy Skills and Knowledge Framework, which was revised in March 
2013. As shown in Exhibit 10, three core competences are mentioned, 
namely (1) the expertise to produce and use evidence for policy purposes; 
(2) an understanding of political constraints; and (3) the skills required for 
the implementation of policy. These competences reflect to a large extent 
the concerns of middle-managers, in particular the duty to deal with 
constraints and to comply with the organisations’ priorities (Wilson, 1989).  
 
Third, there is empirical evidence of the role of policy teams in the research 
process (The LSE GV314 Group, 2014).  
 
 
Exhibit 10 – Role of policy professionals as per the Policy Skills 
Framework 
 
Competence Role/expectation  
Evidence  
– “Compile, assimilate, distil, interpret and present a 
strong evidence base from a wide range of types of 
evidence and opinions”. 
Politics  
– “Translate ministerial vision into a clear outcome, and 
develop a clear and shared understanding of what the 
problem is and what success looks like; test mutual 
understanding of the problem and goal”. 
– “Support ministers’ engagement with parliament and 
enable public accountability in their area”. 
Delivery  
– “Systematically identify issues that could affect 
implementation and addressing them/steps to mitigate 
gaps or weaknesses throughout the life of the policy”. 
– “Maintain political legitimacy, and mandate, 
throughout the life of the policy, working across 
government to co-ordinate progress towards shared 
objectives”.  
 
Source: https://civilservicelearning.civilservice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/link_3_-
_policy_skills_knowledge_-_curriculum_map_with_cpd.pdf 
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3.4.4. Analysts 
 
The second group of officials shaping policy research decisions are the 
department researchers. The British civil service employs a number of 
researchers including economists, statisticians, biologists, psychologists, 
sociologists, etc. Together, they form the ‘Analyst’ profession, whose main 
responsibility is to provide evidence for policy-makers (Government Office 
for Science, 2013).  
 
The formal role of analysts in the UK civil service is defined in the 
Government Social Research Competency Framework (see Exhibit 11). The 
framework provides behavioural indicators for the five levels of the 
profession, from Research Officer to Chief Research Officer. The expected 
skill set of an analyst, according to the Framework, includes (1) intellectual 
capacity; (2) delivery skills; (3) interpersonal skills; and (4) leadership and 
management skills.   
 
The first skill of analysts is to be capable of designing, managing and 
reviewing policy research projects. Exhibit 11 shows the government’s 
expectations for each role. The GSR framework confirms that analysts are 
responsible for making methodological decisions. Interestingly, the 
framework makes no mention of the criteria that should guide these 
methodological decisions. There are many references to “innovative 
methods”; however there is no definition of what makes a methodology 
‘innovative’ and no justification for the desirability of ‘innovative’ methods. 
It is also worth noting that no explicit reference is made to scientific norms 
such as the production of adequate, valid and reliable empirical evidence; 
and the application of logical consistency (Merton, 1942; Zuckerman, 
1988).  
 
Empirically, the role of analysts in the research process has been best 
described in the LSE GV314 study (2013). According to research 
contractors, analysts are those, within government, who seem to be the most 
concerned with the scientific quality of research outputs.  
Exhibit 11 – Role of Government Social Researchers, as per the GSR Competency framework 
 
Grade Examples of ‘intellectual skills’ Examples of ‘delivery skills’  
Research 
Officer  
– “Designs small scale and less complex research projects for 
either in-house work or commissioned projects” 
– “Identifies who the customer and key stakeholders are for each 
project; works with others to identify customer needs”.  
Senior Research 
Officer 
– “Draws upon a track record of designing medium sized or more 
complex projects to translate a policy question into a viable 
research specification or in-house project”.   
– “Engages actively with customers to clarify and determine their 
needs; ensures those needs are addressed”. 
Principal 
Research 
Officer 
– “Takes the lead on a number of ‘technical’ matters within the 
wider GSR/ analytical community, for example, this could be 
methodological”. 
– “Supports SROs/ROs on selection of methods and can deal with 
more complex problems without detailed knowledge of project”. 
– “Influences and negotiates effectively with a range of 
stakeholders/contractors and in different situations, even when 
the audience is sceptical or hostile”. 
Senior  
Principal 
Research 
Officer  
– “Encourages staff to consider new and innovative methods in 
social research and evaluation”. 
– “Actively encourages the use of innovative research methods and 
analytical techniques among team members”. 
– “Generates workable solutions to complex problems while taking 
into account the full range of stakeholder perspective and risks”.  
– “Sensitive to customers’ wider political and organisational 
priorities”.  
Chief Research 
Officer  
– “Keeps abreast of critical methodological developments within 
social research and identifies the value to the department, and 
across Whitehall, of new research techniques and approaches”.  
– “Mediates effectively when there is a professional dispute, for 
example, on issues of methodology”.  
– “Anticipates changing priorities and manages this through 
strategic contingency planning”. 
– “Consults with customers and partners rather than imposing 
solutions; involves stakeholders in deciding what has to be done 
and what can be done better”.  
 
Source: http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/gsr_competencies_framework.pdf
3.4.5. Contract researchers 
 
Most of the policy evaluation research in the field of employment and 
welfare is conducted by external organisations (Boa et al., 2010). The DWP 
commissions research from a framework of approved expert suppliers. A 
framework is an agreement with a group of suppliers, which sets out the 
terms and conditions under which specific purchases can be made. The tasks 
involved in the 2013 Framework include inter alia: 
– Qualitative and quantitative research and evaluation; 
– Data collection through fieldwork and/or interrogation of administrative 
data supplied by the department; 
– Survey design/methodology; 
– Sampling;  
– Pilot studies and experiments;  
– Literature reviews; 
– Evaluation of policy measures.  
 
The involvement of contractors in research decisions varies from one 
project to another. Sometimes they are called on very early on to conduct 
feasibility studies, give advice on sampling or identify the type of data that 
could be used in the evaluation of a particular programme. More frequently 
though, their job is limited to research planning, data collection, analysis 
and reporting, with more ‘fundamental’ decisions taken by the civil servants 
in charge of the project. It is safe to say that, overall, the role of contractors 
increases as the project goes along; however not in a linear way. Analysts 
and policy-makers occasionally step up when key decisions need to be 
made, such as the design of survey questionnaires.  
 
 
3.5. Expected effect of policy commitment on 
the research process  
 
The above shows that all the actors involved in the research process face the 
same dilemma. On the one hand, they all share an interest in getting the best 
possible evidence. On the other hand, they work in an organisation, which is 
tasked with the implementation of a policy agenda. And this policy agenda 
is largely beyond their control. In what follows, I show that, in the context 
of UK ministerial departments, the two objectives are not equal. There is 
strong evidence that scientific considerations are secondary only to 
performative considerations.  
 
 
3.5.1. The business of ministerial departments   
 
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that policy research and evaluation is a 
drop in the ocean of government business. Comparable data is difficult to 
get across departments however some figures are telling.     
 
First, policy evaluation is a minor expenditure for most departments. For 
instance, the DWP spent on average about £20 million per year on ‘external 
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research’ (Government Office for Science, 2012). This amount must be 
compared with the DWP’s departmental expenditure limit – i.e. the budget 
allocated for the running of the services that it oversees and the everyday 
cost of resources such as staff – which was £8.3 billion in 2012-2013. It can 
also be compared with the department’s annually managed expenditure 
(AME), i.e. the amount it spends on programmes which are demand-led – 
such as welfare, tax credits or public sector pensions. In 2012-2013, the 
DWP’s AME was £166 billion.  
 
Second, policy research occupies few people in government. Looking again 
at the DWP, we can see that in 2011, 679 people were working on policy 
research (Government Office for Science, 2012). As a comparison, in 
January 2014, the department employed nearly 100,000 staff (including 
Jobcentre Plus), which made it the biggest government department in the 
UK.  
 
Third, policy evaluation is not a very scrutinised activity. This will probably 
not come as the surprise to the reader given the two above-mentioned 
points. Out of the 1,486 reports published on the NAO website between 
January 1999 and March 2014, only six of them focused on the practice of 
evaluation, including four on regulatory impact assessments. Since 2010, 
the Parliament’s Public Administration Select Committee (PASC), which 
controls the matters relating to the quality and standards of administration 
within the civil service, has launched 49 inquiries on subject as diverse as 
crime statistics, public engagement in policy-making, the Civil Service 
Reform or on public procurement. Not a single inquiry dealt with the 
practice of policy research. Thematic committees such as the Home Affairs 
Committee, which examines the activities of the Home Office and 
associated public bodies, have not shown a greater interest in the issue. It 
would seem that the only parliamentary report dealing with the use of 
scientific advice in government is a House of Commons’ Science and 
Technology Committee report of 2007 (House of Commons, 2007).  
 
 
3.5.2. Effect of policy commitments on ministers and 
permanent secretaries  
 
More in-depth analyses of the utilization of research by British policy-
makers have corroborated the idea that the ‘scientific’ mission of ministerial 
departments was secondary to their ‘implementation’ mission.  
 
This is the case among ministers and senior civil servants. In his very 
detailed account of the policy-making process in UK ministerial 
departments (mentioned earlier), Rhodes argues that permanent secretaries 
are anxious to ensure the implementation of the decisions made by the 
government. According to him, “Both Conservative and Labour 
governments want departments to implement their policies effectively. The 
permanent secretary must get on with the job of ensuring the departments 
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‘deliver’” (Rhodes, 2013). The incentive is even stronger when policy 
implementation depends on third parties (private contractors, local 
authorities, etc.). Ministers and permanent secretaries must compensate for 
the fact that “they have a hands-off, not hands on, link to policy 
implementation” (Rhodes, 2013). 
 
This focus on performance has significantly increased under Labour, with 
the set-up of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit and of the Public Service 
Agreements (PSAs) (Barber, 2008). PSAs were first introduced in the 1998 
Comprehensive Spending Review which set around 600 performance targets 
for around 35 areas of Government (Cabinet Office, 1998). These were 
refined on several occasions until 2010, when the Coalition government 
scrapped them.   
 
The UK government’s performative logic can be seen in the way senior civil 
servants approach research findings. Evidence is more likely to be used 
‘symbolically’, i.e. to justify or legitimate a policy or decision, than 
instrumentally, to inform a decision. Policy-makers construct the story line 
by asking “what happened and why?” They also ask whether a story is 
defensible (to both internal and external audiences); accurate (in that it is 
consistent with known and agreed ‘facts’), believable (in that it is consistent 
with the departmental philosophy). Crucially, as practiced, rational analysis 
is retrospective not prospective. It is used to justify decisions already taken 
by other means and for other reasons. And the other reasons are usually 
political ones.  
 
 
3.5.3. Effect of policy commitments on policy teams  
 
Policy teams are also subject to strong incentives to implement government 
policies. Some of these incentives are formal, as evidenced by the Policy 
Skills Framework (see section 3.4.3). However, most of ministers’ authority 
on policy-makers is exerted informally (Page & Jenkins, 2005). Ministers 
rarely issue direct and clear instructions to policy officials that define what 
they should do with any precision, and senior officials tend to offer advice 
and support rather than commands and injunctions. Thus, middle-ranking 
policy officials often need to exercise discretion. They know that any 
significant policy initiatives, or even any significant features of policy 
initiatives, either need to be sanctioned by ministers or have to be treated as 
if they were subject to being sanctioned by ministers. “Discretion is 
exercised within this context of ministerial sanctioning – actual, deemed or 
anticipated – and this context shapes the way policy officials think about 
their roles. The difficulty with bending over backwards is that ministers 
often have few clear ideas about what they want” (Page & Jenkins, 2005).  
 
Policy teams impose their performative logic on the research process in two 
ways. First, by using their relative authority. Being generally more senior 
than analysts, they can formally impose their views on all research decisions 
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affecting the government’s agenda. Furthermore, the description of the 
research process at the DWP indicates that the degree of involvement of 
policy teams is positively correlated with the cost of the intervention. Thus, 
evaluations of larger and more expensive programmes are likely to be more 
skewed towards implementation than other evaluations.   
  
Second, policy-makers hold the purse-strings. They control programme 
budgets, which are substantially larger than social research budgets and are 
often used to fund in-depth evaluations (Boa et al., 2010; Government 
Office for Science, 2012). Yet, budgetary constraints can also serve to 
support political ammunition objectives in commissioned research. 
Salisbury et al. (Salisbury et al., 2011) show how the constraints set by 
research design features specified by commissioning departments – the 
budgets, the timelines, as well as the specification of the methods to be used 
– can prevent the generation of clear judgements of how well or badly a 
policy is working (The LSE GV314 Group, 2014).  
 
 
3.5.4. Effect of policy commitments on analysts  
 
The effect of policy commitments on analysts’ decisions is both direct and 
indirect.  
 
The direct effect is through the GSR Competency Framework presented in 
Section 3.4.4. It shows that research skills are not the only skills required 
from analysts. Analysts are also expected to show political sensitivity. Some 
‘delivery skills’ mentioned in the framework are presented in Exhibit 11. 
There, the word ‘customer’ refers to the ‘audiences’ defined earlier in this 
thesis; and include programme beneficiaries (jobseekers, pupils and parents, 
victims and criminals, etc.), policy and implementation teams within 
ministries and, to some extent, the members of the Cabinet.  
 
Some ministerial departments provide an additional incentive to guarantee 
the implementation of ministerial decisions. For example, most of the 
DWP’s analysts are not part of a separate ‘research unit’ within the 
department, which would guarantee some autonomy, but are embedded in 
the policy teams they serve. Analysts are therefore made co-responsible for 
the implementation of ministerial policy decisions.   
 
The indirect effect of policy commitment has to do with the organisational 
structure of ministerial departments, which put generalists on top. Analysts 
can only get promoted within their profession to a limited extent. Indeed, 
there are few (very) senior researcher positions within a given department.  
Thus, career-maximising analysts will need to give up their specialisation at 
a certain point and become generalists (policy-makers) themselves. This 
could influence their decisions in anticipation.  
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3.5.5. Effect of policy commitments on contractors  
 
It is difficult to evaluate the influence of contractors on the scientific 
credibility of research decisions.  
 
On the one hand, contractors are hired based on their research credentials, 
reputation and expertise. The technical specifications DWP Research 
Framework indicates that bidders will be evaluated against the following 
criteria, with a minimum score set for each one: 
– Methodological expertise; 
– Quality of outputs; 
– Research ethics; 
– Research strengths; 
– Examples of relevant research.  
The above might suggest that the decisions made for these research projects 
will be in the interest of robustness and scientific quality.  
 
On the other hand, the contractual nature of the relationship between the 
department and the consultant limits the autonomy of the latter and 
encourages reciprocation. The relative dependence of contractors is due to 
the competitive nature of framework contracts. These agreements are only 
an umbrella agreement setting out the basis and the terms and conditions on 
which subsequent call-off contracts are established, but which places no 
obligations, in itself, on the department to purchase any services. Potential 
suppliers who are successfully awarded a place on a framework agreement 
may be invited to compete in “mini competitions” where they are capable of 
providing the services to be called off. These mini competitions generally 
involve between two and ten contractors. Besides, it should make no doubt 
that these contracts are of a commercial nature. The previous DWP 
framework (2009-2013) included 88 organisations from both the profit and 
not-for-profit sectors, although the latter organisations essentially use these 
contracts as money-spinners (see Exhibit 12).    
 
Empirically, the evidence is mixed. The LSE GV314 Study (2013) shows 
that when asked to make some changes to the final report, academics tend 
either to oblige or meet their sponsors half-way (three-quarters of 
respondents). Many respondents mentioned the contentiousness of a given 
reform to explain policy-makers’ hands-on approach to the evaluation. 
However, the survey provides little evidence that this helps produce 
supportive reports.  
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Exhibit 12 – Number of DWP Research Framework contractors per 
sector (2009-2013 Framework) 
 
 
 
 
3.6. Expected variation across research 
decisions 
 
In the previous section, I showed that policy teams had extensive influence 
on all aspects of ‘their’ reforms, including evaluation. However, the 
evaluation process is long and technical. Policy-makers, whose 
responsibility is to lead the reform process, are unlikely to be involved in all 
decisions. Some will matter more to them than others. The purpose of the 
following section is to identify these research decisions. It first starts with a 
general description of the research cycle in a typical government department 
and then considers the three research decisions analysed in this thesis, 
namely the timeframe, the selection of pilot sites and the reporting of 
outcomes.  
 
 
3.6.1. The research cycle in a typical government department  
 
The research cycle starts once the work programme has been established 
and approved by ministers (see Exhibit 13). Three main phases can be 
distinguished: the design phase (steps 1 to 4); the data collection and 
analysis phase (step 5); and the reporting phase (step 6).  
 
The design phase is concerned with the decisions that have policy and 
managerial implications, namely the definition of timeframe of the pilot, its 
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scope, the definition of its objectives, and on some occasions the selection 
of pilot sites. These decisions are made centrally by policy teams and 
analysts and must be formally approved by the relevant minister (steps 1 
and 2). A research design is drawn up by analysts before going out to 
competitive tender (step 3). The design may be revisited by tendering 
organisations in their tender proposals and revised again before the research 
is commissioned and executed (step 4). However, the most fundamental 
decisions will have already been made. Feasibility studies are occasionally 
commissioned for most sophisticated studies.  
 
The data collection and analysis phase starts soon after an evaluator has 
been appointed (step 5). These tasks are typically performed by the 
contractor under the supervision of analysts. Within the WWEG the day-to-
day management of projects varies quite considerably depending on their 
size and status. Individuals interviewed by Boa et al. (2010) stated that 
project management tended to be more proactive on a day-to-day level at 
the design and reporting stage than in other government departments. This 
proactive input tends to focus mainly on quality assurance of the work, and 
the presentation of research results. For large evaluation projects, the DWP 
project manager can be involved full time.  
 
The research cycle ends with the reporting of the evaluation results. In 
principle, this task is performed by the sole contractor but, as mentioned 
earlier, guidance or pressure from both analysts and policy-makers cannot 
be excluded.  
 
Against this background, one could expect decisions made during the 
research design phase to be strongly influenced by policy commitments 
(with some variation depending on the complexity of the decision). 
Conversely, decisions made during the data collection and analysis phase 
are expected to be weakly influenced by policy commitments. Reporting is 
expected to fall somewhere in the middle. 
 
 
3.6.2. Timeframe    
 
The timeframe of a pilot is decided by the relevant policy teams, as 
‘managers’ of a given reform. From an organisational viewpoint, this makes 
sense as the piloting phase has important repercussions. These repercussions 
are political (results will need to be available before the next election or the 
next Spending Review) as well as financial (longer pilots are more 
expensive than shorter pilots) and managerial (local agencies must be 
prepared for a possible national rollout). Good coordination among services 
is thus essential, which is why this competence is given to a generalist rather 
than to a specialist. Once approved, timeframes are usually conscientiously 
monitored by policy-makers. The timely implementation and evaluation of a 
pilot is often a key requirement for the relevant teams. There is clear and 
consistent evidence that timeliness is a key issue (Jowell 2003; Magenta 
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Book). Analysts are consulted but have no decision-making power. 
Research contractors are usually not consulted on the timeframe of research.  
 
Against this background, I would expect policy commitments to have a 
strong effect on the duration of pilots.  
 
 
Exhibit 13 – The research process in a typical ministerial department 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6.3. Site selection 
 
Like the timeframe of a pilot, the selection of pilot sites is usually made by 
policy teams. Again, this is justified by the organisational implications of 
this decision, such as the need to negotiate the implementation of the pilot 
with local policy-makers and front-line agents and the cost of running a 
pilot across multiple locations.  
 
However, the selection of pilot sites is one of the decisions where analysts 
have the greatest influence. Indeed, the quality and the size of samples are 
of paramount importance in research. There is anecdotal evidence of the 
influence of analysts in this matter. Boa et al. (2010) cite the evaluation of 
the Pathways to Work pilot, in which DWP analysts were successful at 
getting the pilot redesigned so that the evaluations provide more meaningful 
data. They indicate that, having made a convincing case, the size of the pilot 
doubled from three to seven areas. One of my interviewees confirmed that, 
although analysts can advocate more or different pilot sites, ultimately the 
 
1 
• Policy development: Definition of the intervention, the objective 
and the target groups (Policy teams) 
 
2 
• Research design: Definition of the research objectives, the time 
frame, the pilot sites and the budget (policy teams and analysts)  
 
3 
• Invitation to tender for the evaluation (analysts) 
 
4 
• Operationalisation: Definition of a sampling and data collection 
strategy (contractors and analysts) 
 
5 
• Data collection and analysis (contractors) 
 
6 
• Reporting (contractors) 
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decision belongs to policy-makers. Research contractors have typically no 
say. 
 
Against this background, I would expect a weak effect of policy 
commitment on the selection of pilot sites. 
 
 
3.6.4. Reporting  
 
The write-up of evaluation reports is the sole responsibility of the research 
contractor or, in the rare instances where the research has been conducted 
in-house, of the department analysts.  
 
In theory, one would expect the reporting of findings to be a highly 
contested research decision. First, it matters to policy-makers. On an 
instrumental level, findings will help policy-makers make decisions 
regarding the rollout of the programme and possible adjustments. On a more 
symbolic level, results will help policy-makers ‘legitimise’ the intervention 
among stakeholders. Second, findings matter to analysts, who will ‘fight 
their corner’ and try to preserve the scientific integrity of the project and, 
thereby, their reputation. Finally, it matters to research contractors, who will 
seek to build up their reputation as experts and reliable business partners.    
 
The LSE GV314 study shows that the reality is more nuanced. Requests to 
change or scale down critical content are actually far from systematic. The 
authors report that 52% of respondents were asked to make changes 
affecting the interpretation of findings or the weight given to them (against 
46% of respondents who were not). However, the free responses in the 
survey as well as the interview material gives ample evidence of those 
sponsoring the research seeking to shape the way the results are reported. 
Moreover, survey data suggest that when asked to make some changes to 
the final report the academics tend either to oblige or meet their sponsors 
half-way (The LSE GV314 Group, 2014). Here again, these results must be 
taken with a pinch of salt, as they might be biased by selective memory and 
social desirability.  
 
Against this background, I would expect policy commitments to have a 
weak effect on the reporting of evaluation outcomes.  
 
 
3.7. Expected variation across departments  
 
It has been said repeatedly in this thesis that organisations matter. To the 
extent that they can freely set their research priorities, hire their staff and 
allocate resources, different ministerial departments can have different 
approaches to policy research and evaluation. The following section 
compares the approaches of the four departments included in this case study 
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and considers, for each of them (1) the commitments to research and 
leadership; (2) research procedures; and (3) their use of evidence in policy-
making.  
 
 
3.7.1. Department for Work and Pensions  
  
The ministerial departments which make the policy research decisions that I 
analyse as part of this project are like any other organisation: they face 
multiple audiences and pluralistic interests. This makes the arbitration 
amongst them all the more difficult and interesting.  
 
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) was created in 2001 as the 
result of a merger of the Department of Social Security and the Employment 
Service. It reports to the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions who 
defines its agenda and priorities. It is the biggest public service delivery 
department in the UK serving over 20 million customers.  
 
The DWP has been regularly praised both within the government and 
outside, for the quality of its research. Between 2008 and 2011, the 
Government’s Office for Science (GO Science) conducted two science and 
analysis capability reviews of DWP. In 2008, the Department was assessed 
to be ‘strong’ in its ability to base choices on evidence, the highest rating. In 
their second review in 2011, the reviewers made again a positive assessment 
of the Department. In particular, they identified a “strong commitment 
across the Department to using analytical and scientific evidence to inform 
the development and the delivery of policy”. They found that the focus on 
analytical and scientific evidence was supported by the presence of analysts 
and scientists in several senior policy delivery roles. The review also found 
“consistently high levels of enthusiasm, commitment and retention among 
analytical staff which reflects and helps to perpetuate the focus on use of 
science and analysis”.  
  
Differences may also appear in the way departments conduct research. In a 
recent report, the National Audit Office noted that DWP “did not properly 
evaluate pilots before launching Pathways to Work. The flawed evaluation 
gave too positive a view of expected performance”. However, the NAO also 
noted some high-quality evaluations in the area of active labour markets: 
eight of ten labour market evaluations were of a sufficient standard to have 
confidence in the impacts attributed to policy (National Audit Office, 2013).  
 
Last but not least, the commitment of a department to research can be 
assessed through the use of research findings. In its 2013 Report on 
Evaluation in Government, the NAO looked at the percentage of regulatory 
impact assessments in 2009-2010 referring to evaluation findings. They 
found out that 80% of DWP’s impact assessments were based on evaluation 
findings – one of the highest scores among government departments.  
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In light of the above, one would expect the research commissioned by the 
DWP to be strongly influenced by scientific norms.  
 
 
3.7.2. Department for Education  
 
The Department for Education (DfE) was formed in May 2010 by the 
incoming coalition government, taking on the responsibilities and resources 
of the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF). It reports to 
the Secretary of State for Education. The DfE is responsible for issues 
affecting people in England up to the age of 19, including child protection 
and education.  
 
In 2009-2010, GO Science made also a strong positive assessment of the 
DfE’s use of science and analysis. The investigators noted a clear focus on 
the use of analytical evidence to inform and guide the development and 
delivery of policy. The Department’s senior leadership was found to play a 
key role in driving this analytical, evidence-based approach. GO Science 
also noted that the Department also had many strong links with the 
academic and wider research community and with delivery partners who are 
often involved in research and data collection. In its 2013 Report (already 
mentioned), the NAO report also noted high-quality evaluations in the area 
of education: six of nine education reports were of a sufficient standard to 
have confidence in the impacts attributed to policy. However, the DfE was 
found to perform poorly in terms of research utilisation. None of the impact 
assessments produced by the Department in 2009-2010 were based on 
evaluation findings (80% of DWP’s impact assessments).   
 
In light of the above, one would expect the research commissioned by the 
DfE to be moderately influenced by scientific norms,  
 
 
3.7.3. Home Office and Ministry of Justice  
 
The Home Office (HO) was formed in 1782. It reports to the Home 
Secretary. It is also responsible for immigration, security, and law and 
order. It is also in charge of government policy on security-related issues 
such as drugs and counter-terrorism. In May 2007, some functions of the 
Home Office were combined with the Department for Constitutional Affairs 
to form the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). The MoJ reports to the Secretary of 
State for Justice. Its stated priorities are to reduce re-offending and protect 
the public, to provide access to justice, to increase confidence in the justice 
system, and uphold people’s civil liberties. In the remainder of this thesis, 
the HO and the MoJ will be considered as one department.  
 
The two departments featured quite prominently in the Report of the 
Parliamentary Science and Technology Committee. The members of the 
Committee also regretted the insufficient scientific leadership within these 
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departments. The Committee noted that the “Home Office DCSA seemed to 
have had little input to the transformation of the Forensic Science Service 
(FSS), a key scientific resource for the Government, describing ‘the low 
visibility of the Home Office Chief Scientific Adviser’ as ‘a source of 
concern, particularly in view of the history of weak scientific culture in the 
department’” (p.23). This view was apparently shared by the research staff 
of the Home Office, who felt a consistent “lack of appreciation of the value 
and importance of scientific evidence among (especially senior) officials”. 
Officials noted that it had an adverse impact in many respects: lack of 
strategic planning or horizon scanning, commissioning hurried and poor 
quality ‘fire-fighting’ research, a reluctance to make use of evidence when it 
is available, poor communication of issues to the outside world, etc. 
 
The House of Commons Committee of Science and Technology gives also 
an account of the Home Office’s research practice. Committee members 
were concerned to hear allegations from certain academics that departments 
have been commissioning and publishing research selectively in order to 
‘prop up’ policies. Professor Tim Hope, a criminologist from the University 
of Keele who has worked with the Home Office, indicated that of two case 
studies looking at burglary reduction commissioned by the Home Office, 
the department decided to only write up one: “Presumably [...] because the 
area-wide reduction was greater here than elsewhere”. Professor Hope also 
accused the Home Office of manipulating the data so as “to capitalise on 
chance, producing much more favourable findings overall”, despite the fact 
that “for individual projects, the [Home Office] method produces 
considerable distortion”. Other academics have voiced similar concerns. For 
example, Reece Walters of Stirling University claimed of the Home 
Office’s treatment of research results: “It is clear the Home Office is 
interested only in rubber-stamping the political priorities of the Government 
of the day [...] To participate in Home Office research is to endorse a biased 
agenda”. 
 
Looking at research utilisation, the 2013 NAO Report observed that 6% of 
the impact assessments conducted by the HO in 2009-2010 and 10% of the 
impact assessments conducted by the MoJ referred to evaluation findings 
(DWP: 80%, DfE: 0%).  
 
In light of the above, one would expect the research commissioned by the 
HO and the MoJ to be weakly influenced by scientific norms,  
 
 
3.8. Conclusion   
 
This chapter was set out to identify a suitable context for this study and 
understand the substantive implications of this context on the expected 
prevalence and severity of confirmation bias in policy research. It should be 
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borne in mind that a different context could have been chosen, and that this 
different context could lead to different conclusions.     
 
The first objective of this chapter was to identify an appropriate location and 
time to address the research question as well as reflect on the ‘external 
validity’ of the conclusions to be drawn from this case study. This chapter 
made clear that the choice of the time and place was dictated by 
convenience rather than probabilistic methods. Thus, throughout this thesis, 
generalisations beyond the case will be limited. Furthermore, the UK has 
been until recently a fairly isolated case in terms of policy evaluation. 
Beyond the UK, evaluation is a quasi-systematic exercise only in the US, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Other European countries might also 
evaluate their programmes, however more punctually.      
 
The second objective of this chapter was to ‘set the scene’ and identify the 
key actors as well as their motivations. The review highlighted a number of 
‘stylised facts’. First, it showed that the policy research decisions considered 
in this thesis were made by middle managers. Ministers and permanent 
secretaries may occasionally influence these decisions, as veto players, 
however systematic intervention must be ruled out. Second, these decisions 
are typically shared between three main groups: policy-makers, analysts and 
research contractors. Policy-makers have the highest level of seniority and 
the greatest capacity to influence research decisions. Third, ministerial 
departments in the UK have strong incentives to implement the 
government’s agenda. They have stronger incentives to perform than to 
demonstrate scientific expertise.  
 
The third objective was to gather qualitative information with a view to 
improve the conclusion validity of this thesis. The review revealed that, 
given the administrative architecture and culture of UK ministerial 
departments, one would expect the effect of policy commitments on 
research decisions to be positively correlated with the degree of 
involvement of policy teams in these decisions. Thus, one would expect 
policy commitments to have a greater effect at the beginning of the research 
cycle, and for decisions like the duration of pilots. In addition, I would 
expect the effect of policy commitments to be negatively correlated with the 
research culture of each department. Of the four departments included in 
this study, the DWP is expected to be the least subject to confirmation bias. 
It is followed by the DfE. The HO and the MoJ are on the third step of the 
podium.  
 
Having defined the theoretical framework underpinning this study and 
described the context on my analysis, I now need to specify the research 
design and the data that will be used to answer the research question. This is 
the purpose of chapter 4 overleaf.  
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4. Research design 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In chapter 2, I discussed the reasons why a government-sponsored policy 
evaluation might be subject to confirmation bias and presented some of the 
research decisions that might reflect such a bias. In chapter 3, I argued that 
the effect of institutions on research decisions was context-dependent and 
suggested a specific case to take my analysis forward. Britain’s Labour 
government (1997-2010) quickly emerged as the most desirable option. It is 
now time to operationalise the research question, i.e. to decide what types of 
data and research design are most likely to bring an answer to the question 
at hand, given the contingencies imposed by the context.  
 
The goal of this chapter is to identify the most suitable research design to 
assess the extent of confirmation bias in a policy context. Two more specific 
objectives have been assigned to it. First, this chapter reviews the 
methodologies used so far to study the effect of institutions on research 
decisions, in both a democratic and market context. Second, it introduces 
the PILOT dataset that I developed for this purpose. PILOT includes 
observational data on over 230 policy evaluations conducted by the British 
government between 1997 and 2010 in three policy areas: employment and 
welfare; crime and justice and education and parenting. PILOT will be 
subsequently used to test the general hypothesis that the strength of policy 
commitment leads to different research decisions. This will be done either 
through regression analyses or through qualitative research; the dataset 
providing the structure for the rigorous selection of cases.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents and 
critically appraises the different methodologies used so far to analyse the 
effect of institutions on research decisions and discusses the relevance of a 
‘meta-research’ design, whereby individual studies are used as unit of 
analysis. Section 4.3 introduces the PILOT dataset, defines the population 
of interest and describes the characteristics of the sample. Section 4.4 
presents the data sources used to populate the dataset as well as the 
procedures followed to limit selection bias. Section 4.5 presents the main 
variables included in the dataset gives some details on their 
operationalization. Section 4.6 discusses PILOT’s strengths and limitations 
as well as the scalability of the method. Section 4.7 concludes.   
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4.2. Review of methods  
 
Studies on the effect of political institutions on research decisions have so 
far relied on a number of methods including: participant and nonparticipant 
observations, interviews, surveys and meta-research. The following section 
illustrates the trade-offs entailed by each method and shows why the latter 
design is the most appropriate to the research question.  
 
 
4.2.1. Participant and nonparticipant observation  
 
Organisational ethnography is not a common research tool in political 
science given the difficulty to get access to senior decision-makers, however 
there have been a few interesting contributions (see Rhodes 2013 for a 
review). In his own account of the British Civil Service, Rhodes draws on 
three sources of information, which he describes as the pattern of ‘practice’, 
‘talk’, and ‘considered writing’ (Oakeshott, 1996; Rhodes, 2013). On 
practice, Rhodes observed the office of four ministers and six permanent 
secretaries for between two and five days each. On talk, he conducted repeat 
interviews with permanent secretaries, cabinet members and other officials. 
On considered writing, he consulted newspaper reports, copies of speeches 
and public lectures, and committee and other papers relevant to the meetings 
he had observed. 
 
Participant and nonparticipant observation are particularly valuable when 
very little is known about a group and to capture the motivations of social 
actors as well as the meaning of their everyday activities. It generates 
descriptive accounts which are valuable in their own right (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 1995). Thanks to Rhodes’s account, we now have a better 
understanding of the rhetorical power of the notion of ‘evidence-based 
policy’, which can be seen as a form of ‘storytelling’ (Rhodes 2013). 
According to Rhodes, civil servants identify and construct their story line by 
asking “what happened and why?” So, they test ‘facts’ in committee 
meetings and rehearse story lines or explanations to see what they sound 
like and whether there is agreement. In this way, they can anticipate the 
reaction of external audiences. Other interesting accounts includes Metcalf’s 
on how policy-makers occasionally lean on contract researchers to provide 
congenial results (Metcalf, 2008) and Allen’s, who narrates his experience 
of contract research in the area of housing and urban policy (Allen, 2005). 
 
However, this method presents number of disadvantages. Firstly, it requires 
the consent of the observed, which is a difficult thing to achieve. Given the 
secrecy of policy-making – documents concerning the formulation of 
government policy are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act – this 
method requires a high level of trust from policy-makers, which 
compromise the independence of the researcher and in any case, limits it to 
the most seasoned researchers. Secondly, the method requires patience, 
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endurance and the collection of a huge amount of data (participation to 
meetings, access to documents, etc.), which makes it hardly replicable and 
cost-effective. Thirdly, it does not allow the analysis of variations across 
policy areas, across time and research decisions, as desired.   
 
 
4.2.2. Interviews 
 
Interviews of researchers in single or comparative case studies have been 
used in the past. For example, this methodology was used to describe how a 
major US nuclear weapons laboratory (the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 
LLL) controlled the process of research within its boundaries in the face of 
conflicting norms imposed by the scientific profession and its patron 
agencies (Sutton, 1984). More recently, it was used to investigate the role of 
cooperative research centres (CRCs) in Australia as a medium for 
facilitating R&D collaboration between academic and government 
researchers (Garrett-Jones, Turpin, Burns, & et al., 2005).  
 
Using interviews in the context of single case studies can be helpful for 
theory-building and when the number of cases is insufficient for a 
quantitative analysis. Thus, this method makes sense in the case of the LLL. 
As noted by Sutton, the LLL was an anomaly in terms of functionalist 
theory because it conformed neither to the academic ideal of disinterested 
inquiry nor to the image of applied science as a parasitic and derivative 
activity. Using rich descriptions gathered from interviews with resident 
scientists, Sutton concluded that research norms were situationally defined. 
Conversely, the CRCs analysed by Garrett-Jones et al. are “hybrid 
organisations” drawing upon the practices and cultures of all their 
participants. Although these organisations are probably more numerous than 
organisations such as the LLL, there was, at the time of the study, very little 
understanding of their added-value, which justified the use of interviews. 
The study of Garrett-Jones et al. shows that ultimately, CRCs may be in 
competition with their participant organisations for human and financial 
resources in relation to activities such as the commercialisation of research 
results (Garrett-Jones et al., 2005).  
 
Despite its strengths, this methodology would be inappropriate to the 
research question this study seeks to answer. Indeed, the research question 
posed in this thesis is broad and shallow, and thus requires a nomothetic 
approach. Conversely, interviews based on a few cases would lead me to 
take an idiographic approach, namely rich descriptions of narrowly defined 
situations.     
 
A more satisfactory option would be to interview scientists in relation to a 
larger number of research decisions or cases. The motivations and uses of 
this method are diverse. For example, it was used to describe the role of 
pilot schemes in policy-making in the UK (Jowell 2003). Later, a group of 
researchers used interviews to provide information on the frequency and 
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reasons for outcome reporting bias in clinical trials (Smyth, Kirkham, 
Jacoby, & et al., 2011). Interviews spanning a large number of cases can be 
helpful when the researcher is eager to identify a pattern in his observations 
but a quantitative design is not possible due to a lack of affordable and 
reliable quantitative data. For example, Jowell (2003) collected information 
about 123 pilot schemes across nine UK government departments. 
However, his research question, as well as its search for ‘mini case studies’ 
meant that the design had to be qualitative. Thus, around 30 face-to-face 
interviews with policy-makers and policy researchers were conducted to 
discover their special perspective on the pilots for which they had been 
responsible.  
 
Although they are better suited to answer questions of prevalence and 
variation than the previous method, interviews related to multiple cases 
would still be a weak design in relation to this thesis. Firstly, they give little 
guarantee of yielding information that is strictly comparable across cases. 
Secondly, they are prone to social desirability bias. Last but not least, it is a 
costly method with a limited chance of success, as shown by the Smyth, 
Kirkham and Williamson study (Smyth, Kirkham, Jacoby, & et al., 2011). 
 
 
4.2.3. Surveys 
 
Against this background, discussions regarding the most appropriate 
research design to analyse the drivers of research decisions will naturally 
lead us to consider a quantitative methodology. Questionnaires are often the 
first method that comes to mind. Questionnaires can be a cost-effective 
research method, especially when it comes to survey professions as well 
organised as researchers. For this reason, surveys have been often used to 
analyse the influence of institutions on research directions (LSE GV314; 
Jowell 2003; Amara et al.).  
 
However, the method has important limitations. As with any unethical or 
socially stigmatised behaviour, self-reported survey data are likely to 
underestimate the true extent of the phenomenon. Respondents have little 
incentive, apart from good will, to provide honest answers (Fanelli, 2009).  
 
Different strategies have been devised to overcome this social desirability 
bias and generate more reliable estimates. For example, a recent survey of 
psychologists incorporated explicit response-contingent incentives for truth 
telling and supplemented self-reports with impersonal judgments about the 
prevalence of practices and about respondents’ honesty (John, Loewenstein, 
& Prelec, 2012). Such incentives led to higher and – according to the 
authors – likely more valid, prevalence estimates of questionable 
behaviours. Other surveys have asked questions on colleagues’ behaviours 
rather than the respondent’s, assuming that a different formulation would 
yield more reliable results (Greenberg & Goldberg, 1994; Tavare, 2012). 
Here again, important variations have been observed.  
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Results from one method to another can vary significantly. A recent meta-
analysis compared the results of 18 such surveys (Fanelli, 2009). The 
average self-report admission rate was 2.3%. Interestingly, the average 
report on colleagues’ misconduct was 14.5%. However, the interpretation of 
such a gap is subject to speculation. On the one hand, the effect of social 
expectations in surveys asking about colleagues could depend on the 
particular interests of respondents. In general, scientists might tend to 
protect the reputation of their field, by minimising their knowledge of 
misconduct. On the other hand, some respondents might have particular 
experience with misconduct and might be very motivated to report it. In 
addition, surveys on colleagues’ behaviour might also lead to inflated 
estimates of misconduct because the same event might be reported by 
several respondents. Finally, the wording of questionnaires was found to 
matter and when interpreting survey results, one needs to bear in mind that 
people have different perceptions of what does and does not constitute 
research misconduct. Scientists were less likely to reply affirmatively to 
questions using the words ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsification’ rather than 
‘alteration’ or ‘modification’ (Fanelli 2009). 
 
More importantly for the study we are concerned about, the possible causal 
link between incentive and questionable research decision is hard to 
establish in this kind of survey. A natural conclusion would be that the 
incentive pre-dated the research decision but the reverse cannot be excluded 
for certain. Moreover, the investigator often has little control on the type of 
cases that are covered by survey respondents. It is not inconceivable that a 
large number of respondents would be involved in a few research projects, 
whereas other interesting cases would not be commented.  
 
 
4.2.4. Meta-research 
 
Meta-research consists in systematically coding and analysing research 
decisions as they appear to the meta-researcher rather than accounts of 
these decisions reported by stakeholders. 
 
Meta-research is typically conducted to evaluate the mean effect of a 
medical treatment across multiple studies. However, it is equally applicable 
to any other kind of effect. One could, for example, compare similar studies 
conducted by different teams and analyse the extent to which the type of 
institution has an effect on findings. This is quite frequent in medical 
research, where similar prescription drugs have been trialled by industry-
funded and government-funded teams of researchers. One such study for 
example, looked into the benefit of statin, a high-selling class of drugs used 
to lower cholesterol. This study found 192 trials in total, either comparing 
one statin against another, or comparing a statin against a different type of 
treatment. Controlling for other factors, they found that industry-funded 
trials were 20 times more likely to give results favouring the test drug (Bero, 
Oostvogel, Bacchetti, et al., 2007). There are many more examples of such 
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problem in the medical literature (see for example (Bekelman, Li, & Gross, 
2003; Kelly et al., 2006; Lexchin, Bero, Djulbegovic, & et al., 2003; 
Sismondo, 2008).  
 
Meta-research has numerous advantages. Unlike ethnographic methods, 
interviews and surveys, it is unobtrusive, i.e. it does not require the 
researcher to be physically present. This is an important characteristic given 
the problems of access, subjectivity and social desirability bias mentioned 
earlier. In addition, meta-research is better suited to collect large amounts of 
information in a comparable and consistent way. Indeed, using interviews or 
surveys to collect information such as the timing of pilots would entail a 
high risk of knowledge/memory bias, especially considering the broad scope 
of the study (230 studies spanning 13 years and four government 
departments). Using administrative data (i.e. evaluation studies) is a more 
reliable option.  
 
However, the method is not without its weaknesses. First, unobtrusive 
measures reduce the researcher’s control over the type of data collected. The 
method assumes that the data needed by the researcher is (1) largely 
available; (2) consistently reported across documents; and (3) reliable. 
These are very demanding assumptions, especially when the documents to 
be reviewed do not follow any reporting standards or guidelines (a point 
which will be made many times throughout this thesis). The number of 
missing values for each variable can be used as indicator of how effective 
the method is.  
 
A second challenge to overcome in meta-research is sampling bias. 
Sampling bias is a systematic error due to a non-probability sample of a 
population, causing some units of the population to be less likely to be 
included than others, and leading to biased inferences. Systematic reviews 
were devised in the 1980s to address this specific issue. It is defined as the 
attempt “to identify, appraise and synthesize all the empirical evidence that 
meets pre-specified eligibility criteria to answer a given research question. 
Researchers conducting systematic reviews use explicit methods aimed at 
minimizing bias, in order to produce more reliable findings that can be used 
to inform decision making” (Higgins, Green et al., 2011).   
 
Although collecting studies in a systematic fashion drastically reduced the 
risk of sampling bias, it cannot address the fact that some studies are 
deliberately not published. Publication bias is the tendency of researchers, 
editors, and pharmaceutical companies to handle the reporting of 
experimental results that are positive (i.e. showing a significant finding) 
differently from results that are negative (i.e. supporting the null hypothesis) 
or inconclusive, leading to a misleading bias in the overall published 
literature (Song, Parekh, Hooper et al., 2010). This issue was first formally 
analysed in the mid-20
th
 century (Sterling, 1959) and since then has become 
very well documented, especially in the medical literature (see Kirby Lee, 
Bacchetti, & Sim (2008) for a review of this literature). So far, the most 
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effective strategy to overcome publication bias has been the resort to 
Freedom of Information requests, however those are only possible in a few 
countries such as in the US and the UK (Fowler, Agha, Camm, & 
Littlejohns, 2013; Joober, Schmitz, Annable, & Boksa, 2012). 
 
 
4.3. The PILOT dataset     
 
Having shown why a design based on the observation of naturally occurring 
policy research decisions was the most adequate, I now turn to the definition 
of the unit of analysis, the population of interest and the sample 
underpinning my empirical work. The objective here is to make correct 
inferences between what I can observe and what I want to know. The 
following section contends that the PILOT dataset can be considered in two 
different ways: as a ‘self-contained’ case, or as a sample drawn from a 
hypothetical population.     
  
 
4.3.1. Research scope    
 
It is useful to briefly remind the reader of the institutional context chosen to 
carry out this study (see section 3.2 for a more detailed account). Given the 
type of information needed to answer the research question, it was decided 
to focus on policy research conducted in the UK. The Labour government 
was chosen as time frame (May 1997 – May 2010). The selected policy 
areas include employment and welfare, education and parenting and crime 
and justice.  
 
 
4.3.2. Unit of analysis 
 
Meta-research uses datasets in which the unit of analysis is a discrete 
intervention or treatment. In the area of biomedical research, where the 
method was first used, these treatments typically include drugs and other 
therapies. In the area of social research, which is the focus of this thesis, an 
intervention is a policy aiming to address a type of social disorder. In both 
the medical and social areas, an intervention is most of the time ‘simple’, 
i.e. a single molecule/policy instrument – for example, a type of statin to 
treat cholesterol or the provision of free school meals to improve the 
educational attainment of poorer pupils. However, it can also be ‘complex’, 
i.e. a specific combination of molecules/policy instruments. The reason why 
complex treatments or policies are considered as one intervention has to do 
with the underlying theory that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. 
For example, tri-therapies used to treat people infected with HIV can be 
considered as a treatment in its own right, given the interaction occurring 
between the different molecules. Likewise, programmes like the New Deal 
for Disabled People (implemented by the DWP) is based on the assumption 
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that, provided together, case management, financial incentives to work and 
training are more effective than separately. Complex interventions are thus 
defined as such by the drug manufacturer or the government and taken at 
face value by the meta-researcher.     
 
I have mentioned earlier in this document that not all policy interventions 
were equally fit for the purpose of this research (see section 2.5.1 for a 
justification). Indeed the research decisions most likely to reflect 
confirmation bias are specific to interventions conducted in an 
‘experimental’ spirit, albeit not necessarily with experimental methods. 
These ‘pilot interventions’ are the units of the PILOT dataset. 
 
Pilot interventions have a number of specificities. Firstly, a pilot tests a 
national policy intervention: only pilots initiated by the central government 
have been included. Conversely, pilots initiated by local authorities or non-
governmental organisations have been excluded. I have also excluded pilots 
initiated by the three devolved administrations of the UK (Northern Ireland, 
Scotland, Wales), insofar as the scope of their competences differs 
according to the region and the policy area. Secondly, a pilot has a known 
duration; in other words, its end date is known when the pilot starts 
(however, pilots can subsequently be extended or shortened). Thirdly, its 
implementation is restricted to a fraction of the territory where it is meant to 
be rolled out. This last criterion was probably the most difficult to apply. 
Indeed, whilst most programmes in this dataset were clearly labelled as 
‘pilots’ or ‘trials’, some other, often small-scale, projects were more 
ambiguous in terms of the government’s intentions. This definition is in line 
with the British legislation
7
.  
 
As noted by Ettelt, there has been a gradual interest in policy piloting under 
the New Labour governments, specifically between the publication of the 
1999 White Paper Modernising Government and the 2007/8 fiscal crisis 
(Ettelt & Mays, 2013). Due to numerous legal, ethical and practical 
constraints, piloting has been essentially limited to the making of 
distributive policies, such as employment programmes, schooling 
programmes, childcare services, rehabilitation programmes for criminals, 
etc. Distributive policy is moderately prone to conflict and rarely involves 
primary legislation, as opposed to regulatory and redistributive policies 
(Lowi, 1972). However its correct implementation is contingent on a 
network of local agencies. According to Jowell (2003), pilots in the area of 
distributive policy became so popular after the publication of the 1999 
White Paper that they became a norm:   
 
For many respondents, however, the decision on whether or not to 
conduct a policy trial was a matter of opportunity. If it was possible to 
conduct and evaluate a trial before national roll-out, then it was 
generally commissioned nowadays more or less as a matter of course. 
The exceptions were when, say, an indelible manifesto commitment 
                                                        
7
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/14/section/77/enacted 
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existed in favour of a particular approach, or when insurmountable 
technical difficulties were likely to arise (Sanderson, 2002; Martin 
and Sanderson, 1999). In the absence of such obstacles, however, a 
presumption in favour of piloting new policies seems to be becoming 
normative in most departments (Jowell 2003). 
 
 
4.3.3. Data sources  
 
Interventions are presented and analysed in evaluation reports or studies. 
These studies are the ‘interface’ between the intervention and the meta-
researcher. Indeed, they often are the only source of information needed for 
a meta-research. Conveniently, each study usually reports the effect of a 
single intervention, which means that in many cases, there is a perfect 
correspondence between the ‘intervention’ and the ‘study’. In the area of 
biomedical research, these studies are known as ‘clinical studies’. In social 
research, these studies are referred to as ‘evaluations’.   
 
Whereas a study usually focuses on one intervention, an intervention can 
inform multiple studies. For example, the efficacy of an intervention can be 
evaluated at different points of time and each measurement phase can be 
reported separately. Furthermore, an intervention can be evaluated from 
different angles (efficacy, cost-effectiveness, implementation, user 
satisfaction, etc.) or different teams, which is possible when the data is 
publicly available. When this happens, the meta-researcher must respect the 
assumption of statistical independence and make sure the intervention is 
included only once.  
 
 
4.3.4. Population  
 
The systematic approach to data collection as well as the limited number of 
observations (both of which are discussed in section 4.5 below) mean that 
the sample drawn for this study includes virtually the entire population of 
pilot interventions conducted in the UK between 1997 and 2010 in the 
relevant policy areas.  
 
This being said, test statistics and inferences are still useful for two reasons. 
On one level, test statistics help us assess the plausibility of a partial 
association (or the lack thereof) in the sample. Low P-values suggest that an 
effect of the size observed in the sample is substantially plausible. On 
another level, it can be assumed that the studies in the PILOT dataset are a 
sample of a ‘hypothetical population’ comprising other types of policy 
evaluations, carried out in other policy areas and at different times (e.g. post 
2010).   
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4.4. Search strategy   
 
The selection process is shown in Exhibit 14.  
 
 
4.4.1. Published evaluation reports   
 
The research started with the identification of all studies commissioned by 
the relevant government departments (DWP, DfE, HO and MoJ) during the 
period of reference (May 1997 to May 2010). For this purpose, I searched 
(1) the DWP’s Research website8; (2) the DfE’s Research & Statistics 
Gateway
9
; (3) the HO’s Research Development and Statistics website10; and 
(4) the MoJ’s Research and Evaluation website11. These websites were 
systematically searched, without restriction in terms of publication ‘series’ 
(for example, the HO has nine different types of research publications).    
From this sample, I selected all evaluations and excluded other types of 
studies (customer satisfaction surveys, scoping studies, evidence reviews, 
etc.). From this sample, I selected all evaluations of pilot interventions and 
excluded other types of evaluations. The definition of ‘pilot’ used in this 
exercise was presented in section 4.3.2. This decision was made based on 
the abstracts and introductions of these studies. When several evaluations 
were conducted on the same policy intervention, this intervention was 
recorded once and for all to ensure the statistical independence of each unit 
in the dataset. However, all relevant evaluation studies were kept to provide 
background information on the pilot intervention.  
 
 
4.4.2. Unpublished evaluation reports   
 
Despite the government’s commitment to publish all publicly funded 
research, not all reports were found online. There are many reasons why 
evaluation reports are sometimes withheld. Firstly, the format and content of 
the published research output remains at the discretion of the 
commissioning department and releases may be paper-based. This mostly 
applies to pre-2000 evaluations however. Secondly, departments are not 
expected to publish research on those rare occasions when publication 
would “threaten national security, destabilise the economy, or not be in the 
public interest”. Thirdly, the quality of the report might be judged 
insufficient for publication (Government Social Research Unit, 2010a). The 
UK Government’s Social Research (GSR) Service regularly publishes 
guidelines for assessing the credibility, rigour and relevance of individual 
research studies
12
. Fourthly, the study might have been commissioned by a 
                                                        
8
 http://goo.gl/yVdNhJ 
9
 http://goo.gl/BjSmR1 
10
 http://goo.gl/cpvDYH 
11
 http://goo.gl/Syh9B2 
12
 http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/networks/gsr/publications 
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department and evaluated by another (this can be the case when the 
intervention has implications for several departments). Finally, it could be 
that a study was published by the research team in a peer-reviewed journal, 
although this seems to be exceptional.  
 
To limit the risk of publication bias to a minimum, I cross-checked the list 
of pilots obtained through my own research with two other sources of 
information. First, I used a number of official documents to identify pilots 
that would have been planned or conducted but not evaluated or not 
published. Those included (for the period of interest): (1) the annual reports 
of all relevant departments; (2) all Budget and Pre-Budget Reports; (3) all 
Green Papers published by the relevant departments; (4) all parliamentary 
research briefings published in the areas of interest; and (5) written 
questions from Members of the Parliament. The research was conducted 
through automatic searches for the following keywords: “pilot”, 
“pathfinder”, “trailblazer”, “experiment” and “evaluation”. Four documents 
in particular proved very helpful in gathering information about pilot 
schemes: three parliamentary research briefings on employment 
programmes (House of Commons, 2000, 2003, 2005a, 2005b) and the 
answer of the Secretary of State for Justice to a parliamentary question 
asking for the list of all external research projects commissioned by the MoJ 
since its inception in 2006 (House of Commons, 2012).  
 
In addition, I also sent a total of 15 Freedom of Information (FoI) requests 
to the four relevant government departments as recommended by the 
literature (Fowler et al., 2013). Departments were asked to provide 
information about unpublished evaluation reports. When the content of the 
missing reports was needed to populate the dataset, subsequent requests 
were made to get access to these reports.  
 
Freedom of Information requests did help me identify a few studies which 
were not available online. However, the procedure has its flaws. Firstly, it is 
more appropriate for ‘confirmatory’ enquiries – that is, when the researcher 
wants to get hold of a specific study – than for ‘exploratory’ enquiries – i.e. 
when the researcher wants to find out the number and nature of unpublished 
studies. The definition of a ‘reasonable’ request is too strict to allow broad 
questions that concern a whole department and its agencies. Thus the 
researcher must limit his request to a specific unit or bureau. It is possible 
that some evaluations commissioned outside the ‘research’ or ‘evaluation’ 
units have been missed; however the number is probably low.  
 
Secondly, government departments consider that they are only required to 
publish final reports. Oftentimes consultants will produce one or several 
interim reports (especially for the evaluation of large programmes), however 
it is unclear why some of these reports are accessible online and other not. 
Interim reports are relevant to my research because they give a first 
indication of the effectiveness of the programme. Also, they help to see if 
the intentions of the government are consistently reported (e.g. with regards 
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to the rollout of the programme). Unfortunately, it was not possible to know 
how many interim reports were not published or to get hold of the missing 
reports.  
 
 
4.4.3. Unevaluated pilots 
 
Whereas there are ways of spotting a study that was carried out but not 
published, identifying an unevaluated pilot proved somewhat trickier. Two 
main scenarios need to be considered here. First, the pilot was implemented 
but not formally evaluated. For example, it could be that results were simply 
monitored. The second scenario is that of a pilot that never was 
implemented but that went close enough to implementation to be visible in 
policy and administrative documents and generate relevant data for the 
researcher. This was typically the case of the last few pilots planned by the 
Labour government but terminated by the new Coalition government after 
the May 2010 coalition. These pilots are far from random and thus needed 
to be included as well.    
 
Given the heaviness of the procedure, this extra research was carried out for 
DWP pilots only. Command papers published between May 1997 and May 
2010 by the DWP as well as all Budget and Pre-Budget Reports were 
reviewed to get a list of announced policy changes. This list was matched 
with the list of research publications available on the web, to estimate the 
number and nature of (1) evaluations that were not publicly announced; and 
(2) evaluations that were announced but either not conducted or not 
published. Four extra DWP pilots were thus added to the list. This list can 
be found in Annex I.  
 
 
Exhibit 14 – Selection process 
 
 DWP DfE HOME MoJ TOTAL 
Studies 886 926 557 200 2,569 
Including evaluations 331 288 134 83 836 
Including pilot studies 218 143 48 54 463 
Including single 
interventions  
58 114 26 25 233 
 
 
4.4.4. Example  
 
To illustrate how the data was collected for this study, I use the Pathways to 
Work (PtW) programme, which is one of the interventions piloted by the 
DWP between 1997 and 2010, and briefly discuss the process which led to 
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its inclusion to my dataset. PtW was an employment programme for 
claimants of incapacity benefits which was first announced in 2002 and 
introduced in October 2003 on a pilot basis.  
 
As virtually all DWP ‘programmes’ (i.e. policies involving the provision of 
a service or financial assistance), PtW was evaluated and thus the first sign 
of PtW was found in the research database of the DWP. One of New 
Labour’s flagship reforms, PtW was a large and costly programme targeting 
one of DWP’s core target groups so it is not surprising that it was 
extensively evaluated: no less than 31 separate evaluation studies were first 
identified, including: 16 implementation studies, nine outcome studies, two 
cost-benefit studies and four ‘lesson-learning’ reports. PtW was piloted 
from October 2003 and in April 2004, and then started being rolled out to 
the rest of the country.  
 
Being such a prominent programme, it was easy, in the end, to identify PtW 
as a single pilot scheme and thus as a unit, even if the occasional reference 
to ‘Incapacity Benefit Reform’ very slightly complicated the identification. 
On other occasions, the identification proved much easier (e.g. when a pilot 
was subject to a single study) or much trickier (e.g. when two studies 
contained contradictory information on the pilot status of a reform).  
 
 
Exhibit 15 – Snapshot of the PILOT dataset 
 
 
 
 
Most of the information needed for the present research project was found 
in these evaluation reports. However, at times, extra research had to be 
conducted because I could not find what I was looking for. This information 
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was found in the Pathways to Work Green Paper (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2002).  
 
 
4.5. Variables 
 
The series of 17 interviews conducted with policy researchers (already 
mentioned in section 3.1) was instrumental to identify the key variables 
influencing the duration of pilots and the selection of pilot sites. In addition, 
these interviews helped me assess the availability of the data.  
 
For each unit in the dataset, primary information was coded manually based 
on a variety of administrative sources. Two types of variables were 
identified. Information pertaining to the research design (e.g. research dates, 
type of research carried out, etc.) and the intervention (e.g. target group of 
the intervention, objectives and policy instrument), was coded primarily 
based on the evaluation reports when they were available, on other 
documents when they were not (including technical specifications, 
secondary legislation, and administrative documents).  
  
Control variables (e.g. time remaining before the next election, performance 
of the government in that policy area) – were built using the above-
mentioned sources as well as any other document published by the 
government, the Parliament and other quasi-governmental organisations. 
Those included, inter alia, press releases, reports of the National Audit 
Office, Hansard, etc. As many pilots have their own ‘brand’ (e.g. New Deal 
for Lone Parents, Beacon Schools, Pathways to Work, etc.), this was, in 
most cases, possible. More information on these variables, as well as 
descriptive statistics, can be found in Annex II as well as in the relevant 
empirical chapters (5 and 6).     
 
 
4.5.1. Dependent variables  
 
Out of the three dependent variables considered in this project, two only 
have been subject to statistical analysis: the duration of a pilot and the 
selection of pilot sites. The third variable (completeness of reporting) has 
been analysed qualitatively and thus is not discussed in the following 
section. Descriptive statistics are provided in the relevant empirical 
chapters. 
 
 
4.5.1.1. Pilot duration  
 
As recommended in Section 2.6.1, the first dependent variable is the 
duration of a pilot. The duration of a pilot is defined as the number of 
months between start and finish. The reported start date for each pilot is that 
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of the launch of the programme in the first pilot site, as indicated in relevant 
evaluation reports. The end date proved trickier to establish. Several 
indicators are proposed in chapter 5, including the actual end date, the 
planned end date and the ‘supposed’ end date. Thus different end dates have 
produced different duration variables for each pilot, all of them measured in 
months. Distinguishing ‘observed’, ‘planned’ and ‘supposed’ duration was 
meant to improve the construct validity of the variable and make the notion 
of duration less ‘thick’. The assumptions made regarding the measurement 
of the ‘supposed duration’ of a pilot mean that this variable should be 
considered in an exploratory way. The reliability of these measurements is 
warranted by the factual nature of the variable.  
 
 
4.5.1.2. Site selection  
 
In line with the prescriptions of section 2.5.2, the second dependent variable 
indicates the regions in which the reform was piloted. The exact 
operationalisation of the variable, as well as the context in which it has been 
used, are presented in section 6.4. What matters for this chapter is that the 
variable has two components. The first component is the type of ‘area’ 
defining the boundaries of the pilot. This area can be geographical or 
‘cultural’ (e.g. North London, Mercia, Teeside), but most often they will be 
administrative (e.g. local authority, county, Jobcentre Plus district, 
probation area). The second component is the list of areas chosen as pilot 
sites. We will see in chapter 6 that, as a result of the variety in the type of 
areas, my analysis could only be performed for one policy (employment and 
welfare). The areas mentioned in the dataset are those reported in the 
evaluations studies. Extra research had to be carried out, given the 
incompleteness of many studies. The reliability of the measurement was 
warranted by the factual nature of the variable.  
 
 
4.5.2. Independent variables  
 
As already mentioned, there is no single, objective way of measuring the 
government’s commitment to a policy. For that reason, the concept of 
‘commitment’ was measured using three different variables: (1) the stated 
aim of the pilot; (2) whether the reform was derived from a pre-election 
pledge; and (3) the seniority of the reform ‘champion’.  
 
 
4.5.2.1. Pathfinders    
 
In line with the prescription of section 2.4.3, the first independent variable 
used in this study indicates the purpose of the pilot, building on the different 
typologies found in the literature (Ettelt & Mays, 2013; Jowell, 2003; S 
Martin & Sanderson, 1999; Sanderson, 2002). To my knowledge, this is the 
first time that such a variable is used for an empirical purpose.    
Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? 
 
 
 
 
Arnaud Vaganay  96 
 
 
A dichotomous variable was created to distinguish the pilots, which the 
government was committed to roll out regardless of the outcome 
(‘pathfinder’ pilots) from other, more ‘formal’ pilots. This question 
exemplifies the ‘black box’ problem for three reasons. Firstly, a government 
might be committed to roll out a pilot, but if the intervention is significantly 
altered between the pilot and the rollout phase, should we regard it as the 
same policy? Secondly, can we confidently assume that, when no evidence 
of commitment can be found, the government is indeed ready to consider all 
options, including a termination of the policy? Thirdly, is the assumption 
that the government always ‘sticks to its initial plan’ a reasonable one? 
Although contrasting pathfinder and experimental pilots does not solve all 
the afore-mentioned issues, I think it is the least imperfect measurement of 
the government’s intention, given that the government coined the term 
specifically to send a message to stakeholders regarding its intentions. The 
reliability of the measurement is ensured by the fact that virtually all 
pathfinder pilots are labelled and ‘marketed’ as such.  
 
 
4.5.2.2. Manifesto    
 
In line with the prescription of section 2.4.4, the second independent 
variable used in this study indicates whether the proposed reform was 
derived from a pre-election pledge.  
 
The operationalisation of this dichotomous variable is similar to that of 
previous studies (Klingemann et al., 1994; Rallings, 1987; Rose, 1980). A 
pledge has two components, the first of which is the statement of a specific 
objective, such as reducing unemployment or increasing school 
performance. However, these objectives are not enough to identify a pledge, 
as they can be found in all party manifestos and are very consensual. The 
second and most important component is the policy intervention chosen to 
meet the said objective. Policy interventions include taxes, expenditures, 
regulations, deregulations, etc. They are the value-ridden part of the policy 
and governments from different end of the political spectrum will be 
expected to resort to different interventions. Importantly, both the objective 
and the intervention are needed to identify a pledge. The question of 
whether a reform was derived from a pre-election pledge was addressed by 
comparing two documents: the evaluation study, which contained the 
intervention that was piloted and its objective, and the party manifesto from 
the previous election. 
 
 
4.5.2.3. Seniority of the announcer 
 
In line with the prescription of section 2.4.5, the third and last independent 
variable used in this study was a measure of the seniority of the official 
announcing the reform. This decision builds on the idea that senior officials 
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operate for most choices a trade-off between credit-claiming and blame- 
shifting (Hood 2011). To my knowledge, this is the first time such variable 
is used in an empirical project. 
 
The variable was created in two steps. Firstly, a taxonomy of ‘announcers’ 
was built from the data itself. The sources used to get to this information 
included, in that order: (1) the evaluation study; (2) policy documents 
related to the reform, including command papers and the Hansard; and (3) 
local newspapers, as some pilots were announced during ministerial visits. 
Although not recorded, the number of cases where evidence was unclear or 
contradictory was minimal and resolved by an expert judgement of the 
strength of the evidence (number of concordant sources, credibility of the 
source). Secondly, an ordinal variable with six categories was created, from 
the lowest to the highest level of seniority: (1) No apparent announcement; 
(2) Civil servant; (3) Junior minister; (4) Secretary of State; (5) Chancellor; 
and (6) Prime minister. The reliability of the measurement is warranted by 
the factual nature of the variable, which limited the risk of misinterpretation. 
 
 
4.5.3. Main control variables  
 
The PILOT dataset includes additional variables which have been used as 
controls. This section presents a few of them. I refer the reader to the 
empirical chapters for a more detailed presentation.   
 
A first set of variables includes the various research decisions made for each 
pilot in addition to those used as dependent variables. One of them is the 
research design elaborated for each pilot using a slightly modified version 
of the Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods (Sherman et al., 1998). The 
scale used in the dataset goes from 0 to 5, where 0 indicates studies based 
on solely qualitative information. In the following chapters, the categories 
of this variable are collapsed into a dummy isolating the qualitative design 
from the other designs.  
 
A second set of variables concerns the intervention which was piloted. A 
policy intervention is defined as (1) a policy instrument (2) targeting a 
specific population or sub-group (3) with a clearly stated objective. In line 
with this definition, the following variables have been included:  
– A dummy to distinguish interventions that are mandatory from 
interventions that are voluntary.  
– Whether or not the pilot was rolled out.  
 
A third set of variables pertains to the organisational context in which pilots 
took place. For example, I indicated which of the four government 
departments commissioned a given pilot: DWP; DfE; HO and MoJ. 
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4.5.4. Data analysis  
 
Empirically, the PILOT dataset has been used in two ways. First, it provided 
the data needed for the regression analyses performed in chapter 5 and 6. 
The type of regression was dictated by the measurement scale of the 
dependent variable. Thus, event-history analysis was used to model pilot 
duration and binary logistic regression was used to model the selection of 
pilot sites. Qualitatively, PILOT was used for the systematic selection of the 
cases analysed in chapter 7.   
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter was set out to propose a research design to assess the extent of 
confirmation bias in policy research.  
 
The first objective of this chapter was to critically appraise the different 
methodologies used so far to analyse the effect of institutions on research 
decisions and to identify the most promising one. The review identified four 
types of methods including participant and nonparticipant observation, 
interviews, surveys and meta-research. There are clear disciplinary 
differences in terms of methods between studies interested in the effect of 
democratic institutions and those focusing on market institutions. In 
particular, the latter studies tend to rely more on quantitative methods. The 
review has concluded that meta-research was the most appropriate design to 
answer the research question posed in this thesis.  
 
The second objective was to introduce the PILOT dataset. PILOT includes 
observational data on over 230 policy evaluations conducted by the British 
government between 1997 and 2010 in three policy areas: employment and 
welfare; crime and justice and education and parenting. PILOT adds value 
to existing methods to study the effect of institutions on research in three 
important ways. First, it analyses this effect in a systematic way, whereas 
previous research have mainly relied on single or small-N case studies. 
Second, it relies on structured and factual methodological choices as 
opposed to verbal accounts of decision-making processes. It also includes 
data pertaining to the type of intervention that was piloted and to the 
political context. Third, it looks at three policy areas, whereas previous 
studies have mainly focused on one.         
 
Having presented and justified the theory underpinning this thesis, the 
context in which this theory will be tested as well as the methods that will 
be used to answer the research question, I now turn to the empirical part of 
this project. The remainder of this document uses PILOT to analyse the 
extent of confirmation bias in three research decisions: the time allocated to 
pilots, the selection of pilot sites and the reporting of pilot outcomes. These 
questions are addressed in chapters 5, 6 and 7 respectively.  
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5. Effect of policy commitments on 
pilot duration  
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
The pilot studies conducted by the UK government between 1997 and 2010 
to test the effectiveness of its social policy reforms before a possible 
nationwide introduction present an interesting variety in terms of 
methodology and approach. For example, whereas an average intervention 
was given 20 months to demonstrate its worth, some had as few as two 
months to do the same job and some others up to four years. The complexity 
of some of these interventions – be it in terms of implementation or in terms 
of evaluation – are one, perfectly sensible, explanation for this outcome. But 
the political institutions which commission these studies expose civil 
servants and researchers to higher-level constraints and incentives which 
cannot be ignored. If the resources which fuel such studies are provided by 
organisations which are not policy-neutral, the influence that these resources 
create on the research process must be examined. 
 
Time is a critical factor in research. On one level, time is a resource given to 
an agent for the execution of a task. As other resources (budgets, people, 
expertise), time is scarce and subject to equilibrium effects (the time 
allocated to a project is taken away from another project). Thus, the amount 
of time allocated to a pilot can be seen as an indicator of its relative value in 
the eyes of government officials. On another level, time acts as a moderator 
variable, i.e. as an independent variable strengthening or weakening the 
effect of an intervention on its beneficiaries. Thus, an organisation or an 
individual with a vested interest in the success of such an intervention might 
find it convenient to interrupt its evaluation earlier than initially planned 
owing to favourable interim results. This phenomenon, known as truncation 
(Bassler, Briel, Montori, Lane, et al., 2010), has been studied in medical 
research. Some have argued that pharmaceutical companies have a financial 
incentive to truncate their clinical trials and market new drugs early (Trotta, 
Apolone, Garattini, & Tafuri, 2008).  
 
The goal of this chapter is to answer the question of whether similar 
mechanisms can be observed in the policy sphere. It builds on the notion of 
‘confirmation bias’ (defined in section 2.3) and its possible effect on the 
duration of research projects (presented in section 2.6.1). In what follows, I 
address two more specific questions. First, I analyse the extent to which the 
pilot studies conducted by the British government between 1997 and 2010 
abide by two scientific prescriptions regarding the duration of research 
projects. These prescriptions are (1) the proportionality of this duration with 
the complexity of the intervention to be evaluated and the complexity of the 
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evaluation itself; and (2) the strict observance of the pre-defined research 
timescales. Second, I analyse the effect of policy commitments on these two 
prescriptions.  
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 5.2, I discuss 
theoretically – using professional research guidelines as well as the political 
science literature and previous empirical evidence – why and how one 
might expect policy commitments to affect pilot timeframes. Section 5.3 
introduces the data and methods for my analysis. Section 5.4 lists the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 5.5 shows some descriptive statistics. 
Section 5.6 presents the results of my analysis, first looking at pilot 
duration, then at early pilot interruptions.  Section 5.7 discusses these results 
in relation to the literature. Section 5.8 concludes.     
 
 
5.2. Expected effect of policy commitments     
 
As discussed in section 3.6.2, the timeframe of a pilot is determined by the 
relevant policy teams who would typically consult analysts on research 
requirements (Boa, Johnson & King, 2010). Given the costs associated with 
pilots that are too long or too short, policy-makers are faced with an optimal 
stopping problem (Carpenter 2002). 
 
 
5.2.1. Commitment to scientific norms   
 
The timeframe of a research project is subject to two scientific prescriptions. 
The first prescription is that the time given to a study be determined solely 
on the basis of the research question. More specifically, two factors need to 
be taken into account. The first factor is the type of intervention. Some 
interventions – such as changes in the school curriculum or health 
campaigns – may take years or even decades to produce a measurable effect. 
Other policies are designed to have an almost immediate impact. In any 
event, most policies take time to bed in and the timetable for their policy 
trial needs to be adjusted accordingly. Unless the period of the trial is long 
enough to detect certain impacts, it can create a false impression of policy 
failure, which would have been contradicted by a later reading (Jowell 
2003). The second factor impacting the duration of a pilot is the type of 
effect to be estimated. Evaluating its effect in terms of access to/take-up of a 
given service is expected to be quicker than in terms of satisfaction/opinion 
or behaviour. For example, the Magenta Book (2003), which outlines the 
UK Cabinet’s methodological standards for policy evaluation, reckons that 
RCTs should be given about “two to three years”. It can be extrapolated 
from the above that the more time is given to a study, the more researchers 
will learn about the effect of the intervention. Longer research projects will 
allow researchers to estimate the short-term and long-term effects of an 
intervention whereas shorter research projects will be limited to the former.    
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The second prescription of science is that, regardless of the duration of a 
study, the timeline must be carefully planned and executed. In clinical trials, 
early stopping (or truncation) must be limited to pre-defined cases of 
extreme benefit (the experimental intervention apparently has superior 
efficacy to the control intervention); safety (the experimental intervention 
apparently has unacceptable adverse effects); or futility (there is apparently 
no prospect of this study showing superior efficacy to the experimental 
intervention) (Trotta, Apolone, Garattini, et al., 2008). Research guidelines 
recommend that timing and frequency of interim analyses, as well as early 
stopping rules, be specified in research protocols (e.g. Consort statement). 
However, I would argue that early stopping rules do not concern policy 
evaluation. First, social interventions do not entail a health risk, so early 
stopping for safety is irrelevant. Second, interrupting a policy evaluation for 
benefit or futility would be unwise given the complexity of the social sphere 
and that the effect of social interventions is rarely stable over time. Time 
variation has been observed in the effect of many policy interventions 
including employment (Card, Kluve, & Weber, 2010; National Audit 
Office, 2010) and crime/justice (Martin, Butzin, Saum, & Inciardi, 1999). 
Thus, I would normally not expect early interruptions of policy pilots. At 
the very least, procedures should be in place to ensure that pilots cannot be 
cut at a ‘propitious time’.  
 
 
5.2.2. Commitment to the intervention    
 
A commitment to the intervention is expected to lead to shorter evaluations 
as research generate important waiting costs for agencies (Carpenter, 2002). 
These costs are above all political. Patients want a drug for their disease, 
and firms that profit from drug sales want entry into potentially lucrative 
markets. To delay the authorisation to market the drug is to impose a cost 
upon these interests, and when these interests are well organised and 
influential, they can make it costly for the agency to delay (Carpenter 2002).  
 
Waiting costs depend on several factors. One of the most obvious is the 
expected benefit of the intervention. The higher the expected benefit is, the 
higher the pressure will be to make it available to all. This benefit can be 
assessed from two different perspectives. The first perspective is that of the 
beneficiary. In the area of clinical trials, this benefit is known as the 
therapeutic novelty of the intervention. In their study of new drug approved 
in the US between 1950 and 1986, Dranove and Meltzer (1994) show that 
more innovative drugs are developed and approved more rapidly than less 
innovative drugs. The second perspective is that of the drug manufacturer. 
The Dranove and Meltzer study shows also that drugs with a greater market 
potential are developed and approved more rapidly than other drugs.   
 
Waiting costs are also affected by the degree of organisation of the 
beneficiaries of the intervention. Agencies might find it harder to wait when 
the people affected by the problem are better organised and better funded.  
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Several scholars have documented the influence of organised patient groups 
over FDA behaviour (Carpenter, 2002; S. Epstein, 1996; Vogel, 1990).  
 
The newsworthiness of a particular problem also makes waiting politically 
costlier. Social disorders with greater severity and entrenchment are usually 
more newsworthy. When media allocate substantial coverage to a problem, 
then potential solutions receive more attention from the public, stakeholders 
and politicians (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). As a result, any delay in the 
implementation of the new intervention are amplified and the costs of 
waiting the publish evaluation results rise. Carpenter (2002) showed that the 
amount of media coverage given to a disease was significantly and 
negatively correlated with drug approval time.   
 
Finally, waiting costs are influenced by the reputational strategies of the 
different actors. In the area of clinical trials, this applies first to drug 
manufacturers. Olson showed that regulators respond to firm-specific 
characteristics when evaluating new drug applications. For example, firms 
that are less diversified and more R&D intensive are subject to shorter 
reviews for their applications than more diversified and less research-
intensive firms (Olson, 1997). The reputational strategy of agencies is also 
an important factor. Carpenter (2002) showed that the FDA will optimise 
the waiting cost related to the review of an application by weighing the 
danger of adverse drug reactions from approved drugs against the political 
cost of delaying the approval of the new drug.  
   
 
5.2.3. Social policy    
 
The above shows that we have accumulated a significant amount of 
information on how executive agencies in highly regulated policy areas 
allocate time to research. In contrast, the view that there might be a ‘double 
standard’ in evaluation procedures depending on the political salience of the 
social policy reform is widely shared but mainly based on hearsay. The 
considerable variation in the duration of evaluation projects as well as the 
absence of research protocols or any transparent rule to allocate resources 
has led some to induce that important non-scientific criteria were at play 
(Fay, 1996; Jowell, 2003; Sanderson, 2002; Walker, 2001).  
 
The public policy literature has provided ample evidence that was an 
important constraint for policy-makers. In-depth interviews with senior civil 
servants and ministers in the UK have shown that the decision to pilot was 
based largely on pragmatic considerations – the most salient of which was 
the timeframe available (Boa et al., 2010; Jowell, 2003). The roll-out of 
many new policies was widely acknowledged to be governed by timetables 
quite unable to accommodate lengthy policy trials. Once a major new policy 
had been announced to the public at large, the political and practical 
momentum in favour of rolling it out nationally – both without delay and 
without modification – was sometimes impossible to resist (Boa et al., 2010; 
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Jowell 2003). This problem is just slightly attenuated for the interventions 
which are granted pilot status. While appreciating the important contribution 
that early evaluation can make to the development and delivery of new 
policies, the ministers and policy civil servants interviewed by Jowell also 
complained that researchers were too seldom willing to recognise how short 
the optimal time period was in which to roll them out. They were 
predictably opposed to “the evaluation tail wagging the policy dog”, 
especially as, as one minister put it, “pilots are often seen to give unequal 
access to benefits for often very deprived people or areas” – a perception 
that was politically unsustainable for long periods (Jowell 2003). 
 
As predictably perhaps, many researchers interviewed by Jowell put the 
opposite case, referring to time scales for some pilots that were patently too 
short to achieve their aims. They argued that, if the very purpose of such 
pilots was to help refine new policies or practices prior to their national roll-
out, there was no point in working to a timetable that was incapable of 
accurately answering the primary questions being addressed (Jowell 2003). 
One or two evaluations (not mentioned to protect the identity of 
respondents) were singled out as examples of unrealistic timetables that had 
proved to be an embarrassment. By not allowing a sufficient period for the 
policy to bed in before measuring its impact, these pilots had wrongly 
presaged a failure of the policy when – as it later turned out – this was not 
the case (Jowell 2003). These findings confirm a hypothesis made earlier by 
other researchers (Coleman, 1979; Nathan, 2008).  
 
The aim of my study is to find out whether the above-mentioned results 
apply to policy research. Specifically, it tests the hypothesis that reforms of 
greater political ‘importance’ might be subject to shorter pilots.  
 
 
5.3. Measuring the duration of a pilot  
 
Contrary to new drug applications (NDAs), which are subject to 
regulation
13
, there is no procedure and no protocol specifying how long a 
pilot will be. Thus, the ‘real’ duration of a pilot is something that can be 
estimated rather than measured.  
 
The duration of a pilot can be estimated in different ways depending on how 
much credit one gives to formal institutions, decision-makers and processes. 
The approach taken in this study is to look at researchers’ intentions. 
                                                        
13
 In the US, the 1962 Drug Amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 
define the regulatory standard used by the FDA to evaluate NDAs. Pharmaceutical firms 
must show, first, that a new drug is safe, and second, that it is effective for its intended use. 
Furthermore, the 1962 Amendments outlined a multistage process for firms and the FDA to 
follow and obtain approval for a new drug. The process begins with laboratory and animal 
studies, and continues with three phases of clinical studies. When the firm completes all of 
these studies (which can take 8 to 10 years), it compiles all of its evidence and then submits 
it in the form of an NDA to the FDA for review (Olson 1997).   
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Accordingly, the duration is the number of months between the start of the 
pilot and its planned termination. The variable makes sense substantively, as 
one can assume that the duration of a pilot is determined by the political 
circumstances at the time of – or shortly before – the time of its launch. The 
planned duration is the dependent variable modelled hereafter.  
 
An alternative measurement would have been to report the date when the 
differentiated treatment of pilot and non-pilot sites terminated. This 
information is the one that is the most consistently given in evaluation 
reports. However, the observed duration can be misleading as it does not 
necessarily reflect the initial intentions of policy-makers. By the time of 
their termination, some pilots will have been extended; others will have 
been shortened for reasons that were unknown at the time when the decision 
was made.  
 
The problem with the above-mentioned indicators is that they take the 
duration of a pilot at face value and assume that policy-makers will wait 
until the end of the pilot to consider a possible roll-out. This might not 
always be what happens. Walker (2000) reported about the New Deal for 
Disabled People – a pilot conducted in the late 1990s by the Department for 
Work and Pensions – that the intention of policy-makers had always been to 
make a decision regarding a possible roll-out half-way through the two-year 
pilot period and before the results of impact analyses were available. Some 
authors have also made similar points about different reforms (Chitty, 2000; 
White & Dunleavy, 2010). Against this background, the supposed duration 
of a pilot could be defined as the number of months between its launch and 
the publication of the first evaluation report. This makes a difference only 
for the longer pilots, for which interim evaluation reports are often 
commissioned at an early stage.   
 
However, this indicator is not without problem either, as it rests on the 
assumption that these reports are made publicly available shortly after their 
presentation to policy-makers. However, I have some evidence that it might 
not always be the case. Firstly, exploratory research showed that the delay 
between the implementation of the pilot and the publication of first results 
can vary significantly from one department to the next. Secondly, I know 
that some reports can be subject to occasional publication embargos from 
the relevant departments (Metcalf, 2008). In fact, it has been argued that the 
control over the acceptance of contract deliverables and the timing of their 
release was the client’s main weapon in influencing the content of research 
reports (Metcalf, 2008). Whether they are due to embargos or genuine 
discussions between research commissioner and researcher, such delays 
suggest that the report’s content might be ‘bended’ in ways that threatens 
objectivity.  
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5.4. Hypotheses 
 
My first hypotheses build on the knowledge that more salient interventions 
are subject to shorter research procedures than less salient interventions (see 
section 5.2.2). An intervention can be considered politically salient if the 
government has publicly expressed its intention to roll out the reform. This 
type of pilots, known in the UK as ‘pathfinders’, is considered by many 
closer to prototyping than to experimenting (Sanderson 2002; Jowell 2003; 
Walker 2000; Boa, Johnson, King 2010; Martin and Sanderson 1999). 
Therefore, I would expect that such reforms were subject to shorter pilots. 
To test this idea, I formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Other things being equal, pathfinder pilots are shorter than formal 
pilots. 
 
Another way of assessing a government’s commitment to a specific reform 
is to check whether it was announced in the ruling party’s manifesto for the 
previous election (Rose, 1980). When policy initiatives arise from election 
manifestos, policy-makers are impatient to receive results that will provide 
evidential support for decisions to proceed with full implementation. Such a 
political interest potentially conflicts with the interests of evaluators, the 
interests of which are served long-term, in-depth analysis of the effects of 
pilots (Jowell 2003, Sanderson 2002, Walker 2002). Against this 
background, it is unlikely that an office-seeking government would commit 
large resources to pilot a measure that contributed to its electoral success. I 
will test this idea based on the following hypothesis:    
 
H2: Other things being equal, pilots that are directly related to a pre-
election manifesto pledge are shorter than other pilots. 
 
The relationship between citizens and elected representatives is the core 
concern of democratic theory and elections are typically assigned the 
principal role in structuring this relationship. They are a means by which the 
public can make governments accountable and influence policy directions. 
In institutions with strong political control of the bureaucracy and adequate 
incentives, this pressure for accountability trickles down to civil servants, 
who are encouraged to take a specific course of actions. In such 
circumstances, the political pressure exerted by an office-seeking 
government on the civil service is expected to be much greater towards 
Parliament’s end of term. A study in Brazil found that the approval of 
environmental licenses varied according to the electoral cycle and 
distributive politics motivations. In years of gubernatorial elections, more 
environmental licenses were approved, especially in municipalities with a 
large presence of loyal voters to the governor. In years of mayoral elections, 
the approval rate is larger where the mayor belonged to the same party as 
the governor (Ferraz, 2007). This responsiveness of bureaucrats to elected 
institutions has also been demonstrated in other settings (Coate, 2002; Frye 
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& Mansfield, 2004). The effect of the electoral cycle will thus be tested 
through the following hypothesis: 
 
H3:  Other things being equal, pilot duration is positively correlated with 
the amount of time remaining before the next general election. 
 
It should be said that hypothesis H4 needs to be taken with a pinch of salt 
when it comes to Britain’s New Labour. Arguably, the outcomes of the 
2001 and 2005 elections were never really in doubt. So the 2010 election 
was really the first one since 1997 that the Conservative Party had a good 
chance to win. This insight might have had an impact on the duration of 
pilots in Labour’s third term. To test that idea, I formulate the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H4:  Other things being equal, pilots launched during Labour’s third term 
are shorter than those launched in the two previous terms.   
 
In particular, I would expect the time before the next election to be a 
particularly salient issue in Labour’s third and last mandate. Therefore, I 
have added an interaction term between these two variables.  
 
H5:  Other things being equal, the effect of the time remaining before the 
next general election on pilot duration is stronger during Labour’s 
third term in government.   
 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 concern the DWP only as data could not be collected 
for all departments.  
 
Hypothesis 6 builds on the idea that the time afforded to research varies 
according to the target group (Carpenter 2002). More ‘important’ target 
groups are expected to be associated with shorter pilots. This is relevant for 
the DWP, which ranks its ‘customer groups’ using a point-based system. 
Against this background, I formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
H6:  Other things being equal, pilot duration is negatively correlated with 
the symbolic importance of the target group.    
 
Hypothesis 7 builds on the idea that the time afforded to research varies 
according to its expected benefit (Dranove & Meltzer 1994; Olson 1997). 
More ‘beneficial’ interventions are expected to be associated with shorter 
pilots. This is relevant for the DWP, which administers both voluntary and 
mandatory employment programmes. Although evidence of the economic 
effectiveness of mandatory work programmes is mixed (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2012), there is wide cross-party support in favour of 
mandatory work programmes and benefit sanctions in the UK (Grice, 2012). 
Against this background, I formulate the following hypothesis:  
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H7:  Other things being equal, mandatory employment programmes are 
subject to shorter pilots than voluntary programmes. 
 
My final hypothesis concerns pilot truncations. Bearing in mind that there is 
no strong scientific justification for the interruption of a policy pilot, but 
that there might be political benefits in it, I hypothesise that pilots to which 
the government is strongly committed are more likely to be truncated than 
pilots to which it is weakly committed. Given the limited amount of data, 
this hypothesis will be tested in a qualitative, non-inferential way. 
Hypothesis 8 reads as follows:    
 
H8:  A pilot is more likely to be stopped early when the government is 
committed to the policy and when interim results show an apparent 
benefit.   
 
This study includes two control variables. First, the optimal duration of a 
pilot depends on the level at which one wants to evaluate the intervention. 
Evaluations of pilot processes (including inputs/outputs, and 
client/implementer’s experiences) can be undertaken as the programme is 
being rolled out. Thus, they can be relatively short. Evaluations of ‘soft 
outcomes’ (employability, attitude in school, attitude to crime, etc.) would 
typically require the programme and its participants to ‘mature’, so they are 
expected to be longer than process evaluations. Evaluations of ‘hard 
outcomes’ (effect of the intervention on employment status, school 
performance, recidivism, etc.) will be the longest to conduct, as they involve 
substantial data collection. To capture this idea, I included a categorical 
variable for the type of effect with three values. 
  
Second, the duration of a research project is contingent on financial and 
human resources, as well as the expertise available within an organisation. I 
use the department commissioning the evaluation as a proxy for this notion. 
 
 
5.5. Data and methods  
 
The following analysis is based on the PILOT dataset presented in chapter 
4, which includes 233 pilots spanning 13 years (1997-2010) and three 
ministerial departments (DWP, DfE and HO and MoJ).  
 
The duration variable indicates the lapse of time, in months, between the 
reported start of a given pilot and its planned end date. I will show later that, 
although one would intuitively conceive duration as a continuous, interval-
level variable, in this specific case, it was treated as a discrete variable 
recorded in months. This was justified by the limited number of duration 
values. 
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Chapter 4 also describes the key independent variables that will be used 
throughout this thesis. As a reminder, I considered pathfinder pilots as a 
proxy for the government’s commitment to a reform and constructed the 
corresponding dummy variable.  
 
A reform was considered a manifesto commitment if both the objective and 
the intervention were mentioned in the Labour Party manifesto of the 
previous general election.  
 
The Election variable captures the number of months between the start of a 
pilot and the next general election. I also created a dummy variable for each 
of the three terms that Labour spent in government (1997-2001; 2001-2005; 
2005-2010).  
 
The type of evaluation conducted as part the pilot was measured using an 
ordinal variable with three categories: (1) process evaluation, (2) outcome 
evaluation; and (3) impact evaluation. Process evaluations address the effect 
of the intervention on daily operations, including the take-up of the 
intervention by target group, the burden on staff, etc. Outcome evaluations 
are concerned with changes in attitudes and dispositions at one point in time 
(e.g. the employability of jobseekers). Impact evaluations are those which 
measure the effect of the intervention using a counterfactual and/or several 
measurement phases. When several studies were available for the same 
pilot, I recorded the highest-order effect.   
 
The commissioning department was coded as mentioned on the report.   
 
I have used the scale used by DWP to prioritise its customer groups. 
According to this scale, Jobcentre Plus earns 12 points for the placement of 
a lone parent or a person with a disability, 8 points for the placement of a 
long-term unemployed and 1 point for the placement of a person already in 
employment.  
 
Finally, I created a dummy to distinguish interventions that are mandatory 
to target groups from interventions that are not. This information was 
collected from evaluation reports.  
 
The duration of a pilot given the government’s commitment to the 
intervention was modelled using event history analysis. The technique 
models the ‘hazard’ of an event, that is to say that an event occurs at 
particular time given that it has not occurred before that time. Event history 
models, sometimes called duration models or survival models, originate 
from biomedicine where they are used to model how observed variables 
(such as smoking) are associated with the amount of time from a starting 
point such as a treatment to an event such as death (see for example (Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004) for an overview). These models are now 
frequently used in the social sciences. For example Dranove and Meltzer 
Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? 
 
 
 
 
Arnaud Vaganay  109 
 
(1994) used event history analysis to model the timing of a drug’s approval 
given its scientific and commercial importance.  
 
Event history analysis is appropriate when the data are subject to censoring, 
that it to say when a subject leaves the study before an event occurs, or the 
study ends before the event has occurred. To be clear, there is no censoring 
in the data used for this study. However, duration models are still 
appropriate and make fewer assumptions than linear regression models 
regarding the distribution of the dependent variable. Normality, in 
particular, is not required.    
 
For the purpose of this study, the ‘survival time’ of a pilot is considered 
discrete as opposed to continuous. Each month of pilot implementation is 
coded 0 until the month when the pilot terminates (it is then coded 1). Thus, 
the equations presented in the results section are of the logistic kind and 
model the odds of a pilot terminating after a duration of a specific number 
of months, given that it has not terminated before and controlling for a 
number of other variables.  
 
 
5.6. Descriptive statistics  
 
The collection and description of data on pilot duration reveals a number of 
findings that are noteworthy. The first is that this information is sometimes 
not available. In more than 10% of cases, I failed to find the precise start 
date and/or the end date of the pilot, despite the extra research carried out in 
policy and administrative documents and the media. In fact, if I had limited 
my research solely to evaluation reports, the number of missing values 
would have been significantly higher. This shows that important 
information is often not reported in government-sponsored evaluations. This 
observation concerns all government departments and is not limited to the 
question of pilot duration. Chapters 6 and 7 will confirm that government 
evaluation reports rarely allow replication or research synthesis.   
 
The second finding concerns the duration of pilots. Exhibit 16 shows some 
descriptive statistics for the planned duration of pilots. I find an average 
duration of 20 months with a standard deviation of 11 months and a range 
going from two months to four years. The frequency distribution shows a 
clear pattern: over a fifth of pilots (51) has a planned duration of exactly 24 
months. The 2
nd
 most frequent value is 12 months (41 pilots) and the 3
rd
 is 
36 months (18 pilots).  
 
The PILOT dataset gives 50 occurrences of pilots for which the observed 
duration is not equal to the planned duration (21%). Out of those 
occurrences, 14 were due to a missing value (six missing planned durations; 
eight missing observed durations) and 36 were due to an early or late stop of 
the pilot. Out of those, 25 were extended and 11 were shortened. 
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Exhibit 16 – Frequency distribution of pilots per planned duration 
(N=207) 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 17 – Number of new pilots launched per year 
 
 
 
 
Looking at the distribution of the number of pilots per year (see Exhibit 17), 
we can see an upwards trend between 1997 and 2010. This trend is most 
obvious when one considers the number of new pilots launched between 
two elections: 26 during Labour’s first term (May 1997 to June 2001); 68 
during its second term (June 2001 to May 2005); and 90 during its third 
term (May 2005 to May 2010). The distribution also indicates that the 
number of new pilots launched does not seem to go down as the next 
election gets closer: indeed, out of the four years which saw the launch of 
the highest number of pilots, two were pre-election years (2004 and 2009). 
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Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Exhibit 18 below.  
 
 
Exhibit 18 – Descriptive statistics (pilot duration models) 
 
Variable  N Min Max Mean SD Freq 
Duration  217 2 48 19.8 10.6 -- 
Pathfinder 233 0 1 -- -- 56 
Manifesto  233 0 1 -- -- 112 
Election  221 0 58 25.4 14.8 -- 
Term 1 229 0 1 -- -- 38 
Term 2  229 0 1 -- -- 78 
Term 3 229 0 1 -- -- 113 
Process  215 0 1 -- -- 112 
Outcome 215 0 1 -- -- 46 
Impact 215 0 1 -- -- 57 
Department – DfE 233 0 1 -- -- 114 
Department – DWP 233 0 1 -- -- 58 
Department – HOME 233 0 1 -- -- 26 
Department – MoJ 233 0 1 -- -- 35 
Mandatory intervention* 54 0 1 -- -- 20 
Target group*  50 1 12 8.2 3.1 -- 
 
* Available for the DWP only  
 
 
5.7. Results 
 
5.7.1. Planned duration 
 
The results of the statistical analysis for the four departments are presented 
in Exhibit 19. The event modelled here is the ‘hazard’ of termination, i.e. 
the probability that a pilot terminates at month m, given that it has not ended 
before and given the independent variables introduced in section 5.4. As a 
reminder, the models are of the binary logistic type and a positive regression 
coefficient for an independent variable means that the hazard of termination 
is higher, and thus the pilot shorter. Three different specifications are 
proposed. Model A focuses on the association between my various 
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indicators of policy commitment and the planned duration of pilots. Model 
B adds the variables related to the electoral cycle. Model C is a more 
parsimonious proposition.  
 
The first six variables (in grey) in the output are part of the intercept of the 
model, i.e. the value of the dependent variable if all parameter coefficients 
were equal to 0. This information is commonly reported but rarely 
interpreted, given the lack of ‘substantive’ meaning. Thus I will not 
comment these lines. Besides, each cell of the output contains two lines: the 
first one represents the coefficient as a log odds ratio and the second line the 
same coefficient as an odds ratio (i.e. the result has been exponentiated). In 
this section and in the rest of the document, I will rather use the latter 
coefficient. The interpretation of the coefficients is as follows.     
 
Hypothesis 1 states that pathfinder pilots are shorter than formal pilots. 
There is strong evidence that it is true: all three models indicate a positive 
and statistically significant partial association between the two variables. 
The hazard of a pilot terminating at any time is between 3.03 times and 3.52 
times higher for pathfinders than for formal pilots. In other words, this 
hazard is between 203% and 252% higher for pathfinders than for pilots. 
This result is strongly significant across models. Hypothesis 1 cannot be 
rejected.  
 
Hypothesis 2 states that reforms directly related to manifesto pledges are 
associated with shorter pilots. The data shows that the opposite is true: 
controlling for other variables, being a pre-election pledge multiplies the 
odds of the hazard of a pilot terminating at any time by between 0.76 and 
0.84. In other words, it decreases the hazard of a termination by between 
24% and 16%. However, the effect is not statistically significant. The 
duration of pilots is evidently not influenced by election pledges and 
hypothesis 2 can be rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 3 states that the duration of a pilot is positively correlated with 
the time remaining before the next general election. Model 2 shows that it is 
not the case. Indeed, each additional month to the next general election 
multiplies the odds of the hazard of a pilot terminating at any time by 1. 
Unsurprisingly, this effect is not statistically significant. Hypothesis 3 can 
be rejected.  
 
According to hypothesis 4, pilots launched during Labour’s third term in 
government (2005-2010) are expected to be shorter than those launched in 
the two previous terms. The baseline in Exhibit 19 is Labour’s first term. 
The results show that, controlling for other variables, being launched in 
Labour’s second term multiplies the odds of the hazard of a pilot 
terminating at any time by 0.58 compared with a pilot launched during the 
first term (they are 42% lower). This result is not significant. Likewise, 
being launched in Labour’s third term multiplies the odds of the hazard of a 
pilot terminating at any time by 0.55 compared with a pilot launched during 
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the first term (they are 45% lower). This result is not significant either. 
Hypothesis 5 can be rejected.  
 
Hypothesis 5 states that the effect of the time remaining before the next 
general election on pilot duration was stronger during Labour’s third term in 
government. Model 2 shows that, each extra month before the next general 
election multiplies the hazard of a termination by 1 when this pilot was 
launched in Labour’s first or second term and by 0.99 in the third term. 
Unsurprisingly given the results above, none of these results are statistically 
significant. Hypothesis 6 can be rejected. 
 
Exhibit 19 contains two control variables. First, the research question 
addressed in the evaluation report was included, based on the hypothesis 
that longer-term questions would require longer pilots. Models 1 to 3 
analysed the partial effect of process evaluations, outcome evaluations and 
impact evaluations separately. I found that, on average, an outcome 
evaluation would multiply the odds of a pilot terminating at a certain time 
by 0.44 (i.e. reduce them by 56%) compared with a process evaluation. 
Likewise, an impact evaluation multiplies the odds of a pilot terminating at 
a certain time by an average of 0.66 (i.e. reduce them by 34%) compared 
with a process evaluation. In other words, both outcome and impact 
evaluations are longer than process evaluations; however the difference is 
only statistically significant for outcome evaluations. Model 3 offers a more 
parsimonious model, whereby outcome and impact evaluations are merged 
into a single category. The model concludes that, controlling for other 
variables, conducting an impact or outcome evaluation multiplies the odds 
of a pilot terminating at a certain time by 0.59 (i.e. reduces them by 41%) 
compared with a process evaluation. This result is significant at the 5% 
level.  
 
Second, I analysed the effect of organisations on pilot duration, based on the 
hypothesis that pilots commissioned by the Home Office or the Ministry of 
Justice would be shorter than those of the DWP or the Department of 
Education. I found that, controlling for other variables, being commissioned 
by the DWP multiplied the odds of a pilot terminating at a certain time by 
between 0.80 and 1 compared with the DfE. Conversely, controlling for 
other variables, being commissioned by the Home Office or MoJ multiplied 
the odds of a pilot terminating at a certain time by between 1.02 and 1.33 
compared with the DfE. Although the direction of these effects is in line 
with my initial hypotheses, none of them are statistically significant.    
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Exhibit 19 – Pilot duration models (all departments) 
 
Method: Duration model for discrete data  
NB: In each cell of the output, the first line represents the coefficient as a log odds 
ratio and the second line the same coefficient as an odds ratio.   
 
 (A) (B) (C) 
Time 
.06** 
(1.06) 
.06** 
(1.06) 
.06** 
(1.06) 
Time6 
1.22** 
(3.38) 
1.27** 
(3.56) 
1.23* 
(3.42) 
Time12 
2.87** 
(17.63) 
2.98** 
(19.68) 
2.86** 
(17.63) 
Time18 
1.56** 
(4.75) 
1.61** 
(5.00) 
1.56** 
(4.75) 
Time24 
3.97** 
(52.98) 
3.93** 
(50.90) 
  3.95** 
(51.93) 
Time36 
4.04** 
(56.82) 
4.07** 
(58.55) 
4.05** 
(56.82) 
Pathfinder  
1.26** 
(3.52) 
1.11** 
(3.03) 
1.15** 
(3.15) 
Manifesto 
-.27 
(0.76) 
-.26 
(0.77) 
-- 
Election -- 
.00 
(1) 
-- 
-- Term 1 (b) -- -- -- 
-- Term 2 -- 
-.54 
(0.58) 
-- 
-- Term 3  -- 
-.59 
(0.55) 
-- 
Election x Term 3 -- 
3.21e-06 
(0.99) 
-- 
-- Process (b) -- -- -- 
-- Outcome 
-.82** 
(0.44) 
-.80** 
(0.44) 
-- 
-- Impact 
-.36 
(0.69) 
-.44 
(0.64) 
-- 
Outcome/Impact -- -- 
-.52* 
(0.59) 
-- DFE (b) -- -- -- 
-- DWP 
-.19 
(0.82) 
-.22 
(0.80) 
-.00 
(1) 
-- HOME_MoJ 
.03 
(1.33) 
-.02 
(1.02) 
.09 
(1.09) 
N 2532 2458 2532 
 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 (b) Baseline 
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5.7.2. Factors specific to DWP  
 
Exhibit 20 provides two extra models based on DWP data only. Model D is 
identical to Model C (but with a focus on the DWP). Model E adds the 
variables related to the target group and the degree of constraint of the 
intervention. The interpretation of coefficient remains unchanged.   
 
Across the models, the effect of pathfinders remains strong and significant. 
However, the effect of the type of study on pilot duration weakens when 
only DWP data is considered and ceases to be significant. 
 
 
Exhibit 20 – Pilot duration models (DWP only) 
 
Method: Duration model for discrete data  
NB: In each cell of the output, the first line represents the coefficient as a log odds 
ratio and the second line the same coefficient as an odds ratio.   
 
 (D) (E) 
Time 
.07** 
(1.07) 
.09** 
(1.09) 
Time6 
1.47 
(4.35) 
2.03** 
(7.61) 
Time12 
3.08** 
(21.76) 
3.48** 
(32.46) 
Time18 
1.76** 
(5.81) 
1.98** 
(7.24) 
Time24 
4.60** 
(99.50) 
4.64** 
(103.54) 
Time36 
4.39** 
(80.64) 
4.15** 
(63.43) 
Pathfinder  
3.65** 
(38.47) 
3.63** 
(37.71) 
Target group -- 
-.01 
(.099) 
Mandatory intervention -- 
.23 
(1.26) 
Outcome/Impact 
-.37 
(0.69) 
-.47 
(0.62) 
N 822 818 
 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 (b) Baseline 
 
 
Hypothesis 6 states that target groups with a higher level of priority are 
subject to shorter pilots. The evidence shows that the effect of target group 
is very small and insignificant. Hypothesis 6 can be rejected.  
Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? 
 
 
 
 
Arnaud Vaganay  116 
 
Hypothesis 7 states that mandatory interventions will be subject to shorter 
pilots than non-mandatory interventions. The evidence shows that the 
‘direction’ of the effect is as anticipated. Controlling for other variables, 
piloting a mandatory intervention multiplies the hazard of a termination by 
1.26 compared with a voluntary intervention, i.e. increases them by 26%. 
However, this effect is not statistically significant. Hypothesis 7 can be 
rejected. 
  
 
5.7.3. Early stopping  
 
Hypothesis 8 states that a pilot is more likely to be stopped early when the 
government is committed to the policy and when interim results show an 
apparent benefit.   
 
The observed duration of a pilot was shorter than the planned duration in 11 
instances. All of them were interrupted further to the May 2010 election, 
which saw a change of majority in Parliament. Thus, the evidence suggests 
that political commitments can lead to early pilot termination, but not in a 
way that could have been predicted by the literature on clinical trials. It was 
the change of policy strategy that triggered the early termination of these 
pilots rather than the will to see them rolled out as soon as possible.  
 
It is difficult to know precisely what role evidence played in these decisions. 
However, there are some indications that, in this particular circumstance, it 
was marginal. Out of the 11 pilots interrupted because of the election, four 
were cancelled by the incoming government before they had even started. In 
five other cases, the change of government resulted in the rescoping and the 
scaling back of the evaluations, which suggests that the decision to interrupt 
the pilot had little to do with results. For example, the evaluators of the 
Child Development Grant pilot reported that:  
 
“The methodology changed significantly following the announcement 
to bring forward the close of the CDG pilot. Original plans for 
longitudinal interviews with parents were not carried forward” (Child 
Development Grant Evaluation, p.ii).  
 
In one case (Right2BCared4 pilots), it was not possible to identify whether, 
on the whole, the intervention had had a positive or negative effect and 
whether this effect was significant. 
 
In only one case (Find Your Talent), the pilot seems to have had a positive 
effect on the target group. As indicated in the evaluation report:  
 
“The findings from Year 1 and 2 demonstrate early evidence of 
programme additionality in several areas, as observed and reported by 
partners and stakeholders”. (Find Your Talent Evaluation, p.27), 
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However; the policy was not rolled out, which shows that the decision to 
interrupt the pilot was not related to the findings. Against this background, 
Hypothesis 8 can be rejected: in policy research, early stopping is unlikely 
to be used to favour the intervention over the counterfactual.     
 
 
5.8. Discussion 
 
The findings of this study agree with the rest of the literature in three ways. 
Across the models, the most robust finding is that reforms which the 
government is committed to roll out (pathfinders) are significantly shorter 
than ‘formal’ pilots. This result is noteworthy: it confirms that reforms 
which the government intends to roll out are less ‘researched’ than other 
reforms, as previously written (Chitty, 2000; Sanderson, 2002; Walker, 
2000; White & Dunleavy 2010).  
 
The second finding counterbalances the first one. It shows that the scientific 
prescription according to which the duration of a research project should be 
dictated by the research question is respected: I found that, overall, process 
evaluations are significantly shorter than outcome/impact evaluations (when 
considered as a single category). The slightly surprising finding of the lack 
of significant difference between outcome and impact evaluations can be 
explained. A number of evaluation reports indicated that the government 
had initially planned to evaluate the impact of the new intervention. 
However formal and informal studies later on concluded to the infeasibility 
of an impact evaluation owing to insufficient sample size, inappropriate 
research design or lack of data. Less ‘ambitious’ research designs have 
sometimes been adopted without affecting the duration of the pilot. This is 
exemplified in the evaluation of the Time to Talk programme, which 
indicates that: 
 
“The original research design included a focus on outcomes as 
measured by questionnaires to the participating parents before and 
after their involvement. However, because of delays and challenges in 
recruiting staff, implementing the programme locally and engaging 
parents, the research design was adapted, with the agreement of the 
Teenage Pregnancy Unit, to one based on qualitative interviews, 
supplemented by basic quantitative data” (Davis, Cullen, Davis, & 
Lindsay, 2010, p.6).  
 
Third, I found out that pilots were sometimes interrupted early after 
instructions given by ministers, as suggested in the medical literature. 
However – and this is a key difference with the medical literature – those 
interruptions did not aim to favour the intervention. All interruptions 
happened further to a change of government and the evidence suggests that 
little attention was given to the evaluation results. This finding is 
interesting, as it gives ground to the ‘symbolic’ role of research in policy 
Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? 
 
 
 
 
Arnaud Vaganay  118 
 
(Weiss, 1979). According to this theory, evaluation is less used to inform 
policy decisions than to justify decisions that have already been made on the 
basis of ideas, professional experience, self-interest, organizational interest, 
a search for prestige, or any of the multiplicity of reasons that go into 
decisions about policy and practice. Besides, this finding triggers the 
interesting question of the effect of changes of government on the type of 
evidence used in policy-making. 
 
This chapter also offered some more surprising results. First, I found no 
significance difference in the duration of pilots based on whether or not they 
were related to a pre-election pledge. This could be explained by the fact 
that some ‘formal’ pilots were announced in election manifestos. Presenting 
an intervention as a pilot (and thus, somehow, as a ‘policy experiment’) 
does not commit the government to a specific decision. In fact, the 
government might even take credit for its pragmatism – at least as long as it 
concerns a limited number of uncontentious reforms. Conversely, the 
financial crisis that hit Britain in 2008 triggered a number of pilots and 
reforms – many of them fairly salient – that could not be foreseen at the 
time of the previous general election in May 2005.       
 
Second, I showed that the duration of a pilot was not affected by the 
electoral cycle. This result is somewhat troubling as it contradicts the 
strongly held view that the timetables of research conflicts with the 
timetables of politics. It could be that, for a few specific reforms, timing 
could indeed have been an issue, giving the impression to some that this was 
a widespread problem. In other words, timing could be a punctual problem 
but in the grand scheme of things, it is not.  
 
 
5.9. Conclusion 
 
This chapter was designed to examine whether politically salient reforms 
were subject to shorter pilots than reforms with lower salience.  
 
The first objective was to analyse the extent to which pilot studies fulfil the 
two scientific prescriptions that concern timeframes. Looking at the 
proportionality of timeframes, I found that whilst government officials are 
generally subject to greater time pressure than researchers working 
independently or in academia (which can be explained by the political cycle, 
scarce resources or both), they still allocate resources such as time based on 
research considerations. Whereas the mean duration (20 months) would 
seem credible in relation to the professional guidance given by 
government’s scientists (Magenta Book), about a third of pilots lasted for 12 
months or less, which raises some questions regarding the type of research 
that can be done in so little time. Generally, I found that there was a great 
amount of variation in the duration of pilots (from 2 to 48 months). Having 
said that, the data shows that, overall, the duration of pilots was proportional 
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to the type of research undertaken, with impact evaluations given more time 
than process evaluations. Unfortunately, it was not possible to assess 
whether more complex interventions were subject to longer pilots, as 
recommended by the research methods literature. Furthermore, I found that 
very few pilots had been truncated (about 5%). All of the truncated pilots 
were interrupted following the change of government in May 2010, which 
thus excludes the possibility that these interruptions were decided for 
convenience.        
   
The second objective of this chapter was to investigate whether pilots to 
which the government was committed were associated with shorter pilots. I 
found limited evidence of an association. The data shows that, controlling 
for other variables, pathfinders are significantly shorter than formal pilots. 
However, there is no significant difference in terms of duration between 
interventions related to a pre-election pledge and interventions which were 
not. In addition, I did not find that the duration of pilots was influenced by 
the electoral cycle, as expected. This is an important finding, which 
contradicts the rest of the literature and most of the anecdotes heard on the 
subject. I also did not find that the duration of pilots was influenced by the 
political ‘salience’ of the intervention as measured by the target group or the 
fact that the intervention may be sanctioned. Finally, the fact that all the 
truncated pilots were interrupted following the change of government in 
May 2010 can be interpreted in opposite ways. On the one hand, it can be 
seen as supporting the idea that policy U-turns (or changes in policy 
commitments) have an effect on the duration of pilots. The results of an 
existing pilot might be embarrassment for a new government with different 
policy priorities. On the other hand, this can be seen as a specificity of 
democratic systems, whereby the most desirable policies are those which 
are supported by a majority, not necessarily those that are the most 
effective.    
 
Unfortunately, I have some reasons to believe that this study did not fully 
answer the question asked in the introduction. First, this study did not 
control for the complexity of the intervention. Yet it is one of the main 
reasons why a pilot might be longer. It is easy to understand why pilots 
requiring deep institutional or organisational changes – such as the merger 
of the Employment Service and the Department of Social Security into 
Jobcentre Plus – need more time to ‘bed in’ than simple adjustments to 
training programmes. None of the variables tested for that purpose proved 
satisfying. Second, it was not possible to control for the ‘size’ of the pilot. 
Here again, the underlying hypothesis was that ‘larger’ pilots would require 
more ‘piloting time’ than smaller pilots. The number of pilot participants 
was too inconsistently reported across evaluation reports to be included in 
my models. The same remark applies to the number of areas or units of 
delivery (schools, jobcentre plus offices, courts, etc.). Third, the reader 
needs to bear in mind that the duration of a pilot can only be estimated. The 
real duration remains a ‘black box’ issue unknown of the public.  
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6. Effect of policy commitments on 
pilot site selection  
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
Just as the amount of time afforded to a pilot can tell us about the respective 
influences of professional and political logics on research decisions, the 
distribution of pilot sites across a country can provide information about the 
goals of policy research. In the previous chapter, I remarked that the 
variation in pilot duration could not only be explained by the type of 
research. In particular, this decision was found to be associated with the 
government’s commitment to the reform. Armed with this knowledge, I can 
now re-examine the question of the selection of pilot sites. For that purpose, 
I will look more specifically at the welfare-to-work pilots run by the DWP 
through Jobcentre Plus, which is organised in 40 districts across England. I 
will try to answer this question: how can it be that, whilst an average 
Jobcentre Plus district hosted about 10 pilots between 1997 and 2010, some 
of them were selected only three times and some others up to 23 times? As 
in the previous chapters, both scientific and ‘real-world’ considerations will 
be controlled for, so I can best estimate the partial effect of the political 
logic.    
    
The objective of the following chapter is not simply to describe the process 
leading to the selection of pilot sites but to explain why I see what I see. Our 
central hypothesis – presented in detail in section 3 of chapter 2 – is that, 
using information on the political salience of some of these pilots, 
researchers will select districts in a way that minimises the uncertainty of 
the pilot outcome. In other words, politically salient pilots are expected to 
be tested in districts chosen for their exemplarity, rather than for their 
representativeness. As in the previous chapter, I aim to build the statistical 
model that best explains this decision.   
   
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The first section discusses 
theoretically – using professional research guidelines as well as the political 
science literature and previous empirical evidence – why one might expect a 
pilot site to be representative in the scientific logic, as opposed to 
exemplary, in the political logic. Section 2 briefly presents the findings from 
interviews conducted with policy researchers in the ‘feasibility’ stage of this 
study. Section 3 introduces the data and the variables for the logistic 
regression. Section 4 discusses the hypotheses. Sections 5 and 6 present 
descriptive and inferential statistics respectively. Finally, section 7 discusses 
the findings.  
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6.2. Expected effect of policy commitment   
 
I briefly discussed in chapter 2 why sampling could be an issue in applied 
research projects and came to the conclusion that the degree of 
representativeness of a research unit (both at individual and regional level) 
could be a meaningful indicator of their responsiveness to market and 
political institutions. The following section looks more specifically at policy 
pilots and summarises what I know on the subject.   
 
 
6.2.1. Commitment to the scientific method   
 
According to the Magenta Book (The Magenta Book: Guidance for 
evaluation, 2011), there are two main threats to the external validity of a 
pilot. The first case is when those affected by a pilot are not representative 
of the wider population. For example, if a policy is only piloted in parts of 
London, it would be unwise to assume that the observed effects would be 
the same in other parts of the country. A well-designed pilot study would 
address this by including a variety of different types of area. Even so, it is 
unlikely to be an exact representation of the whole population. Where it is 
possible to quantify how the pilot areas differ from the country as a whole, 
it may be possible to correct for this bias. This can be particularly valuable 
if the choice of pilot areas (or participants) is constrained, for example, if 
there is a greater than average representation of urban areas in the pilot. A 
second and more difficult case to deal with is where the pilot areas (or 
people, or units) are self-selecting, for example, if local authorities were 
asked to volunteer to participate. In such cases, the generalizability of the 
pilot findings to areas that are compelled to participate in a later 
implementation stage cannot be assumed. 
 
The only way to be certain that the results of an evaluation represent the 
behaviour of a particular population is to ensure that the units are randomly 
selected from that population. For example, out of the 433 local authorities 
in England, each one should have a probability of 1/433 to be selected for a 
given pilot if indeed the intervention is provided at the level of local 
authorities. Importantly, the method does not need to be a simple random 
sample, however it should include some kind of randomness (multistage 
sample, cluster sample, etc.). Regardless of the method used, it is considered 
essential that the roll-out schedule be not correlated with the outcome. For 
example, the performance of local agencies should not be used for sampling 
purposes.   
 
There are implications for our research. If the purpose of the study is to use 
the results from the pilot sites to derive conclusions that will apply for the 
whole country, then the set of pilot sites should be reasonably representative 
of the country. In statistical terms, this means that a probability sample 
should be used, i.e. a sample where each unit has a known, non-zero chance 
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of being selected. Conversely, any kind of sample that does not rely on 
probabilistic properties is prone to a certain type of bias. Just like normal 
conditions will lead to normal results, exceptional conditions lead to 
exceptional results.  
 
 
6.2.2. Commitment to the intervention  
 
From an institutional level, pilots have an important property: they 
introduce a temporary geographical variation in the administration of a 
given jurisdiction. The UK for example had to change its legislation in 1996 
to allow different levels of benefits to be tested across the country. From a 
political point of view, this differentiated treatment creates opportunities 
both for the ‘central’ and the ‘local’ policymaker.   
 
 
6.2.2.1. Pilot sites as exemplars  
 
Although I have already made this point several times in this study, it is 
worth repeating this crucial fact: public policies in the UK – and probably in 
many other countries – are evaluated by the organisations that conceive and 
implement them. This institutional set-up makes the evaluation of these 
policies unlikely to be value-free. Studies finding that a specific reform has 
had an insignificant effect – or a negative one – on the group it was 
targeting will put the government in a rather uncomfortable situation 
(Bovens et al., 2008). If the government has a vested interest in showing 
that its policies have a positive effect, then decisions such as the choice of 
pilot sites do matter. I would indeed expect policy-makers to use their 
knowledge about these sites to select those which are most likely to generate 
a positive outcome.     
 
Pilots with a relatively high level of political salience are virtually 
indistinguishable from gradual reforms. Gradual reforms are deep and far-
reaching policy changes which are implemented in sequences, one group at 
a time, and in the economic literature they are opposed to ‘big-bang’ 
reforms. The literature on gradual reforms – which was first developed to 
explain the successes and failures of reforms in transition countries – has 
shown the importance of building constituencies for reform through 
appropriate sequencing. This usually means implementing a reform on the 
most compliant groups first and taking advantage of favourable exogenous 
events to roll out the reform to other, more resistant groups. Sequencing 
gives governments the opportunity to maximise the probability of moving 
forward to the next stage of the reform process (Dewatripont & Roland, 
1996).    
 
Pilots can be seen as strategies to build constituencies for reform. If the 
objective of the pilot is not to yield generalizable results but as a way of 
building internal support for change and overcoming resistance, it is better 
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not to look for representative sites, but rather to look for exemplars. 
According to this line of thinking, pilot sites should not be randomly drawn, 
but selected with a purpose. Hasluck suggests that such reasoning might not 
be absent from policy-makers’ decisions and that “the resources devoted to 
the pilot may exceed that available at national roll-out” (Hasluck, 2000). 
Some authors have seconded that point of view, alluding that the use of 
pilots could be more akin to prototyping than to experimentation (Brodkin 
& Kaufman 1997; Walker 2001). Others have warned against the “structural 
danger of unrepresentativeness” of pilots in a context where there is a strong 
political commitment to a policy, and the pilot receives generous resourcing 
(Sanderson, 2002). 
 
There are some empirical results supporting this claim. In his study of an 
environmental programme implemented in Madagascar, the Opération 
Menabé Pilot, Billé (2010) observed that the pilot region had been chosen 
amongst other reasons because of the existence of a Regional Development 
Committee, unique in Madagascar and without any official existence in the 
national politico-administrative system. This committee was considered 
reliable, energetic and with strong leadership under the authority of a 
motivated local dignitary (Billé, 2010). Billé concluded that the first step in 
setting up a pilot experiment is usually to identify a space (territory, 
community, sub-basin, administrative unit, etc.) in which the conditions 
before the intervention seem favourable enough to offer the best promise of 
success (Billé, 2010).  
 
 
1.2.2. Clientelism  
 
The second opportunity offered by pilots is clientelism, i.e. the exchange of 
goods and services for political support. Clientelism may arise when two 
conditions are met: (1) the piloted intervention brings an obvious immediate 
benefit to its target groups, such as cash payments and other financial 
incentives; and (2) the piloting phase is long.  
 
There is anecdotal evidence of clientelism in the selection of pilot sites. 
Jowell (2003) reported that the pilot of the Education Maintenance 
Allowance, which tested different models and levels of monetary reward for 
young people to stay on at school, had created intense political pressure, 
especially from MPs in constituencies bordering the pilot sites. Similar 
anecdotes were reported by one of our interviewees (see chapter 4). Rogers-
Dillon came to a similar conclusion in her analysis of the Welfare-to-Work 
reform launched in 1996 by US President Bill Clinton. The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) gave US states the 
power to pilot time-limited benefits. Rogers-Dillon observed that the Act 
created a win-win situation, whereby governors were afforded political 
power in exchange for their support of the reform (Rogers-Dillon, 2004).  
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This type of selection, though morally questionable, does not necessarily 
affect the findings of the evaluation, as long as the sampled sites are not 
correlated with the outcome of interest. It is not addressed in the rest of this 
chapter.  
 
 
6.3. An account of sampling decisions at the 
DWP  
 
The following section reports on a series of 17 interviews conducted with 
policy researchers between October 2011 and February 2012. The aim of 
these interviews was to test the feasibility of a quantitative study of 
sampling decisions, as well as to collect a maximum of information on how 
this decision was made. Two types of sampling decisions were discussed: 
(1) the sampling of regions; and (2) the assignment to conditions in the case 
of studies with control groups.    
 
 
6.3.1. Decision makers  
 
There was a consensus among respondents that sampling decisions did not 
follow a formal, invariable procedure. Having said that, all agreed that it 
was primarily the competence of policy-makers. Some knew that the 
decision was made after consultation of key groups including analysts and 
Jobcentre Plus District (JCPD) Managers. There was also an agreement on 
the fact that external evaluators were never involved. According to one 
interviewee, “the set-up of the pilot, including the selection of sites, is 
brought on a plate to the contractor”. With respect to a possible involvement 
of elected policy-makers, the majority of respondents could not rule it out, 
but in the meantime no one had evidence to support one claim or another 
(see below). 
 
 
6.3.2. Opinion about the use of probability mechanisms for 
the choice of sites/individuals  
 
Questioned about their perception of the meaning and relevance of 
probability sampling among stakeholders, all interviewees agreed to say that 
the notion was highly divisive. 
 
Politicians were perceived to have ambivalent positions on the subject. One 
the one hand, the need to pilot a new intervention in a set of regions that is 
representative of the country as a whole was felt to be understood. 
Occasionally, MPs would even hold the government to account on this 
issue, as shown by the following statement, found in a Select Committee 
Report:   
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 “We understand the reasons why the present pilot areas were chosen, 
but the Government will need to bear in mind during the evaluation 
the fact that the pilot areas are not fully representative of the country 
as a whole. We recommend that, even at this late stage, the 
Government should give consideration to adding a pilot area which 
covers a predominantly London Area or Northern City geographical 
type.” (House of Commons, 1999a).  
 
To which the government responded: 
 
“The Government notes the Committees’ concerns. We are confident 
that the pilot areas are sufficiently representative of the country as a 
whole for us to make sound estimates of the national impact of ONE. 
The selection of the pilot areas was determined primarily by the need 
to ensure that the pilots covered a range of labour markets and 
demographic characteristics, and the areas selected (such as Lea 
Roding and Leeds) include characteristics of concern to the 
Committees such as deprivation and representation of ethnic 
minorities (…). Adding another pilot area at this stage would increase 
substantially the cost of the pilots, and would be impractical at this 
stage, without significantly increasing the depth or robustness of the 
evaluation.” (House of Commons, 1999b).  
 
On the other hand, at a more micro level, the use of probabilistic formulas to 
assign individuals to conditions was perceived by interviewees as 
problematic for ministers and interest groups, who tend to find the method 
unethical. Likewise, mid-level and frontline bureaucrats tend to find 
methods like randomisation unfair and occasionally imposing extra burden 
on public services without prior discussion. Conversely, some interviewees 
reported that probability mechanisms had strong proponents among the 
economists working for the Treasury. One of them said that Treasury 
officials were often ready to trial any kind of intervention, provided it was 
evaluated with experimental methods. For example, the Employment 
Retentions and Advancement demonstration was above all a research 
project testing the feasibility of large-scale RCTs in the UK. Treasury and 
DWP officials had to identify a low-profile intervention to make it happen.  
 
Among the community of researchers, feelings about probability 
mechanisms were thought to depend on the department to which researchers 
were affiliated as well as their academic background. For example, one 
interviewee reported that RCTs were highly regarded at the Department for 
Health, which employs a high number of individuals with training in 
medical research. In fact, this interviewee reported that the use of 
randomisation had been the condition of the Department’s participation to 
the Job Retention and Rehabilitation Pilot initiated by the DWP. 
Conversely, researchers at the Department for Education (which employs a 
large number of analysts with qualitative research skills) were found more 
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sceptical about the usefulness of experiments and quasi-experiments. DWP 
analysts were found to be in the middle.  
 
 
6.3.3. Selection criteria   
 
There appears to be no single sampling method used and probably no ‘pure’ 
method used either. The interviewees indicated that three factors were 
considered when selection pilot sites, with different levels of influence 
depending on circumstances.  
 
The first consideration spontaneously mentioned is normative: site selection 
has a direct impact on the validity of results. However, there was a 
disagreement among interviewees as to what criterion was taking 
precedence. Some said that sites had been selected with a view to maximise 
internal validity. In other words, regions with the highest number of people 
belonging to the target groups were more likely to be selected than others. 
This view was mostly held by researchers having evaluated pilots for well-
defined groups such as lone parents. For others, the selection of pilot sites 
was motivated by the idea of generalizability or external validity. It had to 
cover a range of different characteristics including geography 
(North/South…), urban/rural, economic structure of the region, etc. One 
interviewee mentioned the importance of not having any other pilot running 
for the same target group. Some respondents pointed the presence of quotas. 
For example, London, which is in many respects different from the rest of 
the country (due to its cost of living, its high proportion of migrants and the 
dynamism of its economy), will almost always be included in a national 
pilot.   
 
The second consideration mentioned was more practical or managerial. 
According to one respondent, “some Jobcentre Plus District Managers are 
more compliant to pilot and cooperate with DWP than others” and this was 
view as an important factor in the implementation of pilots. Another one 
seconded that statement, citing the example of Manchester, which is a 
recurrent pilot site for that very reason. Overall, practical considerations 
were found important by a majority of respondents. One of them concluded 
that the sum of all criteria to fulfil made the process of site selection 
“probably not very scientific”.   
 
Last but not least, two researchers drew our attention to the fact that the 
selection of sites had gone through a call for expression of interest to private 
or public service providers. This was the case of the Job Retention and 
Rehabilitation Pilot and the Work-Focused Services in Children’s Centre 
pilot.     
 
 
 
 
Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? 
 
 
 
 
Arnaud Vaganay  128 
 
6.3.4. Evidence of political influence  
 
Interviewees disagreed on whether political considerations had influenced 
the selection of sites for the pilot they were involved in. For about half of 
respondents, a political bias of any kind in the selection of pilot sites was 
unlikely. Respondents felt that the pilot they had evaluated had too low a 
profile to trigger ministerial interest.  
 
 
6.4. Data and methods 
 
6.4.1. Principles 
 
As already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, our analysis is 
based on a subset of the PILOT dataset presented in chapter 4, namely the 
pilots conducted by the DWP. Although a cross-policy analysis would have 
desirable, such study would have very complicated to carry out. The 
problem is that the ‘administrative geography’ of the four government 
departments included in the full PILOT dataset is not comparable. For 
example, the DfE works mainly with the 152 local authorities (LAs) of 
England, however these LAs are free to pilot new interventions jointly or at 
a higher administrative level. The Home Office coordinates the work of the 
43 police forces in England and Wales. On its end, the MoJ ‘manages’ 42 
probation areas (which are coterminous with police force area boundaries 
but are served by 35 Probation Trusts), 650 HM Courts and Tribunals as 
well as 130 HM prisons in England and Wales. Lastly, the DWP relies on its 
network of 40 Jobcentre Plus districts (JCPD) in England for the 
administration of unemployment benefits and on local authorities for the 
administration of the Housing Benefit.   
 
 
6.4.2. Jobcentre Plus districts as units 
 
Given the objective of this study as well as the above-mentioned constraints, 
it was decided that I would focus on the pilots run by the DWP. Fifty of 
them were identified in chapter 4.  
 
In terms of the geographical units, I used Jobcentre Plus districts to define 
the regions where pilots were conducted. This decision was motivated by 
the fact that pilots are often implemented at this level. The number of such 
districts changed over time. I use the 40 distinct districts of England 
(version prior to April 2011) to be able to match data items consistently 
across datasets. Other classifications were also considered such as the 93 
NUTS 3 regions of England, the 152 local authorities, the 354 districts or 
the 850 or so JCP offices, however JCPDs were considered to be the best 
option. 
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For each of the 50 pilot schemes run by the DWP, pilot sites were selected 
from identical pools of 40 districts (N=2000 pilot-districts).  
 
The problem with Jobcentre Plus districts is that few indicators are 
aggregated at this level. So the data collection work involved the 
construction of a pool-up table matching each local authority (counties and 
districts) with NUTS 3 regions and JCPDs.  
 
 
6.4.3. Operationalisation  
 
An exemplar pilot site is a region where a pilot is most likely to produce a 
positive effect, be it in terms of process (i.e. new rules are applied ‘by the 
book’), outcome (i.e. customers get new qualifications) or impact (i.e. 
customers find a job), thereby acting as ‘role-model’ for other regions. 
Thus, the exemplarity of a region may refer to two distinct traits: behaviour 
and performance.  
  
 
6.4.3.1. District managers as local policy entrepreneurs   
 
From a mid- and street-level bureaucrat point of view, pilot implementation 
is not different from policy implementation. It does not matter much for 
local civil servants that the policy be delivered for a limited time (given the 
perpetually changing policy framework) and in small number of districts. 
Therefore, pilot implementation is likely to be affected by the same shirking 
behaviours that characterise policy implementation (Lipsky, 1980). Against 
this background, some JCPDs might be better ‘test beds’ for new 
interventions because local management and procedures have a reputation 
for being supportive of the policies made centrally in Whitehall. JCPD 
managers play a key role in this respect, as they are the links between the 
government and the street-level bureaucracy and thus can act as policy 
entrepreneurs.  
 
A policy entrepreneur has been defined as an individual “who exploited an 
opportunity to influence policy outcomes in order to maximize his/her self-
interests, without having the resources required for achieving this goal 
alone” (Cohen, 2011). This influence is usually exerted through networking, 
a contribution to policy-making and the building of coalitions (Mintrom, 
1997). JCPD managers are in a key position to play this role, which is why 
their support is so important to the success of a pilot. Some authors have 
highlighted the greater level of commitment and the ‘pioneering spirit’ 
amongst staff involved in pilots (Hasluck, 2000). As noted by Billé: 
 
“One of the fundamental parameters often taken into account is the 
presence of key individuals, talented and charismatic leaders thriving 
towards innovation (Saunders, 2003). Later on, the anticipated up-
scaling of the experience is hindered by personalities less driven by 
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innovation, less motivated and less prone to change, be it out of lack 
of conviction, for reasons of personal agenda (such as career 
opportunities), because of decisions on the allocation of available 
resources, or others.” (Billé, 2010).  
 
Unfortunately for this study, I have very little information about JCPD 
managers. A Freedom of Information request was sent to the DWP in 
September 2012 to get the list of all district managers since the creation of 
Jobcentre Plus as well as the permission to contact them. However our 
request was rejected on the ground that the requested information was not 
readily available. Furthermore, district managers were not authorised by 
DWP to answer my questions (DWP, personal communication).  
 
 
6.4.3.2. District performance  
 
Another way of looking at the notion of exemplarity is to consider the 
relative performance of a given JCPD. In fact, this performance is closely 
monitored by the DWP through a series of six indicators including the ‘Job 
Outcome’. Job Outcome is a point system measuring the number of JCP 
customers who move into work, whether through a referral by an adviser or 
one of JCP contracted providers or via self-service channels. When there is 
a match, the job outcome is converted into points depending on the 
customer group. The higher the priorities of the customer, the more points 
are achieved. For example, helping an unemployed lone parent into work 
earns a JCPD or office 12 points, whereas helping an employed person 
change job will give it only one point. Every year, new targets are 
established centrally by the DWP for each district and office based on 
previous performance and labour market circumstances. At the end of the 
year, a job outcome performance is measured in terms of percentage against 
target. However, a discussion with a DWP official revealed that this type of 
indicator is very volatile. Furthermore, rules and definitions seem to have 
changed several times since the introduction of JO targets in 2006.  
 
 
6.4.3.3. Favourable labour market conditions   
 
The above-mentioned performance monitoring system used by the DWP is 
based on the proportion of benefit claimants moving into work. As the 
targets set by the government to Jobcentre Plus are unknown for most of the 
period under consideration, I use the absolute value as proxy for Jobcentre 
Plus district exemplarity. In other words, a new intervention is more likely 
to produce quick and positive results in a district with a fluid labour market 
than in a district where conditions are not as favourable. More specifically, I 
use the Jobseeker Allowance (JSA) exit rate to jobs as indicator (Nunn & 
Jassi, 2010; Riley, Bewley, Kirby, Rincon-Aznar, & George, 2011). To 
reduce noise, the value included in the dataset is the annual average JSA 
exit rate to job of a given district the year before the start of the pilot. To the 
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extent that exemplarity matters, implementing a new intervention in district 
where the labour market is fluid is probably the government’s best way of 
making the new intervention ‘look’ successful. The other advantage of 
using off-flow rates is that it is an indicator commonly used by JCP, as 
indicated by a DWP analyst in a non-recorded discussion.   
 
 
6.5. Hypotheses  
 
Piloted interventions tend to attract the attention of politicians, the media 
and stakeholders. If the pilot seems to work well, the government is unlikely 
to get credit for it; however if it goes wrong, the government is likely to be 
blamed (Hood, 2011; Weaver, 1986). Therefore, it is reasonable to think 
that the probability of a successful implementation is a criterion among 
others in the selection of pilot sites. This probability is positively correlated 
with the degree of exemplarity of a given district. To test this idea, I 
formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Other things being equal, there is a positive association between the 
favourability of labour market conditions in a Jobcentre Plus district 
and its probability of being selected as pilot site.   
 
I have shown in chapter 4 that the government’s commitment to a reform 
could influence some research decisions such as the time afforded to a pilot. 
Against this background, we would expect the government to pay even 
greater attention to the level of Jobcentre Plus exemplarity when the pilot is 
a pathfinder, which the government is committed to roll out (Sanderson 
2002). To test this idea, I formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
H2: Other things being equal, the effect of JCPD exemplarity on the 
probability of being selected as pilot site is greater when the pilot is a 
pathfinder 
 
Likewise, pre-election pledges are expected to make the government more 
anxious to deliver.  
 
H3: Other things being equal, the effect of JCPD exemplarity on the 
probability of being selected as pilot site is greater when the reform 
originates from an election manifesto.   
 
Bearing in mind the discussion regarding the politics of welfare-to-work 
programmes, I would expect the government to pay greater attention to 
JCPD exemplarity when the piloted programme is mandatory, and thus 
politically contentious. Likewise, I would expect greater care in the 
selection of pilot sites when the intervention targets high-priority DWP 
customer groups. To test these ideas, I formulate the two following 
hypotheses: 
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H4: Other things being equal, the effect of JCPD exemplarity on the 
probability of being selected as pilot site is positively correlated with 
the degree of priority of the target group. 
 
H5: Other things being equal, the effect of JCPD exemplarity on the 
probability of being selected as pilot site is higher when the 
programme is mandatory.  
 
Some welfare-to-work interventions are delivered by private-sector 
organisations, local authorities, charities or consortia in which Jobcentre 
Plus may or may not be involved. It can be argued that it is easier for 
government to shift the blame in case of failure when the implementation of 
a programme is not led by a government agency such as Jobcentre Plus.  
 
H6: Other things being equal, the effect of JCPD exemplarity on the 
probability of being selected as pilot site is higher when Jobcentre 
Plus is lead implementer.  
 
This study includes a number of controls. Firstly, I know from evaluation 
reports and interviews that the proportion of benefit claimants is always an 
important factor in the selection of pilot sites. However, the use of this 
indicator varies from one pilot to another. Sometimes policy-makers would 
look for variation/contrast (priority given to external validity). On other 
occasions, they would rather select districts with a high proportion of 
claimants (priority given to internal validity). Against this background, I 
control for the proportion of Income Support (IS), Jobseeker Allowance 
(JSA) and Incapacity Benefit (IB) claimants in the active population. 
 
Secondly, geography matters. As indicated in evaluation reports and 
interviews, policy-makers tend to select pilot sites from different parts of the 
country. For example, UK-wide pilots will very often include at least one 
region from each country (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales 
depending on the intervention and the corresponding competence of the 
national government in that policy area). This study focuses on England so I 
have aggregated the nine English regions into four larger regions: North, 
Midlands, South and London.  
 
Thirdly, demographic variables have been included. Those include the 
population of the Jobcentre Plus, its population density and the proportion 
of ethnic white people in the adult population.  
 
Fourthly, I would expect a negative association between the number of 
pilots already running in the district and the probability of seeing this 
district chosen for a new pilot. Therefore, I control for the capacity of the 
JCPD at the start of the pilot, i.e. the number of pilots already running in the 
district.  
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6.6. Descriptive statistics  
 
Considering our limited knowledge of the processes leading to the selection 
of pilot sites, I found it useful to present some descriptive statistics before a 
more in-depth analysis.  
 
My first observation is that the location of pilot schemes is not always 
reported and the selection criteria seldom indicated (see Exhibit 21). Out of 
the 50 pilots included in this study, I reviewed the evaluation reports of the 
45 that were implemented (Π=0.9). For 35 of those, I got a complete list of 
the districts in which the intervention was piloted (Π=0.83). Missing values 
were obtained from other documents (legislation, policy briefs, media). Out 
of these 35 pilots, 21 listed the selection criteria (Π =0.5). Still, among 
those, it was sometimes difficult to understand how the selection criterion 
was applied (looking for variation or large number). There is no more 
systematic answer to this question, which makes this paper even more 
relevant.  
 
 
Exhibit 21 – Published information 
 
 Numerator Denominator  Proportion 
Number of pilots 50 -- -- 
Number of implemented pilots 45 50 0.9 
Number of published 
evaluations  
42 45 0.93 
Number of studies listing pilot 
districts  
35 42 0.83 
Number of studies listing 
selection criteria  
21 42 0.5 
 
 
My second observation is that there is no set protocol for the selection of 
pilot sites. A small number of criteria seem to be used to make the decision 
but the exact formula changes from one pilot to another. Importantly, the 
selection of pilot sites is never random. Exhibit 22 below shows the type 
and frequency of selection criteria used in the 21 pilot studies for which I 
found this information. It shows that the number of benefit claims in a given 
district is the most recurrent selection criterion used by the DWP. However 
this indicator is not always used in the same way, depending on whether 
researchers sought internal validity or external validity. For example, whilst 
in nine pilots, researchers looked for districts with a high number of benefit 
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claimants; in seven others they selected districts with different levels of 
benefit claimants. Variation in the population density of pilot sites is another 
important criterion, followed by logistical and institutional constraints and 
geographical considerations. Some studies mentioned the absence of other 
pilots running in the district for the same target group as an important 
element. Lastly, in three pilots, researchers were interested in testing a new 
intervention in districts with a high proportion of ethnic minorities. These 
findings are broadly in line with the comments made by the policy 
researchers I interviewed.  
 
 
Exhibit 22 – Criteria used for the selection of pilot sites (frequency 
distribution, based on 21 studies) 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of the distribution of pilots across the country, the data shows that, 
out of 2000 possible pilot-districts, I have 411 effective pilot districts. This 
means that, on average, an intervention was piloted in eight districts and that 
a district hosted an average of 10 pilots (as shown in Exhibit 23).    
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Exhibit 23 – Frequency distribution of pilot-districts (N=411) 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 24 – Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable  N Min Max Mean SD Freq 
Pilot  2000 0 1 -- -- 411 
Region – North (b) 2000 0 1 -- -- 550 
Region – Midlands 2000 0 1 -- -- 400 
Region – London  2000 0 1 -- -- 450 
Region – South 2000 0 1 -- -- 600 
Pathfinder 2000 0 1 -- -- 360 
Manifesto 2000 0 1 -- -- 680 
Mandatory  1880 0 1 -- -- 800 
JCP lead 1800 0 1 -- -- 307 
JSA exit rate (%) 1960 3.98 31.11 16.34 3.11 -- 
Benefit claimants (%) 2000 1.3 7.3 3.08 1.43 -- 
Working age population  
(in 100,000) 
2000 3.98 15.37 7.72 2.75 -- 
Population per ha (in 10) 2000 0.1 26.8 2.92 5.24 -- 
Ethnic white (%) 2000 57 96 85 10.45 -- 
Capacity  2000 0 6 0.94 1.16 -- 
Target_DWP 2000 1 12 8.56 2.92 -- 
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6.7. Results   
 
The results of the binary linear regressions are displayed in Exhibit 25. 
Eight different specifications have been tested. Model 1 focuses on the 
association between our measure of fluidity and the odds of being selected 
as pilot site. Model 2 considers only the selection criteria mentioned in 
evaluation reports and in the interviews. Models 3 to 7 all include the 
measure of fluidity and the control variables but each of them tests a 
different interaction, as per the hypotheses presented in section 6.4. In 
model 3, the interaction is the government’s commitment to the policy and 
the measure of fluidity. The interaction in model 4 is that of performance 
and fluidity. In models 5 and 6, I focus on target groups and mandatory 
programmes respectively. Model 7 tests the hypothesis that pilots 
implemented by Jobcentre Plus will increase the effect of fluidity on a 
district’s likelihood of being selected as pilot site. Model 8 is a more 
parsimonious proposition.  
 
Hypothesis 1 states that high-performing JCPDs are more likely to be 
selected as pilot sites. Five models out of six show that the opposite is true: 
indeed the odds of a district being selected as pilot site decrease by between 
1% and 10%) for each additional percentage point of performance 
depending on the specifications. This result is statistically significant in 
models 1 (at the 1% level) and 7 (at the 5% level) only. Thus, hypothesis 1 
is rejected. To the extent that there is an effect in the population, this effect 
is more likely to be negative.     
 
Hypothesis 2 states that the effect of a district’s performance on its odds of 
being selected as pilot site will be greater when the pilot is a pathfinder. 
Model 3 shows that, when there is no commitment to the reform, the odds of 
being selected as pilot site decrease by 1% for each additional percentage 
point in performance when the pilot is not a pathfinder and decrease by 
about 5% when the pilot is a pathfinder. The interaction is not statistically 
significant. Hypothesis 2 can be rejected.  
 
Hypothesis 3 states that the partial effect of a district’s performance on the 
odds of being selected as pilot site is higher when the pilot originates from a 
pre-election pledge. Model 4 tests that hypothesis and shows that the odds 
of being selected as pilot site decrease by 1% for each additional percentage 
point in performance when the pilot does not originate from a manifesto and 
increase by 3% when it does. Given that these results are not significant, I 
reject this hypothesis.  
 
According to hypothesis 4, the partial effect of a district’s performance on 
the odds of being selected as pilot site is higher for high-priority JCP 
customers, using the DWP Job Outcome Points table. This hypothesis is 
tested in model 5, which shows that the odds of being selected as pilot site 
decrease by 9% when the pilot tests an intervention for non-priority target 
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groups (baseline) and increase by 1% for each additional point in the JO 
point grid used by the DWP. This result is not significant.   
 
Hypothesis 5 states that the partial effect of a district’s performance on the 
odds of being selected as pilot site is higher when the pilot tests a mandatory 
programme. Model 6 shows that the odds of being selected as pilot site 
increase by 2% for each additional percentage point in performance when 
the pilot does not test a mandatory labour market intervention and decrease 
by 3% when it does. These results are not significant; the hypothesis is thus 
rejected.   
 
Finally, hypothesis 6 states that the partial effect of a district’s performance 
on the odds of being selected as pilot site is higher when Jobcentre Plus is 
lead implementer. To test that effect, model 7 adds the appropriate 
interaction term. It shows that, controlling for the other variables in the 
model, the odds of a district being selected as pilot site decrease by 10% for 
each additional percentage point in performance when Jobcentre Plus does 
not implement the pilot. This result is significant. Conversely, when 
Jobcentre Plus is in charge of the pilot, each additional percentage point in 
performance increases the odds of a district to be selected by 4%. However, 
this result is not significant. This last hypothesis is rejected as well.    
 
Models 2 to 8 include control variables, which are the known criteria used 
by the DWP to select its pilot sites. Results across models are highly 
consistent.  
 
I will first consider the proportion of benefit claimants in the working age 
population of a JCPD. My review of evaluation reports and the interviews 
carried out as a preliminary stage of this study had given a blurry picture of 
how this criterion was used in the selection of sites. In some circumstances, 
DWP would look for diversity; in others it would mainly select districts 
with a high proportion of claimants, supposedly to increase the internal 
validity of the evaluation. In models 2 to 7 the partial effect of each 
additional percentage point in the proportion of benefit claims on the odds 
of being selected as pilot site varies between -1% and +11% but with 5 
models out of six  showing a small, positive effect. None of these results are 
statistically significant.   
 
In terms of geography, and holding everything else constant, districts in the 
North of England (the baseline) are more likely to be selected as pilot sites 
than districts in any other part of the country. The difference is particularly 
large and statistically significant for the London and southern districts. For 
example, the odds of a southern district to be selected as pilot site are, 
depending on the specifications, between 49% and 62% lower than for a 
northern district, controlling for other variables. This cannot only be 
explained by the respective size of each region. To understand this result, it 
is important to remind the reader that the North of England comprises 11 
districts, the Midlands 8 districts, London 9 districts and the South 12 
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districts. If one district from each region was selected as pilot – as implied 
by some evaluation reports and interviews, a given southern district would 
have an 8% chance of being selected and a northern district a 9% chance. If 
our assumption was true, the odds of a southern district to be selected as 
pilot site would be expected to be 0.92 those of a northern district, i.e. only 
8% lower. More strikingly, the odds of a London district would be expected 
to be 1.22 those of a northern district, i.e. 22% higher. Thus, there seems to 
be an additional reason for piloting in the North of England, even when 
other known selection criteria are controlled for.   
 
The demographic variables used as controls include the working age 
population, the population density as well as the population of ethnic white 
people in the working population. Here again, the results are pretty 
consistent across models. First, I notice a positive association between the 
working age population and the odds of being selected as pilot site. Indeed, 
for each additional 100,000 people in the working population, the odds of a 
region being selected increase by 6% and 8% depending on the 
specifications. The effect is significant at the 1% level in six out of seven 
models. Likewise, districts with higher population density have a better 
chance of being used as pilot site. On average, an increment of 10 people 
per hectare in a given district will increase the odds of this district being 
selected by 5%. This result is significant at the 1% level in all but one 
specifications. The likelihood of being selected as pilot site decreases when 
the proportion of ethnic white people in the working population increases. 
The effect (3% to 5%) is consistent and significant across all models.   
 
Finally, I find that capacity matters. Each additional pilot run in a district at 
a given time decreases the odds of the next pilot being implemented in that 
district by between 10% and 12%. This result is statistically significant in 
all but one models.  
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Exhibit 25 – Probability of being selected as pilot district 
 
 Binary logistic regression  
 Y = PILOT 
 Coefficients are odds ratios 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
JSA exit rate (%) 0.94** -- 0.99 0.99 0.91 1.02 0.90* -- 
Benefit claimants (%) -- 1.08 1.08   1.09 1.11   1.07 0.99 -- 
Midlands -- 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.93 0.89 
London  -- 0.31** 0.31** 0.32** 0.31** 0.27** 0.18* 0.23** 
South -- 0.51** 0.49** 0.51**   0.51** 0.51** 0.38** 0.44** 
Working age population  
(in 100,000) 
-- 1.08**   1.08** 1.08**  1.08**   1.07**   1.07    1.06** 
Population per ha (in 10) -- 1.05**   1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 1.02   1.05** 
Ethnic white (%) --   0.97*   0.97*   0.97*   0.97* 0.96* 0.95* 0.96** 
Capacity  -- 0.90* 0.89* 0.90* 0.90* 0.89* 0.88 0.90* 
Pathfinder -- -- 1.14 -- -- -- -- -- 
Commitment x JSA exit 
rate 
-- -- 0.95 -- -- -- -- -- 
Manifesto -- -- -- 0.83 -- -- -- -- 
Manifesto x exit rate -- -- -- 1.03 -- -- -- -- 
Target_DWP -- -- -- -- 0.77* -- -- -- 
Target_DWP x exit rate -- -- -- -- 1.01 -- -- -- 
Mandatory  -- -- -- -- -- 1.77 -- -- 
Mandatory x exit rate -- -- -- -- -- 0.97 -- -- 
JCP lead -- -- -- -- -- -- 57.40** -- 
JCP lead x JSA exit rate -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.04 -- 
         
N 2000 1960 1960 1960 1960 1840 1760 2000 
 
* p<0.05 
** p<0.01 
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6.8. Discussion 
 
In the case of the UK pilots, none of the hypotheses predicting the selection 
of pilot sites in connection with the salience of the intervention has been 
confirmed. I do not claim that purposive selection never occurs; I note only 
that I find no evidence in this case. Given the relative weakness of the 
evidence base, different interpretations can be given.  
 
The idea that the selection of pilot sites might be influenced by policy 
commitments can be rejected, as shown by the lack of significant effect of 
both manifesto pledges and pathfinders. This latter result is more surprising 
given that the government’s commitment to a reform was found to be a 
strong predictor of pilot duration. 
  
The salience of the reform – in terms of target group and the ‘severity’ of 
the intervention – does not affect the selection of pilot sites either. This 
finding can be interpreted in two different ways. The first interpretation is 
that the choice of pilot sites has too little political salience to be visible 
through a ‘thick’ quantitative design. Group dynamics might be at play, I 
just cannot see them. The second hypothesis is that the political logic plays 
a significant role in the selection of pilot sites, albeit in a different way. I 
refer the reader to the earlier discussion on the benefit of implementing the 
pilot in constituencies where the government has strong or opportunistic 
allies.   
 
The selection of pilot sites reflects some ‘managerial’ considerations. On 
the one hand, I observed that the DWP did not pay more attention to the 
fluidity of local labour markets whether the pilot was implemented by JCP 
or by another organisation. On the other hand, the consistently negative and 
significant effect of capacity suggests that the managerial logic does play a 
role in the selection of pilot sites. The idea that ‘busier’ JCPDs are less 
likely to be selected for the piloting of a new intervention than districts with 
more capacity not only makes sense from an organisational viewpoint, it 
also concurs with the interviews realised in the ‘feasibility’ stage of this 
project.  
 
One of the most surprising findings is the geographical distribution of pilots 
across England. Even after controlling for population density, fluidity of the 
labour market and proportion of benefit claimants etc., we can observe that 
districts from the South of England and London are systematically under-
represented in pilot programmes. The difference with the North of England 
and the Midlands is particularly large and statistically significant. It is 
unclear, at this stage of my research, how this choice – to the extent that it is 
one – can be justified from the viewpoint of the scientific logic. It looks as if 
London and Southern districts were used as quotas in pilot studies rather 
than for their true representativeness of the country.  
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This analysis also showed a positive, significant and consistent correlation 
between the proportion of ethnic minorities in the population and the odds 
of being selected as pilot site. Positive correlations were also found for the 
working age population and the population density.  
 
One possible explanation, mentioned earlier, is that new interventions tend 
to be piloted in Labour constituencies outside London. Indeed, the map of 
pilots seems to match to a large extent the map of Labour votes. Given the 
symbolic property of pilot programmes (Weiss 1979, 1986; Rogers-Dillon 
2004), one could argue that pilots are used to give a distributive advantage 
to some regions, through an early access to new programmes and budgets. 
To test that claim, I would need to compare the distribution of pilot sites 
under a Labour and a Conservative government, which goes beyond the 
scope of this thesis.   
 
 
6.9. Conclusion 
 
This chapter was designed to examine whether, in the context of 
employment and welfare pilots, high-performing Jobcentre Plus districts 
were more likely to be selected as pilot sites than low-performing ones. 
Such an association would indicate the presence of confirmation bias, as 
high-performing districts are more likely to generate results supporting the 
government’s initial hypothesis.  
 
Two findings are noteworthy. First, I found that, overall, pilot sites were not 
selected with the primary aim of warranting representativeness. Indeed, 
between 1997 and 2010, the ‘busiest’ Jobcentre Plus district was seven 
times more likely to be selected as pilot site than the ‘idlest’ district – a 
result that is unlikely to be attributable to chance. This finding might appear 
suspect, especially when one considers that these districts have been shaped, 
in part, to be comparable in terms of caseload and resource allocation. Some 
other significant and robust associations are more difficult to explain. 
Controlling for other variables including population density, labour market 
characteristics and the ethnic composition of the population, the London and 
Southern JCPDs were significantly more likely to be selected as pilot sites 
than the Northern and Midlands districts. Likewise, districts with a higher 
population, a higher population density and a higher proportion of ethnic 
minorities were significantly more likely to be sampled. More research is 
needed to explain why.    
 
Second, the initial hypothesis that high-performing districts would be more 
likely to be selected as pilot sites than low-performing ones can clearly be 
rejected. Indeed, the small, insignificant effect of performance on the 
probability of selection is one of the most robust findings of the study. So 
even if pilot sites are not representative, they do not appear to be exemplar 
either, at least not based on the collected evidence. Unsurprisingly given 
this result, none of the interactions between performance and the political 
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salience of the intervention had a significant effect on the odds of a given 
site to be selected. The data shows – convincingly – that the selection of 
pilot sites was in fact significantly constrained by capacity issues with a 
negative and significant correlation between the number of pilots already 
run in a given JCPD and the probability of this district to be sampled for a 
new pilot.     
 
The main limitation of this study concerns the operationalization of the 
‘performance’ variable. Although local labour market conditions can 
certainly guide researchers eager to pilot a new policy intervention in 
‘favourable’ conditions, they do not reflect the quality of the local 
management. In other words, a JCPD with a relatively fluid labour market 
can still perform poorly if it fails to meet its objectives. Collecting and using 
data on JCPDs’ results against target as well as on JCPD managers’ 
characteristics would be useful in this respect.  
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7. Effect of policy commitments on 
outcome reporting  
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
In its most extreme form, reporting bias refers to the non-publication of a 
study because of inconvenient results (study publication bias). It has 
received much attention in the field of medical research (Abramson, 2008; 
Angell, 2005; Avorn, 2005; Goldacre, 2012). Empirical research has 
consistently shown that published research is more likely to be positive or 
statistically significant than unpublished research (Easterbrook, Berlin, 
Gopalan, & Matthews, 1991; Eyding et al., 2010; Song, Parekh, Hooper, et 
al., 2010). However, this type of investigation is particularly difficult and 
requires collecting unpublished data from regulators, drug manufacturers 
and conference papers. It would be even more so in the area of policy 
research, where protocols and registration are not required. Thus, the 
following chapter had to pursue a different strategy.    
 
Within-study outcome reporting bias (ORB or ‘spin’) relates to studies that 
have been published. It has been defined as a specific reporting strategy, 
emphasizing the beneficial effect of an experimental treatment (Boutron, 
Dutton, Ravaud & Altman, 2010) but is equally relevant for the piloting of 
social interventions. The use of spin in scientific writing can result from 
ignorance of the scientific issue, unconscious bias, or wilful intent to 
distract the reader from statistically non-significant results (Boutron et al., 
2010; Fletcher & Black, 2007). Spin can take different forms, such as, for 
example, incomplete reporting, a particular focus on less informative results 
or an inadequate interpretation of non-statistically significant differences 
(Boutron et al., 2010). Spin can also occur at later stages, for example in the 
communication of results to stakeholders and the media (Yavchitz et al., 
2012); however this is not addressed here.  
 
The underlying assumption in medical meta-research is that these 
distortions are a manifestation of confirmation bias (or experimenter’s bias), 
which is a tendency to favour information that confirms prior beliefs or 
hypotheses (Plous, 1993). The investments made for the development of 
new drugs is such that pharmaceutical companies can hardly afford 
reporting on ineffective drugs. In this chapter, I investigate whether a 
similar risk of bias exists in policy research. The amount of political capital 
invested in some reforms would justify a more ‘hands on’ approach to the 
evaluation. Two related questions will be addressed: What is the prevalence 
of spin in policy evaluation reports? Is spin more likely when the 
government expressed a commitment to the policy? 
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This question matters as the likely bias from spin is to overestimate the 
effect of the intervention, leading to moral hazard. Firstly, the beneficiaries 
of these policies will receive interventions which might have an 
insignificant effect or even cause harm. Secondly, voters using this type of 
information to appraise government performance will be misled. Thirdly, 
researchers and policy-makers using these results to inform subsequent 
policies will also be misguided (see Bailar, 2006; Fletcher & Black, 2007; 
Marco & Larkin, 2000 for a similar discussion in a medical context). 
 
The following chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 reviews the 
literature on ORB. Section 7.3 presents the data and methods used in the 
empirical analysis. Section 7.4 introduces the hypotheses to be tested. 
Section 7.5 reviews two sets of technical specifications for policy 
evaluations. Section 7.6 presents the results of the content analysis; which 
are then discussed in section 7.7. Section 7.8 concludes.  
 
 
7.2. Expected effect of policy commitments 
 
In the UK, where most policy evaluation is carried out by contracted 
organisations on behalf of ministerial departments, the formal decision of 
what should be reported and how is shared by the evaluation team and the 
civil servants managing the project (Boa et al., 2010; The LSE GV314 
Group, 2014; Walker, 2001). This situation creates an agency problem. On 
the one hand, evaluators are recruited based on their reputation for 
competence and expertise. On the other hand, they might want to 
reciprocate the favour of having been awarded a contract (Fehr & Gächter, 
2000).  
 
 
7.2.1. Principles of scientific reporting      
 
There is no specific prescription for the reporting of outcomes of policy 
interventions. In the UK, the reference document for the management of 
research project, the Magenta Book (2011) is vague. Its recommendations 
on reporting fit on one page and stress that many policy makers are able to 
read and understand complicated analysis, but most do not have the time. 
Consequently, many will want to be given a flavour of the complexities of 
the analysis but without getting lost in details. Other policy makers may not 
have the technical background and will want a simpler presentation. So 
there is a delicate balance between keeping the respect and interest of the 
more technical while not losing the less technical. ‘Reporting tips’ are 
provided (based on Vaughan & Buss, 1998).  
 
In contrast, reporting guidelines in the area of medical research are much 
more thorough. The Declaration of Helsinki states that “authors have the 
duty to make publicly available the results of their research on human 
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subjects and are accountable for the completeness and accuracy of their 
reports” (World Medical Association, 2013). To help enforce this principle, 
trial registration is required (American Economic Association’s registry; 
Registry for International Development Impact Evaluations) and reporting 
guidelines are available
14
. Although these reporting requirements go way 
beyond the practice of policy research, they are still useful as a norm, an 
objective that researchers should strive to achieve. This chapter assumes 
that a researcher taking a scientific approach will report findings according 
to pre-specified research questions, theories and variables. Specifying the 
method from the outset of the research process means that outcomes cannot 
be manipulated (for example, in order to present flattering results). 
Therefore, provided they apply similar methods, different researchers are 
likely to report the same results, whether these results are positive, negative 
or nil.  
 
 
7.2.2. Are evaluation reports spun?   
 
Until recently, the idea that the results of policy evaluations might be spun 
to produce politically useful results was mainly a speculative one. Building 
on the research utilisation literature which flourished in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Barnsteiner & Prevost, 2002; Caplan, 1980; Knott & Wildavsky, 1980; 
Weiss, 1979), some argued that the strong agency relationship existing 
between policy researchers (civil servants or consultants) and policy-makers 
(elected or appointed) made the former vulnerable to the pressure exerted by 
the latter (see chapters 2 and 4). More precisely, it could shift the purpose of 
evaluation reports from pursuing ‘speaking truth to power’ to providing 
‘political ammunition’ to policy-makers already committed to a specific 
course of action (Bovens et al., 2008; The LSE GV314 Group, 2014). The 
converse idea that the contractual relationship between the policy-making 
and research communities could, in the long run, mould ‘docile researchers 
intuitively oriented to producing satisfied funders’ has also been put forward 
(Allen, 2005; Metcalf, 2008). However, evidence of either theory has been 
equally scant and mostly anecdotal.  
 
A recent survey of academics having completed commissioned research for 
government has strengthened the evidence base. Researchers found that 
more than half of respondents reported they were asked to make significant 
changes to their draft reports (i.e. affecting the interpretation of findings or 
the weight given to them). The most effective constraint appears to be found 
when government specifies the nature of the research to be done at the 
outset. No other form of constraint has as powerful an effect on the degree 
to which the overall conclusions the researchers reach support government 
policy (The LSE GV314 Group, 2014).  
 
                                                        
14
 These guidelines have been listed by the US National Library of Medicine: 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/research_report_guide.html 
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Despite its significant contribution, the LSE GV314 study is not without its 
weaknesses. For example, the finding that “the academics’ ability to resist 
pressure to steer the results appears to be substantial” is debatable given its 
design. As acknowledged by the authors of the study, “academics have an 
interest not only in resisting political pressure, but also in appearing to be 
able to resist it even if they cannot or do not”. More objective data is 
needed.  
 
 
7.2.3. Policy commitment and level of spin   
 
The ideal design to assess the influence of policy commitments on the level 
of spin in an evaluation report would be to compare two series of evaluation 
reports, some conducted by a governmental body, the others by 
organisations with no vested interest in the success of these programmes. 
Any significant difference between the two sets of studies, controlling for 
other variables, would give strong evidence that politics can influence the 
reporting of policy outcomes. This type of design has already been used in 
medical research; unfortunately, it is more difficult in a policy context, 
given that few non-governmental organizations commission evaluations 
(see chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion). This study is based on a 
different design, which compares, in a qualitative way, the level of spin 
across different evaluation reports. These reports were selected in a way that 
maximizes the contrast between interventions to which the government was 
strongly committed (high-salience) and interventions to which the 
government was not or weakly committed (low salience).  
 
The a priori relationship between policy commitments and level of spin is 
unclear. It could be argued that the outcomes of high-salience reforms are 
more accurately reported because they are more likely to be scrutinized by 
the media, the research community, watchdogs and interest groups. The 
opposite case makes just as much sense. The outcomes of high-salience 
reforms could be subject to more spin, given the high stakes and the blame 
game and political sanction that could follow the claim that a major reform 
is a ‘failure’. Ministers are rarely neutral about their research. If they are 
testing a novel intervention, they usually suspect that it is effective 
otherwise they could not convince themselves, fellow cabinet members, 
members of parliaments and ultimately the public at large that it is worth 
evaluating. This lack of equipoise can affect the way they interpret negative 
results. Ministers having invested a large amount of political capital in 
developing the policy under evaluation might find it difficult to accept that 
it may be ineffective. In addition, democratic institutions create strong 
incentives to ‘frame’ research findings in a positive way, especially in 
countries where governments have the responsibility to ensure their 
citizens’ welfare. In such a context, political failures tend to be remembered 
more than successes, and indeed ministers often turn out to get less credit 
from the voters for their successes than the blame they get for failures 
(Hood, 2011; Weaver, 1986).  
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Although it is thin, the evidence base leans towards the second hypothesis. 
Several interviewees of the LSE GV314 team indicated that policy-makers 
were more inclined to try and influence the reporting of outcomes when the 
reform was perceived as politically salient (The LSE GV314 Group, 2014). 
Likewise, Rhodes concluded from his observation of the British senior civil 
service that evidence was used to construct story lines rather than to inform 
policy decisions (Rhodes, 2013).  
 
 
7.3. Data and methods     
 
7.3.1. Approach  
 
The design of this study has been shaped by the various constraints 
pertaining to the research question and the available data. To begin with, the 
definition of reporting bias presented in the introduction implies that studies 
not supporting the initial working hypothesis (i.e. the intervention has a high 
probability of having positive and significant effect on the population) are 
more likely to be spun than others (Hewitt, Mitchell, & Torgerson, 2008). 
Thus, the studies reviewed in this chapter all reported a primary outcome 
that was either not statistically significant at the conventional level (P≥0.05) 
or in the direction opposed to the initial hypothesis (i.e. the intervention has 
a negative effect).  
 
The availability of data created a number of additional constraints. Firstly, 
the fact that policy evaluations are overwhelmingly commissioned by the 
governments which designed and implemented those policies means that it 
was not possible to compare the amount of reporting bias in studies taking 
place within the political sphere and outside of it. Such design would have 
provided a useful counterfactual. Although it has been used in medical 
research to assess the effect of industry sponsorship on reporting (Bourgeois 
et al., 2010), it remains difficult to replicate in policy research. Instead, I 
had to contrast studies with a high level of policy commitment with studies 
with a lower level of policy commitment, as explained in chapter 2.  
 
Secondly, the absence of formal research protocols for the evaluation of 
public policy means that it was not possible to estimate the amount of 
reporting bias through systematic comparisons between the content of 
published reports and those protocols (Bourgeois et al., 2010) or other 
documents issued in the planning phase of research such as research 
proposals (Rising, Bacchetti, & Bero, 2008). In other words, there is no 
clear baseline against which published results can be benchmarked. Instead, 
I looked for evidence of research decisions that have previously associated 
with an intention to spin (Boutron et al., 2010). Those include incomplete 
statistical outputs (Chan & Altman, 2005; Chan et al., 2004), spurious 
analyses (Ioannidis & Karassa, 2010; KL Lee, McNeer, Starmer, Harris, & 
Rosati, 1980; Rothwell, 2005) and biased interpretations of results (Alasbali 
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et al., 2009; Boutron et al., 2010; Malenka, Baron, Johansen, Wahrenberger, 
& Ross, 1993). Those variables will be presented in greater details below.  
   
Thirdly, the number of evaluation reports amenable to this kind of research 
was too limited to allow a quantitative analysis. Instead, a qualitative 
approach was adopted, focusing on the content of these reports, their claims 
and the language adopted by evaluators. Two sections were analysed: the 
‘results’ sections and the ‘executive summaries’ (or, when missing, the 
conclusion or the ‘policy brief’ which sometimes accompany the main 
study). The main implication for this study is that my observations are 
limited to the chosen sample.  
 
Against this background, this chapter offers a qualitative analysis of the 
content of six evaluation reports with different levels of political salience. 
Its objective is to find out, in the context of studies with non-significant 
primary outcome, whether high-salience interventions are subject to more 
spin than low-salience interventions.  
 
 
7.3.2. Selection of studies 
 
The selection process is shown in Exhibit 26. Studies were screened from 
the PILOT dataset presented in Annex I. The selection process followed a 
number of steps. First, studies with a score of 3 and above on the Maryland 
Scale of Scientific Method were included and studies with a ‘weaker’ 
design were excluded. Level 3 corresponds to “comparisons between two or 
more comparable units of analysis, one with and one without the 
programme” (Sherman et al., 1998). When several studies were available for 
the same pilot, I selected the one, which seemed to offer the most definitive 
conclusions regarding the effect of the intervention (e.g. final report as 
opposed to interim report). Cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit outcomes 
were not considered. From this sample, I then screened the full-text studies 
and looked for primary outcomes. Only studies showing that the 
intervention had a non-significant effect were selected (P≥0.05). The 
decision to use a P-value of 0.05 or a 95% confidence interval to determine 
statistical significance is arbitrary but widely accepted. Conversely, I 
excluded studies for which the primary outcome could not be identified with 
confidence and studies showing a positive and significant effect of the 
intervention. In one study, the primary outcome was not identified from the 
evaluation report itself but from the technical specifications issued by the 
sponsoring department for the evaluation of the intervention.  
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Exhibit 26 – Case selection 
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From this sample, I attempted to select two studies per government 
department with relatively high/low levels of salience. In this chapter, I used 
a surrogate measure, which the level of seniority of the ‘champion’ or 
‘sponsor’ of the reform, based on who made the first announcement. The 
announcement of a pilot can be seen as a delegation issue, whereby each 
principal, from the Prime minister to the mid-level bureaucrat can decide 
whether to be the ‘manager’, taking direct responsibility for the outcome, or 
the ‘chair of the board’ overlooking operations (Hood, 2011). Given 
politicians’ propensity to avoid blame even when that implies not getting 
credit (Weaver, 1986), I consider a pilot announced by the Prime minister as 
being more politically salient than pilots announced by any other 
policymaker (Chancellor, Secretary of State, junior minister, civil servant) 
or a pilot not announced at all. An ordinal variable reflecting these 
categories (in this order) was created for my analysis. The announcer is also 
convenient in that it captures many of the dimensions of political salience 
including the ‘size’ of the programme, its visibility, etc. Here, the objective 
was to maximise the contrast between high-salience interventions and low-
salience interventions. When two studies or more at the same level of 
salience, the final selection decision was made at random. That was possible 
for the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and the Department for 
Education (DFE) but not for the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Home 
Office (HO), for which it was not possible to find the desired pairs. In the 
end, I selected a high-salience intervention evaluated by the HO and a low-
salience intervention evaluated by the MoJ. I believe that this decision does 
not compromise significantly the design of this study for two reasons. 
Firstly, the two organisations have very similar cultures. The MoJ was 
formed in 2007 when some functions of the Home Office were combined 
with the Department for Constitutional Affairs. As a result of this re-
organisation, staffs were moved from the HO to the newly created MoJ. 
Secondly, the two selected interventions were evaluated against the same 
primary outcome, namely the rate of reconviction. The corpus of this 
analysis includes six studies, which are presented in Exhibit 27.  
 
In addition, Freedom of Information requests were sent to the relevant 
government departments to get hold of the technical specifications issued 
for these evaluations, as well as any interim report not published on their 
respective websites. Technical specifications were obtained for two studies 
out of six (DWP-1; DFE-1) and one interim report for one study only (three 
studies had no interim report). This interim report was screened but no 
impact analysis was found and so it was decided not to include it in the 
study corpus. The list of documents that were reviewed can be found in the 
Appendix at the end of this chapter. The interventions are presented in 
Exhibit 27.   
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Exhibit 27 – Study corpus  
 
 
Pathways to Work (DWP-1) 
 
– Sponsor: Department for Work and Pensions; 
– Strong commitment: First announced by the Chancellor. 
– Objective: to encourage employment among people claiming incapacity 
benefits.  
– Interventions: The pilot consisted of a series of interventions including 
mandatory interviews with a personal adviser for new beneﬁt claimants; 
support to claimant in the management of their health condition; as well 
as an extra £40 per week credit for the ﬁrst 12 months of employment.  
– Dates: The programme was introduced on a pilot basis in seven 
Jobcentre Plus districts between October 2003 and April 2004.  
– Policy decision: Since then, Pathways gradually expanded to cover more 
districts, so that by April 2008, all new incapacity benefits claimants in 
Britain were eligible for Pathways.  
 
 
Job Retention and Rehabilitation Pilot (DWP-2) 
 
– Sponsor: Department for Work and Pensions and Department of Health  
– Weak commitment: Never formally announced 
– Objective: To increase the return-to-work rate of those off-work sick for 
six weeks or more.  
– Interventions: The pilot tested three new interventions: a workplace 
intervention (e.g. ergonomic assessment), a health intervention (e.g. 
physiotherapy) and a combined intervention, which effect were 
compared to existing provisions. The JRRP involved over 2,800 
voluntary participants who were randomly assigned to one of the four 
conditions.  
– Dates: It was tested in six areas across the UK. The pilot ran from April 
2003 to March 2005. 
– Policy decision: JRRP was not rolled out.  
 
 
The Two Year Old Education Pilot (DFE-1) 
 
– Sponsor: Department for Children, Schools and Families (which later 
became the Department for Education),  
– Strong commitment: First announced by the Chancellor in his 2004 Pre-
Budget Report. 
– Objective: The Two Year Old Education Pilot intended primarily to 
improve children’s social and cognitive development.  
– Intervention: The pilot provided free early years education to over 
13,500 disadvantaged two year olds. 
– Dates: From April 2006 to April 2008. 
– Policy decision: The pilot was not rolled out. 
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The Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (DFE-2) 
 
– Sponsor: Department for Education  
– Weak commitment: Never formally announced 
– Objective: To improve the social and cognitive development of children 
aged 10-16 who were placed in foster care.  
– Intervention: MTFC employs multiple methods, including individual 
and family therapy, social skills training and support with education. 
MTFC provides young people with a short-term foster placement, 
usually intended to last around nine months, followed by a short period 
of aftercare. The study was designed as a randomised controlled trial 
(RCT), but in anticipation of the potential difficulties, was embedded 
within an observational study to ensure a sufficient sample.  
– Dates: The pilot ran from 2002 to 2006. 
– Policy decision: Unknown.  
 
 
The Alcohol Arrest Referral Pilot (HOM-1) 
 
– Sponsor: Home Office  
– Strong commitment: First announced by the Home Secretary in 
February 2008  
– Objective: Its aim was to reduce the number of offences related to 
alcohol consumption.  
– Intervention: AAR involved offering a brief intervention to individuals 
arrested and deemed by a police officer to be under the influence of 
alcohol. This intervention consisted of (1) an assessment of the clients’ 
drinking patterns; (2) the provision of information on the risks of 
excessive alcohol consumption; (3) practical advice for managing the 
risk of drinking; and (4) a follow-up session.  
– Dates: The pilots were located in eight police force areas in England and 
were funded between November 2008 and September 2010. 
– Policy decision: Unknown. 
 
 
The Restorative Justice Pilots (HOM-2) 
 
– Sponsor: Ministry of Justice (but funded by the Home Office)  
– Weak commitment: Never formally announced 
– Objective: to reduce re-offending whilst retaining “significant focus on 
the needs and rights of victims”.  
– Interventions: Three different types of judicial mediation were tested 
(direct, indirect and conferencing) in different settings.  
– Dates: The three pilots ran between mid-2001 and early 2004.  
– Policy decision: Unknown. 
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7.4. Hypotheses  
 
7.4.1. Missing outcome indicators  
 
The most obvious form of spin is to ‘filter out’ the least convenient results. 
The medical research literature has often commented on the existence of 
unreported study outcomes, using different strategies to estimate the gap 
between published studies and what was thought to best represent the 
original intentions of the researchers. In an early study, the investigator 
compared the number of statistical analyses reported and the number that 
were not reported but were very likely to have been undertaken, given the 
data and variables presented in the study (Tannock, 1996). More recent 
studies used the research protocols submitted to ethics committees as 
baseline for their work (Chan et al., 2004; Hahn, Williamson, & Hutton, 
2002). However, those are difficult to obtain, even in medical research. One 
study used primary publications (i.e. the first report of final trial results) as a 
proxy for research protocols and compared the content of subsequent 
publications to estimate the number and type of unreported outcomes (Chan 
& Altman, 2005). Unfortunately, for the reasons presented in section 7.3.1, 
it was not possible to carry out a similar analysis.  
 
 
7.4.2. Incomplete reporting  
 
Even when outcomes are presented in publications, they may be reported 
superficially (see Dwan et al., 2008 for a review). Direct evidence of such 
bias has recently been shown in two cohort studies that compared trial 
publications with the original protocols (Chan et al., 2004). For each 
identified outcome, the level of reporting can be recorded as one of three 
levels based on the amount of data presented in the publication. If sufficient 
data is provided for inclusion in a meta-analysis, the outcome can be 
recorded as fully reported. This data includes (a) group numbers; (b) size of 
intervention effect and (c) a measure of precision/variability (P-value and/or 
confidence interval). An outcome is considered partially recorded if the 
publication provides only some of the data necessary for meta-analysis and 
qualitatively reported if the publication presents only a measure of statistical 
significance (Chan & Altman, 2005) (see Exhibit 28). Against this 
background, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  In the context of studies with non-significant primary outcome, the 
risk of incomplete reporting is positively associated with the strength 
of the government’s commitment to the reform.  
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Exhibit 28 – Hierarchy of levels of outcome reporting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chan and Altman (2005). 
 
 
7.4.3. Spurious subgroup analyses 
 
The effects of an intervention on the entire study population are of primary 
interest in a study. It could be appealing, however, for investigators and 
research commissioners to identify differential effects in subgroups based 
on characteristics of trial participants or interventions. This analytic 
approach, termed ‘subgroup analysis’, can sometimes be informative – but it 
is often misleading (Fletcher, 2007; Oxman & Guyatt, 1992; Schulz & 
Grimes, 2005; Yusuf, Wittes, Probstfield, & et al., 1991). Some have 
compared them as data-driven ‘fishing expeditions’, in which investigators 
perform numerous post-hoc subgroup analyses, seeking statistical 
significance (Rothwell, 2005; S. Wang, Ou, Cheng, & Dahm, 2010). 
Clinical research has shown that conducting multiple tests was associated 
with the risk of false-positive results due to chance. Even when investigators 
specify a limited number of subgroup analyses ex ante, chance can result in 
the identification of spurious subgroup effects (Rothwell, 2005; S. Wang et 
al., 2010).  
 
The clinical literature offers criteria that aid differentiation between spurious 
and real subgroup effects (Guyatt, Wyer, & Ioannidis, 2008; Sun, Briel, 
Walter, & Guyatt, 2010). The criteria used in this chapter are based on these 
guidelines (see Exhibit 29). These include whether the hypothesis of a 
subgroup effect preceded the analysis, and was one of a few subgroup 
hypotheses that were explored. It is also important that the appropriate 
statistical test for investigating a subgroup effect is not whether a 
statistically significant effect is seen in one subgroup and not in another 
(Wang, Lagakos, Ware, Hunter, & Drazen, 2007). Instead investigators 
N and effect size, plus 
precision or P-value for 
continuous data 
Effect size or 
precision (± n 
or P-value) 
P-value 
Full 
Partial 
Qualitative 
Unreported 
Incompletely 
reported 
outcomes 
Reported 
outcomes 
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should use a statistical test of interaction that, assuming that no subgroup 
effect exists, test the hypothesis of how often one would observe differences 
in apparent effects as large as or larger than those observed in the study.    
Against this background, I test the following hypothesis:  
 
H2:  In the context of studies with non-significant primary outcome, the 
risk of spurious sub-group analyses is positively associated with the 
strength of the government’s commitment to the reform. 
 
 
Exhibit 29 – Guidelines for determining whether differences in 
subgroup responses are based on real criteria  
 
Design 
1. Was the hypothesis specified a priori? 
2. Is the subgroup variable a characteristic measured at baseline or after 
assignment? 
3. Is the subgroup difference suggested by comparisons within rather than 
between studies?  
4. Was the direction of the subgroup analysis specific a priori? 
5. Was the subgroup difference one of a few hypothesised effects tested? 
Analysis 
6. Does the interaction test suggest a low likelihood that chance explains 
the apparent subgroup effect? 
Context 
7. Does external evidence support a hypothesised subgroup effect?  
 
Source:  Sun et al., (2010) 
 
 
7.4.4. Spurious within-group comparisons  
 
The essence of a clinical trial or policy pilot is to compare the outcomes of 
groups of individuals going through different interventions. We expect 
studies to give us an estimate of the difference (the ‘intervention effect’) 
with a confidence interval and a P-value. However, rather than comparing 
the groups directly, researchers sometimes look within groups at the change 
between the outcome measure from pre-intervention baseline to the final 
measurement at the end of the trial. They then perform a test of the null 
hypothesis that the mean difference is zero, separately in each group. They 
may then report that in one group this difference is significant but not in the 
other and conclude that this is evidence that the groups, and hence the 
treatments, are different (Bland & Altman, 2011). To test this idea, I 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
  
H3:  In the context of studies with non-significant primary outcome, the 
risk of spurious within-group comparisons is positively associated 
with the strength of the government’s commitment to the reform. 
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7.4.5. Misleading inferences   
 
When a study shows a difference that is not statistically significant there is a 
risk of interpretive bias (Hewitt et al., 2008; Kaptchuk, 2003). Interpretive 
bias occurs when authors and readers overemphasise or underemphasise 
results (Hewitt et al., 2008). For example, authors may claim that the non-
significant result is due to lack of power rather than lack of effect, using 
terms such as ‘borderline significance’ or stating that no firm conclusions 
can be drawn because of the modest sample size. In contrast, if the study 
shows a non-significant effect that opposes the study hypothesis, it may be 
downplayed by emphasising the results are not statistically significant. For 
the purpose of this analysis, I define a non-significant result as a regression 
coefficient with P-value larger than the conventional 5% level. I will test the 
following hypothesis:  
 
H4:  In the context of studies with non-significant primary outcome, the 
risk of interpretative bias is positively associated with the strength of 
the government’s commitment to the reform. 
 
 
7.4.6. Upgrading or downgrading outcomes  
 
In a given study, a primary outcome is the outcome of greatest importance. 
Data on secondary outcomes are used to evaluate additional effects of the 
intervention (CONSORT Statement 2010). According to Dwan, Kirkham, 
Williamson and Gamble (2013), ‘selective reporting’ occurs when, in a 
given study (1) a primary outcome is downgraded to secondary 
(downgrade); (2) a secondary outcome is upgraded to primary (upgrade); (3) 
a new outcome not stated in the protocol is added to the full review 
(addition); or (4) an outcome stated in the protocol was omitted from the 
full review (omission). When a change in outcomes occurs, it must be said 
and justified (Dwan et al., 2013). In this chapter, upgrades/downgrades were 
identified in two ways: (a) through comparisons between technical 
specifications or interim reports on the one hand and final reports on the 
other hands; (b) within studies, by comparing the order of results in the 
executive summary and the ‘results’ section. Thus, an outcome coming first 
in the results section and second in the executive summary will be 
considered ‘downgraded’. Against this background, I formulate the 
following hypothesis:  
 
H5:  In the context of studies with non-significant primary outcome, the 
risk of upgraded/downgraded outcomes is positively associated with 
the strength of the government’s commitment to the reform.    
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7.4.7. Conclusion bias  
 
Finally, one can look at the evaluator’s final judgement of the merit of the 
intervention in the conclusion of the report or its executive summary. An 
overemphasis on positive results will be taken as an indication of 
interpretive bias. For that purpose, I assessed the level of spin in the 
executive summaries, updating the classification developed by Boutron, 
Dutton, Ravaud and Altman (2010). High spin was defined as the 
suggestion that, overall, the intervention was a success despite a non-
significant primary outcome. Moderate spin was defined as the 
acknowledgement of the non-significant effect of the intervention, but with 
an immediate emphasis on spurious analyses meant to distract the reader 
from the main study outcome. Low spin was defined as the 
acknowledgement of the statistically non-significant result for the primary 
outcomes and uncertainty in the framing of the study.  
 
H6:  In terms of overall conclusion, the risk of conclusion bias is positively 
associated with the strength of the government’s commitment to the 
reform.      
 
 
7.5. Analysis of technical specifications   
 
The following section is based on the two sets of research specifications 
obtained from government (studies DWP-1 and DFE-1). The analysis of the 
content of technical specifications leads me to make four remarks.   
 
Firstly, the technical specifications issued by commissioning departments 
provide a clear illustration of the agency problem. On the one hand, 
tendering evaluators are required to provide evidence of their qualifications 
for the job. The following excerpt suggests that the most competent 
candidate will be retained:    
 
“Tenderers’ suggestions for evaluating net impact needs to be of the 
highest quality, and this will be looked at specifically in addition to a 
more broad requirement of methodological expertise” (DWP-1 TS, 
p.27).   
 
On the other hand, the document reminds the candidates that the policy and 
analysis teams within the commissioning departments will remain the 
ultimate decision-makers on key research decisions, including reporting: 
 
“The contractor will be expected to work closely with officials of the 
Department throughout the research, keeping them informed of 
progress and involving them in key decisions. Officials in policy and 
analytical branches in DWP and DH must have the opportunity to 
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comment on and approve topic guides and questionnaires, formats for 
analysis and draft reports” (DWP-1-TS: 22-23).   
 
Secondly, technical specifications suggest that the salience of the reform has 
an effect on how evaluation outcomes will be reported: 
 
“This will be a high-profile evaluation and to get full value from it, 
timely and high quality reporting is essential. To ensure full value of 
the evaluation tenderers should consider ways in which emerging 
findings from studies can most appropriately be fed back to policy 
officials in order to inform further policy development. For example 
in advance of the production of draft reports, contractors are likely to 
be asked to present headline findings to core policy officials and 
analysts” (DWP-1-TS, p.24). 
 
However, it is unclear from the above whether the association is positive 
(higher salience reports are more spun) or negative (higher salience are less 
spun). The notion of “high-quality reporting” as that of “policy relevant” is 
subjective (The LSE GV314 Group, 2014). The following excerpt, also 
from the technical specifications for the evaluation of a higher salience 
intervention suggests that the level of spin is limited: 
 
“It is the expectation that the key outputs from the study will be in the 
public domain. The Department will aim to publish key outputs within 
a reasonable period of time following receipt of an agreed final report.  
The publication of any research articles or other publications based on 
information collected for this study will be subject to approval from 
the DfES. However, this will not be unreasonably withheld” (DFE-1-
TS, p.4). 
 
Fourthly, the content of technical specifications shows that, despite the fact 
that they are the closest document to a research protocol one can get, their 
use remains problematic. Indeed, tendering evaluators are expected to 
contribute to the design of the study: 
 
“Tenderers are invited to suggest what further surveys of clients in 
pilot and other areas would be useful in arriving at an impact 
assessment” (DWP-1-TS, p.15-16).   
 
Additionally, amendments to the original intervention or to the original 
design of the evaluation cannot be ruled out:     
 
“[Tenderers] must also demonstrate a commitment to meet deadlines 
and yet be sufficiently flexible, should the programme of work require 
amending” (DWP-1-TS, p.26).  
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7.6. Analysis of final reports  
 
7.6.1. Incomplete reporting  
 
Hypothesis 1 states that, in the context of studies with non-significant 
primary outcome, the risk of incomplete reporting is positively associated 
with the strength of the government’s commitment to the reform. All six 
reports reviewed in this study reported intervention outcomes in a complete 
way, i.e. including group size, effect size and a P-value. A minor 
presentational flaw was found in the DFE-2 evaluation, which reported P-
values in the text and not in the output as customary. However, given these 
results, no association between completeness of reporting and commitment 
can be established. On the basis of the limited evidence, Hypothesis 1 seems 
unlikely.  
 
 
7.6.2. Within-group analyses  
 
Hypothesis 2 states that, in the context of studies with non-significant 
primary outcome, the risk of spurious within-group comparisons is 
positively associated with the strength of the government’s commitment to 
the reform. None of the studies in this review conducted within-group 
analyses, so no evidence of an association between this type of spin and 
political salience can be established. Hypothesis 2 seems unlikely.  
 
 
7.6.3. Sub-group analyses 
 
Hypothesis 3 states that, in the context of studies with non-significant 
primary outcome, the risk of spurious sub-group analyses is positively 
associated with the strength of the government’s commitment to the reform. 
To test this hypothesis, I assessed the credibility of the subgroup analyses of 
each study using the criteria mentioned earlier, with the notable difference 
that in my study, all subgroup variables are assessed together and not 
individually for simplification. Exhibit 30 shows the results.  
 
The assessment of the credibility of these sub-group analyses shows a 
pattern. Firstly, all studies used a small number of sub-group variables, 
usually between four and six, with one exception (DWP-2: 10 subgroups). 
Qualitatively, two of these sub-groups seem to be consistently tested: sex 
and age. Other variables are subject-specific but fairly consistent within a 
given policy area (socio-economic status, health situation, family situation). 
Secondly, sub-group analyses undertaken in policy research seem to differ 
systematically from those conducted in medical research on at least three 
indicators. Indeed, I found out that all the analyses carried out in these six 
studies (a) were based on characteristics measured at baseline, (b) were 
suggested by comparisons of within-studies and (c) were based on tests of 
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interaction. This suggests that the sub-group analyses conducted in policy 
research have a high level of credibility.   
 
Given the design of this study and the data available, it is more difficult to 
assess whether these analyses were underpinned by a theory and whether 
the direction of the effect was specified from the outset. Prima facie, it 
seems that in most cases, sub-group analysis was exploratory rather than 
confirmatory. In only two studies, both low-salience (DFE-2 and HOM-2), 
researchers clearly reported why they were conducting these analyses and 
what they were expecting. However, the evidence is not strong enough to 
conclude that, in other instances, sub-group analyses were carried out with 
the aim to mislead the reader. Instead, experience and an incremental 
approach to policy development seem to have guided the researcher, as 
explained in the DWP-2 study: 
  
“The choice of variables from which to create sub-groups is somewhat 
arbitrary. The final list is based on a selection of possible variables for 
which: (a) the sub-groups have large enough sample sizes for at least 
moderately large impacts to be detected; (b) there is some expectation 
that impacts may have been different in at least some of the sub-
groups” (DWP-2: 49). 
 
 
Exhibit 30 – Credibility of sub-group analyses 
 
 DWP-
1 
DWP-
2 
DFE-1 DFE-2 
HOM-
1 
HOM-
2 
Number of sub-groups  4 10 4 5 4 6 
Number of subgroup 
variables measured at 
baseline  
4/4 10/10 4/4 unclear 4/4 /6 
Number of analyses 
suggested by 
comparisons of within 
vs. between studies 
4/4 10/10 4/4 5/5 4/4 6/6 
Number of sub-group 
analyses based on 
interaction 
4/4 10/10 4/4 5/5 unclear unclear 
Theoretical justification 
mentioned 
0/4 0/10 0/4 3/5 0/4 2/6 
Number of analyses for 
which the direction of 
the SG effect was 
specified a priori 
0/4 0/10 0/4 2/5 0/4 2/6 
 
Source: Sun, Briel, Walter and Guyatt 2010 
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Another explanation is that, consciously or unconsciously, evaluators did 
not report their original intentions with the level of accuracy that would be 
expected in a peer-reviewed scientific publication. The technical 
specifications of the DWP-1 study highlight that:  
 
“A key requirement underpinning sampling is the need to include a 
discussion on the capability of analysing sub-groups, and any 
implications for overall samples of the need to estimate impacts of 
separate components. We would welcome suggestions on types of 
sub-group analyses” (DWP-1-TS: 17).    
 
The above shows that there is no evidence that the sub-group analyses 
carried out in these six studies were spurious. Hypothesis 3 seems thus 
unlikely.   
 
 
7.6.4. Interpretation of results 
 
Hypothesis 4 states that, in the context of studies with non-significant 
primary outcome, the risk of interpretative bias is positively associated with 
the strength of the government’s commitment to the reform. The six studies 
reviewed regarded P-values of 0.05 or less as indicating statistical 
significance, even though this point was not always explicitly made. For 
example, the HOM-1 and HOM-2 evaluations made no reference to a cut-
off point, however only P-values smaller than 0.05 led to a formal rejection 
of the null hypothesis. The one exception to this pattern concerns the 
significance test of the primary outcome of DWP-1. The study reads as 
follows: 
 
“The P-value suggests that the impact is statistically significant since 
there is only a nine per cent probability of finding an effect of this size 
by chance” (DWP-1, p.48).  
 
This comment is accompanied by the following footnote:  
 
“By convention, P-values of five per cent or less are regarded as 
indicating statistical significance. However, this is essentially arbitrary 
and ignores the continuous nature of P-values. The approach taken in 
this report is to use the conventional five per cent P-values for the 
results based on the administrative data but to use ten per cent P-
values for the results based on the survey data in view of the smaller 
sample size available for these estimates” (DWP-1, p.48).   
 
It is useful to mention here that the “smaller sample size” the evaluators 
refer to is 3,237 – which many will regard as sufficient to yield credible 
results. The fact that such a bias concerns a pilot with higher political 
salience suggests that an association between policy commitment and 
interpretative bias cannot be excluded when considering the ‘big picture’.  
Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? 
 
 
 
 
Arnaud Vaganay  162 
 
The other aspect of interpretative bias relates to the attribution of non-
significant effects (intervention vs. methods). Three types of languages were 
used across the six studies. In three reports (DFE-1, HOM-1, DWP-2), non-
significant effects were unambiguously attributed to the intervention, as 
shown by the following excerpts:   
 
“The finding is clear-cut: there is no evidence that, on average, the 
pilot improved the non-verbal reasoning of children overall” (DFE-1, 
p.99). 
 
“The key finding was that overall [the intervention] appeared to be 
ineffective for the client group in reducing re-offending. There was a 
higher rate of re-arrest amongst the intervention group, compared with 
the comparison group” (HOM-1, p.25).  
 
In one study (DFE-2), the non-significant result was attributed to the 
intervention, however the claim was followed by a caution note on the 
methodology used in the investigation:  
 
“Taking the sample as a whole, across both the randomised trial and 
the observational comparison, there was no evidence that the 
[intervention] resulted in significantly better functional outcomes than 
treatment as usual as measured on our primary outcomes. Despite the 
strengths of the study methods, this conclusion needs to be set against 
different kinds of limitations for each of the analyses. In the 
randomised study the sample size was underpowered to detect a 
plausible effect size. There was also a high proportion of ‘crossover’ 
cases”. (DFE-2, p.153-154).  
 
In two studies (DWP-1, HOM-2), evaluators strongly suggested that the 
insignificant effect was due to a lack of statistical power and that the effect 
would have been significant, had the sample been larger:  
 
“The small sample size of those in work and with earnings 
information at the time of the outcome interview reduced the 
likelihood of detecting an impact on earnings. No statistically 
significant impact of Pathways on monthly net earnings about a year 
and a half after the initial incapacity benefits enquiry was found 
(Table 5.2). It is not possible with the survey data to observe earnings 
between the time of the initial enquiry and the outcome interview; it is 
possible that there may have been an earnings effect during this 
period. In view of the employment effect of Pathways, one would 
expect a positive impact on earnings” (DWP-1, p.2).  
 
“The individual restorative justice trials and groups in this study each 
had relatively small sample sizes and therefore would not, on their 
own, be expected to have a large enough impact on re-offending to be 
statistically significant (i.e. so that we would know that they were 
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unlikely to have been caused by chance). The exception was the 
Northumbria JRC court property trial which showed such a large 
impact on the reduced likelihood and severity of re-offending (against 
a control group) that these results were statistically significant” 
(HOM-2, p.33). 
 
The above shows that spin might occasionally occur in the interpretation of 
findings. However, there is no strong evidence that such form of spin be 
positively associated with the strength of the government’s commitment to 
the reform. Therefore hypothesis 4 seems unlikely.  
 
 
7.6.5. Upgraded/downgraded outcomes   
 
Hypothesis 5 states that, in the context of studies with non-significant 
primary outcome, the risk of upgraded/downgraded outcomes is positively 
associated with the strength of the government’s commitment to the reform. 
I identified three categories of studies. The first category is by far the most 
representative. It brings together studies with clearly identified primary and 
secondary outcomes (DWP-2, DFE-1, DFE-2, HOM-2). I found that, for 
this cluster of studies, outcomes were reported in the executive summaries 
in the exact same way as in the Results section, i.e. according to their 
relative importance for policy-makers. There is one exception though: one 
of the secondary outcomes in the HOM-2 study was not reported in the 
executive summary of the study.  
 
In another study (DWP-1), primary and secondary outcomes were not 
clearly signposted; however I found that the order in which they had been 
reported in the Results section was consistent with the objectives of the 
intervention as presented in the report. Furthermore, the order in which 
outcomes were presented in the executive summary is the same as in the 
Results section.  
 
Finally, one study (HOM-1) evaluated the effect of the intervention on just 
one outcome, making the question of upgrading/downgrading outcomes 
irrelevant.  
 
In light of the above, there seems to be no association between policy 
commitment and the risk of upgraded/downgraded outcomes. Hypothesis 5 
seems unlikely.  
 
 
7.6.6. Conclusion bias  
 
Hypothesis 6 states that, in the context of studies with non-significant 
primary outcome, the risk of conclusion bias is positively associated with 
the strength of the government’s commitment to the reform. In two studies, 
it was found that the level of spin was high (DWP-1, HOM-2). Indeed, the 
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executive summary of the DWP-1 evaluation states, despite a primary 
outcome borderline non-significant at the 10% level, that:  
 
“Overall, the results are encouraging in that they suggest Pathways 
continues to have a positive impact on employment and, furthermore, 
that this impact may be sustained” (DWP-1, p.4).  
 
And although the evidence suggests the opposite, the HOM-2 concludes 
that:  
 
“Summed over all three restorative justice schemes, those offenders 
who participated in restorative justice committed statistically 
significantly fewer offences (in terms of reconvictions) in the 
subsequent two years than offenders in the control group” (HOM-2, 
p.iii).  
 
Two studies were found to be subject to moderate spin (DFE-1; DFE-2). For 
example, the DFE-1 executive summary does acknowledge the non-
significant result for the primary outcome of the study:    
 
“Taking all those children entering pilot places in aggregate, on 
average the pilot did not significantly improve the cognitive and social 
development of the children receiving the free childcare relative to a 
matched comparison group. The pilot children developed only very 
slightly further than their matched comparison group over the same 
period” (DFE-1, p.4).  
 
But this statement is immediately followed by another on the effect of the 
intervention on one specific subgroup, which I have showed to be an 
example of spurious analysis:  
 
“However, this overall lack of a significant impact disguises the fact 
that for those children who were found places in relatively high 
quality settings (…) there was an impact on children, at least in terms 
of child vocabulary. For these children (who between them represent 
around two-thirds of all pilot children) the effect of the pilots was to 
significantly improve their language ability scores (from 45.8 to 49.4 
on average). This is equivalent to moving a child from the 34
th
 
percentile for language development to the 46
th
 percentile. What this 
suggests is that, had the pilot local authorities been able to secure 
more places in relatively high quality settings, then the pilot would 
have had a considerably larger impact overall” (DFE-1, p.4). 
 
The last sentence is particularly interesting, as it suggests that the children 
centres sampled for this study were excessively representative of the 
population and that the pilot would have been more effective with higher-
quality children centres. A similar pattern is observed for the DFE-2 
evaluation. 
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Finally, I found evidence of low spin in two studies (DWP-2, HOM-1). In 
one of them (HOM-1), it seems that the results were so consistently 
negative that the study was ‘beyond spinning’. However, spurious subgroup 
analyses were certainly tried:  
 
“The regression analyses confirmed that those receiving the 
intervention were significantly more likely to be re-arrested in the six 
months post-intervention than those in the comparison group. 
However, there were no clear subgroups for whom the scheme 
appeared to be more effective” (HOM-1, p. iii).  
 
The other study (DWP-2) is much more ‘sober’ in terms of interpretation. 
No evidence of spin was found, as shown by these two excerpts:  
 
“It is not entirely clear why the interventions did not impact on 
employment” (DWP-2, p.7).  
 
“This report has shown no evidence that offering Job Retention and 
Rehabilitation Pilot interventions to those off work sick improved 
their chances of returning to work (DWP-2, p.129). 
 
The fact that I found both high-salience and low-salience pilots in each of 
these three categories shows that there is apparently no association between 
salience and level of spin. Hypothesis 6 seems unlikely.    
 
 
7.7. Discussion 
 
None of the hypotheses predicting outcome reporting bias in connection 
with policy commitment has been confirmed. Given the theoretical 
arguments for why we might expect such an association, this section 
presents a discussion about the circumstances under which the reporting of 
outcomes from politically salient pilots is not biased. I discuss (1) the type 
of evaluations that are less spun; (2) the notion of salience; (3) the issue of 
blame shifting; (4) the stage of the policy process where spin is likely to 
occur; and (5) the organisational and political context in which reporting is 
more comprehensive;  
 
Firstly, one could argue that some reports are not ‘fit for spinning’. On the 
one hand, studies reporting overwhelmingly positive results do not need to 
be spun, as they will offer plenty of good news for their sponsors. On the 
other hands, studies not reporting a single significant outcome might just be 
‘beyond spinning’. The political cost of defending a reform showing very 
meagre results might be greater than that of chucking it altogether since in 
the latter case, ministers and policy-makers can more easily play the 
‘Chairman’ card (Hood, 2011). Between these two extremes, ‘murky’ 
studies mixing a few good findings in a sea of insignificant results could be 
Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? 
 
 
 
 
Arnaud Vaganay  166 
 
better for fishing expeditions. There is some evidence in the studies I 
reviewed that this could be the case. For example, the authors of the DWP-2 
study – which showed very few significant results – warned about the risks 
of over-interpretation:  
 
“There is a danger, of course, that in a trial that demonstrates little or 
no overall impact, too much emphasis may be placed on isolated 
findings. So, although we believe the findings for those self-assessing 
they can return to the same job (…) are probably genuine, we should 
stress that, it may just be statistical ‘noise’” (DWP-2, p.50). 
 
To the extent that this true, this means that the political salience of a pilot 
could have some direct effect on the probability of spinning but that this 
effect would be stronger in studies showing a mix of significant and non-
significant outcomes.  
 
Secondly, one could argue that none of the chosen policy areas was 
politically salient at the time when these pilots were conducted. Although 
some of the pilots were more politically salient than others, it could be that, 
in the broader policy spectrum, these policies were fairly consensual, at 
least during the New Labour government. This hypothesis is congruent with 
the idea of a progressive ideological convergence between the Labour and 
Conservative parties (L. Epstein, 1980; Rae & Gil, 2010). Also, it needs to 
borne in mind that only six studies were analysed. It cannot be excluded 
that, had another set of studies been selected, evidence of an association 
between political salience and spin would have been found.    
 
Thirdly, it could be that the findings of impact studies carry no particular 
political risk. Indeed, these studies are virtually always accompanied by 
implementation/process evaluations which allow the government to shift the 
blame of failure to implementing bodies and frontline workers.  
 
Fourthly, it could be that spin happens at a later stage of the policy cycle, 
for example in the phrasing of the press release announcing the publication 
of a given study (Yavchitz et al., 2012) or in subsequent policy documents 
and communications (Henig, 2008). 
 
Fifthly, it could be that the effect of political salience on the level of spin 
depends on another variable, such as the minister or the department. That 
could be explained by the culture or reputation of the department 
(Carpenter, 2001). Civil servants also have a vested interest in the success in 
the policy. For example, analysts might want to demonstrate that their 
predictions regarding the expected effect of the programme were true:  
 
“It is hoped that the pilot provision will reduce that by approximately 
4 percentage points” (DWP-1-TS: 7).  
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It should be borne in mind that such calculations can also be used to 
determine the sample size needed for the pilot. Likewise, policy-makers 
have their own hypotheses; they specify causal chains when they design 
policy: 
 
“Personal Advisers will have a central role in helping IB customers 
prepare for and seek work, and in supporting both individuals and 
their employers so that employment is sustained. This will be 
achieved through providing advice related to clients’ social and health 
circumstances, developing their skills and potential, and matching 
clients with the needs of employers” (DWP-1-TS, p.10). 
 
This echoes what the LSE GV314 Group found: 
 
“A key distinction in my experience is between commissioners of 
research and their policy counterparts. It’s the latter who are often the 
trickier to handle, whilst the former sometimes even see themselves as 
protecting research integrity against the demands of the policy people. 
This was certainly my experience of doing work… in a politically 
contentious area” LSE GV314 study  
 
The LSE GV314 Group survey makes a distinction between “those expected 
to be more sensitive to the political ammunition aspects of the research, 
above all the policy officials and politicians, taking part in the design of 
research questions at the beginning and the writing up and reporting at the 
end”, and those more committed to the programme evaluation, above all 
researchers and research managers.  
 
 
7.8. Conclusion  
 
This chapter was designed to examine whether, in the context of studies 
with non-significant primary outcome, politically salient reforms were 
subject to more spinning than reforms with lower salience. Overall, I found 
little evidence of spin in the six studies that I reviewed. Out of the seven 
indicators of spin suggested by the medical literature, one could not be 
verified given the information available (missing outcomes), four led to a 
forthright rejection (incomplete reporting, within-group comparisons, 
spurious subgroup analyses, upgrading/downgrading outcomes) and two 
found evidence of spin (interpretation of results and conclusion bias). The 
notion of ‘spin’ here is not a moral judgement; it indicates that the reporting 
decisions made in this instance, for whatever reason, diverged from the 
norms imposed by the scientific method.  
 
The initial hypothesis that high-salience reform would be subject to more 
spin than low-salience reforms can be clearly rejected – at least on the basis 
of the present evidence. Indeed, none of the six indicators of spin used in 
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this study seems to show any form of association. The fact that a ‘high-
salience’ pilot (DWP-1) was more spun than others is not sufficient in itself 
to validate my theory and looks, on balance, fairly anecdotal. The opposite 
claim that high-salience reforms would be associated with high-quality 
reports (in terms of compliance with the principles of scientific reporting) is 
not supported either.  
 
Unfortunately, I have some reasons to believe that this study did not fully 
answer the question asked in the introduction. Firstly, the absence of formal 
research protocols did not allow me to understand what type of information 
would have been reported, and in what way, had the intervention had a 
positive and significant effect on its target group. Although technical 
specifications are useful documents, they cannot be considered as a proxy 
for research protocol. As a result, the crucial question of missing outcomes 
could not be answered. Secondly, this research was hampered by the lack of 
consistency in the presentation of reports as well as the insufficient 
transparency in research decisions (e.g. no justification for the choice of 
subgroup analyses and the expected effect). Thirdly, the design of the study 
did not allow me to make inferences about the vast and ever-increasing 
amount of evaluation reports commissioned by the UK government. Thus, it 
is possible that the findings of this study are due to chance and that another 
set of studies would have yielded different results. A larger and more 
systematic analysis is needed to test that hypothesis. Finally, a broader 
research scope would allow me to test whether these findings hold across 
governments, policy areas and jurisdictions.   
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Appendix – Reviewed documents  
 
Pathways to Work (DWP-1) 
Bewley, H, Dorsett, R, Haile, G (2007). The impact of Pathways to Work. 
Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 435. Available 
here. 
Department for Work and Pensions (2003). Evaluation of Incapacity Benefit 
Pilots. Invitation to Tender. Unpublished document.  
 
JRRP (DWP-2)  
Purdon, S, Stratford, N, Taylor, R, Natarajan, L, Bell, S, Wittenburg, D 
(2006). Impacts of the Job Retention and Rehabilitation Pilot. Department 
for Work and Pensions Research Report No 342. Available here. 
 
Two Year-Old Education Pilot (DFE-1) 
Smith, R, Purdon, S, Schneider, V, La Valle, I, Wollny, I, Owen, R, Bryson, 
C, Mathers, S, Sylva, K, Lloyd, E (2009). Early Education Pilot for Two 
Year Old Children. Department for Children, Schools and Families 
Research Report RR134. Available here. 
Department for Children, Schools and Families (2006). Evaluation of the 2 
year old early education pilot: Specification of Requirements. Unpublished.  
 
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (DFE-2) 
Biehal, N, Dixon, J, Parry, E, Sinclair, I, Green, J, Roberts, C, Kay, C, 
Rothwell, J, Kapadia, D, Roby, A (2012).  The Care Placements Evaluation 
(CaPE).  Evaluation of Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care for 
Adolescents (MTFC-A). Department for Education Research Report 194. 
Available here.   
Biehal, N, Dixon, J, Parry, E, Sinclair, I, Green, J, Roberts, C, Kay, C, 
Rothwell, J, Kapadia, D, Roby, A (2012).  The Care Placements Evaluation 
(CaPE).  Evaluation of Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care for 
Adolescents (MTFC-A). Department for Education Research Brief 194. 
Available here.  
 
Alcohol Arrest Referral (HOM-1) 
McCracken, K, McMurran, M, Winlow, S, Sassi, F, McCarthy, K (2012). 
Evaluation of Alcohol Arrest Referral Pilot Schemes (Phase 2). Home 
Office Occasional Paper 102. Available here.   
 
Restorative Justice Pilots (HOM-2) 
Shapland, J, Atkinson, A, Atkinson, H, Dignan, J, Edwards, L, Hibbert, J, 
Howes, M, Johnstone, J, Robinson, G, Sorsby, A (2008). Does restorative 
justice affect reconviction? The fourth report from the evaluation of three 
schemes. Ministry of Justice Research Series 10/08. Available here. 
Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? 
 
 
 
 
Arnaud Vaganay  170 
 
 
[This page was intentionally left blank] 
 
Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? 
 
 
 
 
Arnaud Vaganay  171 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
It is now time to conclude. Before I sum up the main findings of this thesis 
and discuss its implications, it is useful to recall its specifications. The 
Central Thesis Question was to assess the risk of confirmation bias in 
government-funded policy evaluations. This goal was broken down into two 
more definite objectives. First, my thesis assessed the scientific credibility 
of a sample of government-sponsored policy evaluations. Three common 
scientific prescriptions were considered: the proportionality of time frames 
to the scope of the project; the representativeness of pilot sites; and the 
comprehensiveness of outcome reports (Specific Questions 1a, 1b, 1c). 
Second, it examined whether the known commitment of the government to a 
reform was associated with less credible evaluations (Specific Questions 2a, 
2b, 2c). The operational map is presented again as a reminder (see Exhibit 
31).  
 
This conclusion chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.1 summarises the 
main findings. Section 8.2 considers the broader implications of this thesis. 
Section 8.3 draws some conclusions regarding the methodology used in this 
study. Sections 8.4 and 8.5 provide some recommendations for practitioners 
and researchers interested in the subject. Section 8.6 presents some final 
thoughts.   
 
  
8.1. Findings 
 
8.1.1. Scientific credibility of government-sponsored policy 
evaluations  (Empirical Strand 1) 
 
This thesis addressed two series of questions. The first question was 
whether, in the context of New Labour’s Britain, policy evaluations 
commissioned by the government were credible from a scientific viewpoint. 
This question was justified by the government’s open commitment to 
evidence-based policy, by the ‘routinisation’ of evaluation, and above all by 
the fact that virtually all policy evaluations were published during that time 
(and still are). This commitment to transparency could be the single most 
important difference between policy research and clinical trials, where 
evidence suggests that a significant number of studies are unpublished 
(Kerry Dwan et al., 2008; Easterbrook et al., 1991). On the other hand, the 
poor quality of evaluation reports as well as their inconsistent presentation 
has been a serious impediment to this research project (see section 8.3.2).  
 
Overall, the evaluation reports I reviewed were found to be, on average, 
relatively credible from a researcher’s point of view (Specific Question 1a).   
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Exhibit 31 – Operationalisation (reminder) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specific question 2a: 
Are interventions to which the 
government is strongly 
committed subject to shorter 
evaluations? 
Specific question 2b: 
Are ‘exemplary’ areas more 
likely to be selected as pilot 
sites? 
Specific question 1c: 
Are the intervention outcomes 
comprehensively reported in 
pilot evaluation reports? 
Central Thesis Question: 
To what extent are government-funded policy 
evaluations subject to confirmation bias? 
Specific question 1a: 
Is the duration of pilots 
proportional to the complexity 
of the intervention and the 
evaluation? 
 
Specific question 1b: 
Are pilot sites representative 
of the population? 
Specific question 2c: 
Are interventions to which the 
government is strongly 
committed subject to more 
selective reporting?  
Empirical Strand 1: 
Research credibility 
Empirical Strand 2: 
Effect of policy commitments 
Overarching  
Research Question:  
What is the effect of 
political institutions on 
research? 
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Results show that, on average, the duration of a pilot was proportional with 
the scope of the research. Controlling for the department and a number of 
other variables, evaluations of longer-term effects were associated with 
longer pilots, in line with scientific norms. Besides, I found that less than 
5% of the pilots were truncated. However, I also found a great variation in 
the duration of those pilots, with a third lasting for 12 months or less and 
some others lasting for up to four years. These findings suggest that 
government-sponsored evaluations can serve vastly different purposes, from 
answering very narrow and ‘simple’ questions to much more demanding 
and sophisticated ones. This thesis is the first contribution to our 
understanding of how resources like time are allocated to policy research.  
 
I also found that government-sponsored policy evaluations presented a 
limited risk of outcome reporting bias or ‘spin’ (Specific Question 1c). The 
qualitative nature of this work does not allow me to make any inference 
beyond the sample, even though studies were systematically selected. Out of 
the seven indicators of spin suggested by the medical literature, one could 
not be verified given the information available (missing outcomes), four led 
to a forthright rejection (incomplete reporting, within-group comparisons, 
spurious subgroup analyses, upgrading/ downgrading outcomes) and two 
found evidence of spin (interpretation of results and conclusion bias). 
Although there have been some accounts of spin in the literature (LSE 
GV314), it is the first time that spin is analysed using objective and 
‘structured’ data. The findings suggest that spin is less prevalent in policy 
research than in clinical trials.   
 
Out of the three research decisions considered, the only one that does not 
seem primarily driven by scientific considerations is the selection of pilot 
sites (Specific Question 1b). Chapter 7 shows that pilot sites are almost 
never sampled using a probability formula and as such, are unlikely to be 
representative of the UK as a whole. Regardless of the motive, this finding 
has important implications. Empirically, it suggests that the results of these 
pilot evaluations cannot be straightforwardly extended to the rest of the 
territory. In other words, the argument that the intervention will work 
‘there’ because it worked ‘here’ is flawed. From a theoretical viewpoint, this 
conclusion supports a point previously made by Cartwright and Hardie 
regarding the limited external validity of policy experiments (Cartwright & 
Hardie, 2012).  
 
 
8.1.2. Effect of policy commitments on the scientific 
credibility of evaluations (Empirical Strand 2)   
 
The second empirical strand of this thesis concerned the effect of policy 
commitments on the scientific credibility of evaluations. This question was 
justified by the strong emphasis on performance and delivery under the 
Labour government as well as the seniority of generalist bureaucrats over 
specialists like analysts and various other incentives.    
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Overall, the effect of policy commitment on the credibility of evaluations 
was found to be weak.  
 
Policy commitments had no significant effect on the selection of pilot sites 
(Specific Question 2b). This means that, even if pilot districts were not 
selected in the way that would warrant representativeness, they were not 
selected for exemplarity either, at least as measured in this thesis. The fact 
that each additional pilot being run in a given district significantly reduces 
the odds of this district being selected again for a new pilot can be 
interpreted in two different ways. It could be to prevent a risk of 
‘contamination’, which would be advisable from a scientific viewpoint. Or 
it could be for managerial reasons, to make sure that the administrative 
burden of implementing pilot interventions be evenly distributed across the 
territory. Regardless of the motive, this conclusion differs from those of the 
medical literature.  
 
Policy commitment did not seem to affect the reporting of outcomes either 
(Specific Question 2c). However, I have already mentioned that the level of 
spin across the six studies that I reviewed was low, so even if there were an 
association in the population, it would be difficult to see in the context of 
this qualitative study. More research is needed to quantify the strength and 
the significance of policy commitments on spin.  
 
The evidence regarding the effect of policy commitments on the duration of 
pilots is mixed (Specific Question 2a). On the one hand, I found that 
reforms to which the government was committed were subjected to 
significantly shorter pilots, even after controlling for the research question, 
the department and the prominence of the pilot. On the other hand, I did not 
find that pilots related to a pre-election pledge were shorter pilots which 
were not. Moreover, I found that neither the electoral cycle nor the 
‘salience’ of the intervention had a significant effect on the duration of 
pilots as suggested in the rest of the literature.  
 
 
8.2. Theoretical implications  
 
8.2.1. How much confirmation bias in policy research 
(Central Thesis Question)?  
 
What do the above results tell us about the extent of confirmation bias in 
government-funded policy evaluation? Such an appraisal is a difficult 
exercise. It is important to bear in mind that the results of a study may in 
fact be unbiased despite a methodological flaw. Thus, a non-zero risk of 
bias does not necessarily imply biased conclusions. The design of my thesis 
did not allow quantifying the ‘amount of bias’ caused by the fact that the 
government evaluated its own policies.  
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Another problem is that there is no real precedent or benchmark. To the 
extent that the comparison is relevant, I would simply argue that this effect 
seems to be more limited (in terms of scope) than the effect of industry 
sponsorship on the credibility of clinical trials. My research shows that the 
effect of policy commitments is only tangible at the beginning of the 
research cycle, where policy and analytical teams have to work together and 
make compromises. Later decisions would appear to be more immune to 
policy commitments. In contrast, the literature suggests that industry 
sponsorship affects all clinical trial decisions including duration, sampling 
and outcome reporting.   
 
 
8.2.2. More confirmation bias than meets the eye? 
 
My research has shown that, prima facie, policy commitments do not 
significantly affect the course of evaluation. However, it has also suggested 
that confirmation bias might concern research decisions taken both earlier 
and later than the decisions I chose to analyse. 
 
Earlier, institutions affect the free course of research by imposing strict 
constraints on what to study and what not to study. This is in stark contrast 
with the principle of ‘academic freedom’, which underpins much of the 
research conducted in universities. The fact that all pilot interruptions were 
decided by the new government in May 2010 is a reminder that, in an 
institutional context, research is not conducted for the sake of knowledge, 
but to support the government’s policy initiatives. In the medical sphere, 
this bias has for a long time manifested itself in an under-investment in 
research on rare or neglected diseases (LaMattina, 2012; Rockoff, 2013).      
 
Later, it was suggested that confirmation bias was less visible in the actual 
studies than in the documents communicating the results to stakeholders and 
the public at large (see chapter 7).   
 
Last but not least, the effect of confirmation bias is both direct (e.g. by 
imposing shorter timeframes to some pilots), and indirect – through the 
allocation of human and financial resources. 
 
 
8.2.3. Implications beyond the case 
 
To what extent are these findings capable of extension to other 
jurisdictions? While the direct application of my findings is likely to be 
limited to policy evaluation in the UK, it does hold implications for other 
jurisdictions and other research areas, such as clinical trials.  
 
My thesis suggests that there are three main forces that increase the 
scientific credibility of research and its immunity to policy commitments.  
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The first is a significant proportion of individuals with a scientific 
background within the senior management of the organisation. The case of 
the DWP has been cited as an example of good practice on several 
occasions. However, I did not find empirical evidence that the studies 
commissioned by this department were more credible than others. 
Alternatively, a decent understanding of the scientific method and its 
requirements and among those – product managers or policy-makers – who 
commission research.   
 
The second is a high-level commitment to transparency. In the UK, this is 
enforced through both ‘hard’ regulation (Freedom of Information Act) and 
‘soft’ regulation (GSR publication guidelines). 
 
The third is the independence of researchers. This independence must be 
statutory (i.e. researchers cannot be hired, promoted or demoted for reasons 
other than the quality of their research) and, above all financial, with limited 
incentives to supply favourable results. Disclosing payments made to 
researchers has been suggested as a way of making research more 
accountable (Rao & Sant Cassia, 2012). 
 
 
8.3. Methodological lessons 
 
Given that, to the best of my knowledge, it is the first time that policy 
research decisions are studied from a meta-research perspective, it is 
important to reflect on the added value of the methodology and share my 
experience.  
 
The ex-ante assessment of meta-research showed that the method had two 
critical advantages over the interviews and questionnaires which have 
dominated the literature so far. First, it is based on observed research 
decisions as opposed to accounts of research decisions, which can often be 
biased by selective memories and social desirability. Second, this data was 
systematically collected, which means that there is a limited risk of 
sampling bias.     
 
Ex post, the PILOT dataset proved to be a useful tool in the study of 
confirmation bias in policy research. New and important questions have 
been answered – as shown in sections 8.1 and 8.2.  
 
However, the limitations of the method must also be acknowledged. In 
particular, the coding of variables has been long and difficult due to the 
inconsistent quality of government-sponsored evaluation reports. The 
significant amount of missing information, as well as the occasional factual 
errors found after cross-checks, suggests that double-coding should be used. 
Still, the method might be hard to replicate in the future.  
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8.4. Recommendations for future practice  
 
The above-mentioned results and caveats suggest that no major institutional 
reform would be justified in the UK. However, some adjustments would 
dramatically improve the transparency of the evaluation process, and thus, 
its trustworthiness. Such adjustments include (1) the design and publication 
of research protocols; (2) the publication of reporting guidelines; and (3) the 
publication of results in scientific journals and/or research repositories.   
 
 
8.4.1. Publication of research protocols  
 
Government can hide important information by publishing evaluation 
reports ex post and ‘adjust’ its initial intentions to fit the new circumstances. 
This is known as the ‘black box’ problem, which has been mentioned 
several times throughout this thesis.  
 
Government would be wise to require that all research projects be registered 
by the government before their implementation as opposed to after. 
Protocols specify the time that each phase of the project is likely to take, 
along with a detailed month by month timeline for each activity to be 
undertaken. Subsequent modifications to this protocol are then mentioned in 
the protocol and justified. Furthermore, peer-reviewed research publications 
indicate the dates when the manuscript was first submitted and published as 
well as any other interim step such as revisions. Furthermore, technical 
specifications should be published in the cases where those evaluations are 
contracted out.  
 
 
8.4.2. Transparent reporting  
 
The Government Social Research website
15
 provides a wealth of 
professional documents to its members and the general public, including: 
methodological handbooks, ethical guidelines, publication guides, etc. 
However, none of these documents address the question of what 
information a standard evaluation report should contain.  
 
Government should encourage the standardisation of evaluation reports. 
This could be could achieved in two ways. First, each government 
department could sign and publish a common statement of their 
commitment to transparent reporting, such as the CONSORT statement
16
. 
Second, Government should provide each of its agencies and departments 
with reporting guidelines such as the CONSORT checklist
17
.   
                                                        
15
 http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/networks/gsr/publications 
16
 http://www.consort-statement.org/ 
17
 http://www.consort-statement.org/checklists/view/32-consort/66-title 
Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? 
 
 
 
 
Arnaud Vaganay  178 
 
There is some evidence that reporting guidelines are associated with more 
comprehensive studies. A 2012 Cochrane systematic review assessed the 
effect of journal’s endorsement of CONSORT on the reporting of trials they 
publish (Turner, Shamseer, Altman, Schulz, & Moher, 2012). In 50 included 
studies evaluating the reporting of 16,604 trials, 25/27 CONSORT-related 
items measured were more completely reported in trials published in 
endorsing journals than those in non-endorsing journals, five items were 
significantly better reported. Similar findings were yielded for many items 
when comparing trials published in journals before and after CONSORT 
endorsement. 
 
 
8.4.3. Publication of findings in scientific journals   
 
Studies evaluating the effect of policy interventions are published by the 
relevant government departments. That has two implications. On one level, 
this means that these studies are subjected to the different levels of quality 
control and reporting requirements. On another level, this makes research 
synthesis more difficult and costlier than if these results were available in a 
unique location.  
 
Government should encourage researchers to publish their results in 
journals. Alternatively, studies published by government departments 
should also be systematically made available in research repositories such as 
3ie’s Impact Evaluation Repository18. This would simplify systematic 
reviews and meta-evaluations.   
 
 
8.5. Directions for further research 
 
From one point of view, these findings are an important step forward in the 
study of public administration and public policy. From another point of 
view, they barely scratch the surface. I see five main directions for future 
research in this area.  
 
 
8.5.1. Geographical scope   
 
This thesis focused on the UK during the Labour government (1997-2010). 
The motivations and the case selection process have been described in 
section 3.1. This relatively narrow scope has had some benefits. In 
particular, I believe that it has enhanced the conclusion validity of the 
findings. Indeed, the research done on the political and institutional context 
(presented in chapter 4) has been instrumental in the interpretation of 
findings from the empirical analysis. However, it also means that the results 
                                                        
18
 http://www.3ieimpact.org/evidence/impact-evaluations/impact-evaluation-repository/ 
Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? 
 
 
 
 
Arnaud Vaganay  179 
 
can hardly be extended beyond the case. Future research in this area would 
benefit from a broader scope. Introducing more variation in terms of 
geography and time would result in larger datasets and greater statistical 
power. It would also allow comparisons across polities, governments and 
types of civil service.  
 
 
8.5.2. Independent variable 
 
In this study, I used the variation in the government’s known commitment 
to a reform (strong/weak) as a proxy for the strength of confirmation bias. 
Although not entirely satisfying from a construct validity viewpoint, this 
decision was constrained by the limited number of policy evaluations 
undertaken by independent entities in the selected geography, time frame 
and policy areas. The loosening of the time and geographical constraints 
discussed in section 8.5.1 would make the alternative more feasible. Future 
research in this area would thus benefit from contrasting policy evaluations 
sponsored by government with similar evaluations sponsored by non-
governmental organisations (academia, think tanks, charities, etc.). As 
argued repeatedly throughout this thesis, research sponsorship has been a 
strong predictor of clinical trial outcomes. Using policy commitment as 
independent variable should be used in last resort, when it is not possible to 
contrast different types of sponsorship.  
 
 
8.5.3. Dependent variables 
 
This study examined the effect of policy commitments on the scientific 
credibility of evaluations based on three research decisions: the time 
afforded to research, the selection of pilot sites; and the level of spin. 
Ultimately, though, the extent of confirmation bias is best measured using 
study outcomes. Future research in this area would benefit from addressing 
the following lines of inquiry:    
– Is government sponsorship of a policy evaluation associated with 
favourable outcomes?  
– Is government sponsorship of a cost-benefit analysis associated with 
favourable reported ratios?  
 
Other interesting questions include: 
– Are international economic development programmes associated with 
more robust impact evaluations than equivalent domestic interventions?  
– How are blame and credit attributed in implementation evaluations?  
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8.5.4. Using existing data as opposed to collecting new data 
 
This study involved the development of a new dataset of over 230 studies. 
As explained in section 8.3, data collection has been a painstakingly slow 
process. This compromises the replicability and the scalability of this type 
of research. Again, loosening the time and geographical constraint opens up 
a number of opportunities. Future research in this area could be made more 
cost-effective by using existing systematic reviews, such as those published 
by the Campbell Collaboration and by the various ‘What Works’ centres in 
the US and the UK (What Works Clearinghouse, Development Experience 
Clearinghouse, Early Intervention Foundation, What Works Centre for 
Local Economic Growth, etc.). In the area of social research, these 
systematic reviews usually include a fairly large number of studies funded 
by different sources (governmental vs. non-governmental). The second 
benefit of using existing systematic reviews is that they report many of the 
variables that I would need for my own research (e.g. effect, sample size, 
type of research design, etc.).   
 
 
8.5.5. Why is this so?  
 
Last but not least, there is a need for more qualitative research into the 
different factors that strengthen or weaken confirmation bias. This thesis has 
shown that government-sponsored policy evaluations were very diverse in 
terms of depth and thoroughness. Although trying to identify patterns and 
means is interesting per se, we would also learn a great deal by doing more 
exploratory research on a number of systematically selected cases. This 
would be best achieved through comparisons of different organisational 
contexts (e.g. governmental/ industrial/charitable) and research areas (e.g. 
social research vs. science and technology studies). Interviews and case 
studies are seen as particularly desirable methods to address this question.  
 
 
8.5.6. Use of findings  
 
In addition to conducting more research on confirmation bias, it would be 
interesting to measure the extent to which the conclusions of policy 
evaluations inform subsequent policy decisions. This is particularly relevant 
in the case of pilot evaluations, given that these studies are meant to address 
a straight-forward question, namely: should these pilot interventions be 
rolled out nationally?    
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8.6. Final word 
 
It bears repeating: on the whole, government-funded policy evaluations 
observe a number of important scientific prescriptions and are only 
marginally affected by previous policy commitments.  
 
I am aware that this conclusion will disappoint some. The popular 
assumption among viewers of TV series such as ‘Yes Minister’ and ‘The 
Thick of It’ is that politics (in a derogatory sense) permeates all levels of 
governance and all steps of the policy cycle, from agenda-setting to lesson-
learning. To be clear, I am not suggesting that policy evaluation is immune 
to politics – indeed, this thesis has shown that higher-level constraints 
(resources, time, people) were often in the way. However political 
institutions appear to have a more limited effect on research than the market.    
 
The reader will remember that this thesis began with two opposed views on 
the role of researchers in the policy process. A first view (David Blunkett) 
was that social scientists were given enough autonomy to inform policy 
with their research. A second view (Eric Pickles) was that researchers were 
‘on tap’ and politicians ‘on top’. I believe and I hope that readers are now 
better equipped to make their own judgment.    
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Annex I – List of pilots included in 
the PILOT dataset  
 
1. 14-19 Pathfinder Initiative 
2. Achievement for All 
3. Action Teams for Jobs 
4. Activity Agreements Pilots 
5. Adult Basic Skills Extension Pathfinder 
6. Adult Guidance Pilots 
7. Adult Learning Grant 
8. Adult Learning Option  
9. Adults Facing Chronic Exclusion 
10. Aiming High: African Caribbean Achievement Project 
11. Alcohol Arrest Referral - Phase 1 
12. Alcohol Arrest Referral - Phase 2 
13. Ambition programme 
14. Anti-social behaviour co-ordinators 
15. Automatic Referral to Mediation  
16. Better-off In-Work Credit 
17. Black Children's Achievement Programme 
18. Boarding School Provision for Vulnerable Children Pathfinder 
19. Budget Holding Lead Professionals 
20. Budget Holding Lead Professionals for Children in Care 
21. CONNECT 
22. Care First Careers pilot 
23. Child Development Grant  
24. Child Sex Offender Review (CSOR) Public Disclosure Pilots 
25. Childcare Affordability Pilots 2009 - 100% 
26. Childcare Affordability Pilots 2009 - Actual Costs 
27. Childcare Affordability Pilots 2009 - Disabled Children 
28. Childcare Affordability Programme 
29. Childcare Taster Pilot 
30. Children's Trust Pathfinder 
31. Choice Advice Service 
32. City Strategy 
33. Cognitive Skills Booster (CSB) programme 
34. Community Finance and Learning Initiative 
35. Community Safety Partnerships 
36. Community Support Officers 
37. Conditional Cautions scheme 
38. Connexions Customer Information System 
39. Connexions Direct Pilot 
40. Connexions Service Pilots 
41. Dedicated Drug Courts 
42. Dedicated Sexual Assault Unit 
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43. Devolution of Education Welfare Services to secondary schools 
44. Disabled Children's Access to Childcare 
45. Diversity Pathfinders 
46. Drug Testing Pilot Programme 
47. Drug Treatment and Testing Orders  
48. Drug Treatment and Testing Requirements 
49. Drug and Alcohol Courts Pilot 
50. ESOL Pathfinder 
51. Early Education Pilot for Two Year Old Children 
52. Early Excellence Centre 
53. Early Professional Development 
54. Early Support Pilot Programme 
55. Early neutral evaluation pilot 
56. Education Business Link 
57. Education Maintenance Allowance  
58. Effective bail scheme 
59. Electronically Monitored Curfew  
60. Employer Training Pilots 
61. Employment Advisers in GP surgeries (Pathways Advisory) 
62. Employment Pathfinder - Phase 1 
63. Employment Pathfinder - Phase 2 
64. Employment Retention and Advancement 
65. Empowering Young People Pilots 
66. Entry to Learning 
67. Ethnic Minority Outreach 
68. Evaluating judicial mediation in employment tribunals 
69. Every Child Counts 
70. Every Child a Reader  
71. Every Child a Writer  
72. Excellence Fellowship Awards 
73. Exit to Work 
74. Extended Flexible Entitlement for 3 and 4 YO pathfinder 
75. Extended Schools Childcare Pilot 
76. Extended Schools Pathfinder 
77. Extended Services Subsidy pathfinder 
78. Extended Telephone Support Service Pilot 
79. Extra Mile 
80. Face-to-Face Guidance Pilot 
81. Fair Cities 
82. Family Nurse Partnership 
83. Family Resolutions Pilot Project 
84. Family and Young Carer Pathfinder 
85. Fast Track to Prosecution for School Non-Attendance Pathfinder 
86. Find Your Talent 
87. Fine Payment Work  
88. Fit For Work Service 
89. Forensic Science Service Pathfinder  
90. Formalised Peer Mentoring Pilot Evaluation 
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91. Fortnightly jobsearch review 
92. Free School Meals Pilot 
93. Helping Children Achieve Trial 
94. Helping Families Programme 
95. Higher Level Basic Skills Pilots 
96. Home Access Programme Pathfinder 
97. I-Sign project 
98. In-Work Retention Pilot 
99. Increasing take-up of formal childcare in BME communities 
100. Individual Budgets for families with disabled children 
101. Individual Learning Accounts 
102. Inform, Persuade and Remind campaign 
103. Integrated Domestic Abuse Programme 
104. Integrated Domestic Violence Court (Croydon) 
105. Integrated Employment and Skills 
106. Integrated Offender Management pioneer 
107. Intensive Activity Period mandatory for the 50+ 
108. Intensive Alternatives to Custody pilots 
109. Intensive Control and Change Programme 
110. Intermittent Custody Pilot 
111. Invest to Save Pathfinders 
112. JCP Intensive Activity trial for substance misusing customers 
113. JRFND [From W25] - Skills Conditionality Pilot 
114. Job Retention and Rehabilitation Programme 
115. Jobcentre Plus pathfinder 
116. Jobseeker Mandatory Activity 
117. Justice Research Consortium  
118. Key Stage 2 career-related learning pathfinder 
119. Leadership and Management Development Programme  
120. Learning (Connexions) Card Demonstration 
121. Learning Agreement Pilots 
122. Link Up 
123. Local Authority Child Poverty Innovation Pilot  
124. Local Authority Commissioning Pathfinders 
125. Local Housing Allowance Pathfinders 
126. Lone Parents New Services 
127. Lone-parents pilots (IWC, WSP, ESC, ND+fLP) 
128. Low Attainers Pilots 
129. Making Good Progress 
130. Mandatory basic skills pilot - Benefit sanctions 
131. Mandatory polygraph testing 
132. Mental Health Courts 
133. Mentor Points 
134. Multi-systemic Therapy Pilot 
135. Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care 
136. New Deal for the Long-Term Unemployed ND25+ - Pilot  
137. New Deal for the Long-Term Unemployed ND25+ - Gateway  
138. New Deal for the 50+ - Pathfinder 
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139. New Deal for the 50+ - Over 50s Outreach Pilot 
140. New Deal for Disabled People 
141. New Deal for Lone Parents Pathfinders 
142. New Deal for Young People Pathfinders 
143. New Deal for Young People - Intensive Gateway 
144. NOMS Offender Management Model 
145. National Reassurance Policing Programme 
146. Neighbourhood Agreements Pathfinder Programme 
147. New Deal for Partners 
148. New Entrepreneur Scholarships 
149. New Jobseeker Regime 
150. Next Steps test bed Regional Pilots 
151. Numeracy/literacy pilots 
152. ONE Service 
153. Occupational Health Advice Lines pilot 
154. Off the streets and into work 
155. On-charge drug testing 
156. Outcomes for Learners Pathfinders 
157. Parent Support Advisor Pilot 
158. Parenting Early Intervention Programme pathfinder 
159. Partners Outreach for Ethnic Minorities 
160. Pathfinder UK Online Centres 
161. Pathways to work pilots 
162. Penalty notices for disorder on 10- to 15-year-olds 
163. Personalised Employment Programme pilots 
164. Pilot Beacon Schools 
165. Police And Criminal Evidence 
166. Post 16 Equal Opportunities Pilots 
167. Postal requisitioning 
168. Progress 
169. Progress File 
170. Progression to Work Pathfinders 
171. Public Law Outline in family courts 
172. Pupil Learning Credits 
173. REMEDI 
174. Raising the Achievement of Bilingual Learners 
175. Raising the Participation Age (RPA) Phased intro 
176. Re-Ach Project 
177. Referal Orders for 10-17 year olds 
178. Referral Orders for 10-17 year olds 
179. Repayment of Teachers' Loans Scheme 
180. Resettlement Pathfinders 
181. Restriction on Bail [DIP] 
182. Right2BCared4 pilots 
183. Satellite Tracking of Offenders 
184. Saving Gateway 1 (SG1) 
185. Schema modal therapy in a high-secure hospital 
186. School Gate Employment Support (CPP) 
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187. Schools Linking Network 
188. Schools Plus Teams Pilot 
189. Second Great Parenting Experiment 
190. Secondary Social Emotional and Behavioural Skills 
191. Services for Separating Parents  
192. Short breaks Pathfinder 
193. Single Level Test Pilot 
194. Skills Coaching and Passport 
195. Small Firm Development Account 
196. Social Pedagogy Pilot Programme 
197. Soft Skills Pilot 
198. Specialist Employment Adviser Programme 
199. Stable and Acute' risk assessment pilot 
200. Statutory Time Limits in the Youth Court 
201. Staying Put: 18 Plus Family Placement Programme pilot 
202. StepUP programme 
203. Study Plus Pilots 
204. Support Childminder Pathfinder 
205. Support to victims of road accidents 
206. Sure Start Mainstreaming Pilots 
207. Sure Start Plus 
208. Tackling Knives and Serious Youth Violence Action Programme 
209. Targeted Mental Health in Schools 
210. Targeted Youth Support Pathfinders 
211. Teenage Parent Supported Housing (TPSH) pilot  
212. The 'Go-Between' pathfinder projects 
213. The impact of debt advice 
214. Time to Talk 
215. Together Women  
216. Transition Information Sessions 
217. Travel to Interview Scheme 
218. Trust School Pathfinder 
219. UK Resilience Programme 
220. Understanding Connexions Pilot 
221. Unpaid reparative work caution 
222. Victims' Advocate Scheme pilots 
223. Virtual School Head 
224. Virtual courts pilot 
225. Welfare Reform Drug Recovery Pilot 
226. Women specific condition pilot 
227. Work for Your Benefit 
228. Work works pilots (Discovery Weeks, ESC+Childcare Tasters) 
229. Work-focused services in children's centres  
230. Working Neighbourhoods Pilot 
231. Young Volunteer Challenge 
232. Young witness support 
233. Youth Offending Teams 
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Annex II – PILOT Codebook   
 
Pilot duration (planned)  
 
Definition:  Pilot duration in months, from start to planned finish, i.e. taking 
into account extensions and truncations 
Source: Evaluation reports 
Type: Continuous  
Range: [2, 48] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 34 Missing:  16/233 
Mean:  19.8 Std dev.: 10.6  
Percentiles: 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
 7 12 18 24 36 
 
 
Pilot duration (observed)  
 
Definition:  Pilot duration in months, from start to actual finish, i.e. taking 
into account extensions and truncations 
Source: Evaluation reports  
Type: Continuous  
Range: [0, 60] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 38 Missing:  18/233 
Mean:  19.9 Std dev.: 11.8  
Percentiles: 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
 6 12 18 24 36 
 
 
Pathfinder  
 
Definition:  Whether the government has expressed an explicit commitment 
to roll out the intervention, or whether a roll-out schedule is 
mentioned in the evaluation study 
Source: Evaluation reports 
Type: Categorical  
Range: [0, 1] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 2 Missing:  0/233 
Values:  [0] No [1] Yes   
Tabulation:  Frequency 
177 
56  
Value 
0 
1 
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Manifesto 
 
Definition:  Whether the intervention and its objective were mentioned in 
the manifesto of the Labour Party for the previous general 
election  
Source:  Labour Party manifestos (1997, 2001, 2005) 
Type: Categorical  
Range: [0, 1] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 2 Missing:  0/233 
Values: [0] No 
[1] Yes 
   
Tabulation:  Frequency 
121 
112  
Value 
0 
1 
 
 
Election  
 
Definition:  Number of months between the start of the pilot and the next 
general election 
Type: Continuous  
Range: [0, 58] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 53 Missing:  7/233 
Mean:  25.4 Std dev.: 14.8  
Percentiles: 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
 6 13 24 38 47 
 
 
Term  
 
Definition:  Labour’s term in government   
Type: Categorical 
Range: [1, 3] Unit:  1 
Unique values:  Missing:  4/233 
Values:  
Frequency (1): 
[1] First term: May 1997 to May 2001 
[2] Second term: May 2001 to May 2005 
[3] Third term: May 2005 to May 2010 
Tabulation:  Frequency 
38 
78 
113  
Value 
1 
2 
3 
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Type of evaluation  
 
Definition:  Whether the evaluation covers questions pertaining to the 
process, the outcome or the impact of the intervention. 
Impact is considered measurable only based on a 
counterfactual. The dataset records the ‘highest’ type of 
design. 
Source: Evaluation reports 
Type: Categorical 
Range: [1, 3] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 3 Missing:  18/233 
Values: [1] Process evaluation 
[2] Outcome evaluation 
[3] Impact evaluation  
Tabulation:  Frequency 
112 
46 
57  
Value 
1 
2 
3 
 
 
Department  
 
Definition:  Department sponsoring the evaluation  
Source  Evaluation reports 
Type: Categorical 
Range: [1, 4] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 4 Missing:  0/233 
Values: [1] Department for Education  
[2] Department for Work and Pensions 
[3] Home Office 
[4] Ministry of Justice 
Tabulation:  Frequency 
114 
58 
26 
35  
Value 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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Mandatory intervention (for DWP studies only)  
 
Definition:  Whether the intervention is mandatory to its target groups and 
entails a sanction for non-compliance  
Source: Evaluation reports  
Type: Categorical 
Range: [0, 1] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 2 Missing:  0/54 
Values:   [0] No [1] Yes   
Tabulation:  Frequency 
34 
20  
Value 
0 
1 
 
 
DWP target group (for DWP studies only) 
 
Definition:  Group targeted by the intervention, according to the DWP 
Job Outcome classification (highest category recorded) 
Source: Evaluation reports  
Type: Categorical 
Range: [1, 12] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 5 Missing:  4/54 
Values: [1] Employed customers 
[3] Unemployed customers not claiming benefits 
[4] Customers claiming JSA for under 6 months 
[8] Customers on New Deal or claiming JSA for over six 
months 
[12] Lone parents, people with a health condition/disability 
and other inactive benefit customers 
Tabulation:  Frequency 
2 
1 
10 
22 
15  
Value 
1 
3 
4 
8 
12 
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Chapter 6 – Selection of pilot sites  
 
Pilot  
 
Definition:  Whether Jobcentre Plus District i was selected as pilot site 
for pilot j 
Type: Categorical 
Range: [0,1] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 2 Missing:  0/2000 
Values  [0] No                             [1] Yes 
Tabulation:  Frequency 
1589 
411  
Value 
0 
1 
 
Region  
 
Definition:  Region of England where the District is located 
Type: Categorical 
Range: [1,4] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 4 Missing:  0/2000 
Values  [1] North of England, includes: Cheshire, Halton and 
Warrington; Cumbria and Lancashire; Manchester 
(Central); Manchester (East and West); Merseyside; 
North East Yorkshire and the Humber; Northumbria; 
South Tyne and Wear Valley; South Yorkshire; Tees 
Valley; West Yorkshire. 
[2] Midlands, includes: Birmingham and Solihull; Black 
Country; Coventry and Warwickshire; Derbyshire; 
Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire; Marches; 
Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire; Staffordshire. 
[3] London, includes: Brent, Harrow and Hillingdon; Central; 
City and East; Lambeth, Southwark and Wandsworth; 
North East; North; South East; South; West.  
[4] South of England, includes: Bedfordshire and 
Hertfordshire; Cambridgeshire and Suffolk; Devon and 
Cornwall; Dorset and Somerset; Essex; Gloucestershire, 
Wiltshire and Swindon; Hampshire and Isle of Wight; 
Kent; Norfolk; Surrey and Sussex; Thames Valley (Berks, 
Bucks, Oxfs); West of England.   
Tabulation:  Frequency 
550 
400 
450 
600  
Value 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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Pathfinder  
 
Definition:  Whether the government has expressed an explicit 
commitment to roll out the intervention, or whether a roll-out 
schedule is mentioned in the evaluation study 
Source: Evaluation reports 
Type: Categorical 
Range: [0, 1] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 2 Missing:  0/2000 
Values  [0] No                             [1] Yes 
Tabulation:  Frequency 
1640 
360 
Value 
0 
1 
 
 
Manifesto 
 
Definition:  Whether the intervention and its objective were mentioned in 
the manifesto of the Labour Party for the previous general 
election  
Source: Labour Party manifestos (1997, 2001, 2005) 
Type: Categorical 
Range: [0, 1] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 2 Missing:  0/2000 
Values  [0] No                            [1] Yes 
Tabulation:  Frequency 
1320 
680 
Value 
0 
1 
 
 
Mandatory  
 
Definition:  Whether the intervention is mandatory to its target group and 
entails sanctions.  
Source: Evaluation reports 
Type: Categorical 
Range: [0, 1] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 2 Missing:  120/2000 
Values  [0] No                            [1] Yes 
Tabulation:  Frequency 
1080 
800 
Value 
0 
1 
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JCP Lead  
 
Definition:  Whether Jobcentre Plus leads the implementation of the 
pilot (as opposed to local authorities or private-sector 
providers).  
Source:  Evaluation reports  
Type: Categorical  
Range: [0,1] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 2 Missing:  200/2000 
Values  [0] No                              
[1] Yes 
Tabulation:  Frequency 
1493 
307 
Value 
0 
1 
 
 
JSA Exit Rate 
 
Definition:  Ratio of the number of individuals terminating their JSA 
claim because they found a job over the total number of 
JSA claimants in a given month and Jobcentre Plus 
District. The value included in the dataset is the annual 
average JSA exit rate to job of a given district the year 
before the start of the pilot.  
Source:  NOMIS - Official labour market statistics 
Type: Continuous  
Range: [3.98, 31.11] Unit:  % 
Unique values: 433 Missing:  40/2000 
Mean:  16.34 Std dev.: 3.11  
Percentiles: 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
 12.56 14.06 16.12 18.12 20.49 
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Benefit claimants 
 
Definition:  Ratio of benefit claimants (Jobseeker Allowance, Income 
Support, Incapacity Benefit) in the active population of 
each Jobcentre Plus District in August 2007.  
Source:  NOMIS - Official labour market statistics 
Type: Continuous  
Range: [1.3, 7.3] Unit:   
Unique values: 26 Missing:  0/2000 
Mean:  3.08 Std dev.: 1.43  
Percentiles: 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
 1.55 2 2.75 3.8 5.1 
 
 
Working age population  
 
Definition:  Number of individuals aged 16 to 59 (females) or 64 
(males) in 2003 in a given Jobcentre Plus District. The 
figure in the dataset is expressed in 100,000s.  
Source: NOMIS - Official labour market statistics 
Type: Continuous  
Range: [3.98, 15.37] Unit:  .001 
Unique values: 39 Missing:  0/2000 
Mean:  7.72 Std dev.: 2.75  
Percentiles: 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
 4.71 5.45 7.00 9.89 11.35 
 
 
Population density  
 
Definition:  Total population per hectare in each Jobcentre Plus District 
Source ONS, Census data 2003 
Type: Continuous  
Range: [1, 268] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 20 Missing:  0/2000 
Mean:  29.2 Std dev.: 53.1  
Percentiles: 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
 1 2 4 38 82 
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Ethnic white (%) 
 
Definition:  Ratio of adults identifying themselves as white in the 
population of a Jobcentre Plus District in 2003.  
Source: ONS, Census data 2003 
Type: Continuous  
Range: [57, 96] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 20 Missing:  0/2000 
Mean:  85 Std dev.: 10.45  
Percentiles: 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
 69 79 90 93 94 
 
Capacity  
 
Definition:  Number of pilots already running in Jobcentre Plus District 
i at the launch of pilot j 
Source:  Evaluation reports  
Type: Continuous 
Range: [0, 6] Unit:  1 
Unique values: 7 Missing:  0/2000 
Mean:  0.94 Std dev.: 1.16  
Tabulation:  Frequency 
931 
591 
273 
121 
55 
23 
6 
Value 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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DWP target group 
 
Definition:  Group targeted by the intervention, according to the DWP 
Job Outcome classification (highest category recorded) 
Type: Categorical  
Range: [1, 12] Unit:   
Unique values: 5 Missing:  0/2000 
Values: [1] Employed customers 
[3] Unemployed customers not claiming benefits 
[4] Customers claiming JSA for under 6 months 
[8] Customers on New Deal or claiming JSA for over six 
months 
[12] Lone parents, people with a health condition/disability 
and other inactive benefit customers 
Tabulation:  Frequency 
80 
200 
160 
880 
680 
Value 
1 
3 
4 
8 
12 
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Annex III – List of interviewees 
 
Name Organisation  Interview date 
Alan Marsh Policy Studies Institute  1 February 2012 
Bruce Stafford University of Nottingham  19 January 2012 
Carl Emmerson Institute for Fiscal Studies  13 December 2011 
Claire Crawford Institute for Fiscal Studies  12 January 2012 
Genevieve Knight Policy Studies Institute 14 September 2011 
Jim Hillage and Sarah 
Dewson 
Institute for Employment 
Studies  
6 February 2012 
James Riccio MDRC 2 May 2012 
Jo Casebourne  Nesta 23 March 2012 
Jonathan Portes  National Institute of 
Economic and Social 
Research 
10 May 2012 
Mike Daly Department for Work and 
Pensions  
3 October 2013 
Rachel Marangozov Institute for Employment 
Studies  
19 February 2012 
Richard Dorsett National Institute of 
Economic and Social 
Research 
15 December 2011 
Rita Griffiths  CESI 6 February 2012 
Stephen Morris Policy Studies Institute 18 January 2012 
Susan Purdon  Bryson Purdon Social 
Research 
18 January 2012 
Suzanne King Freelance evaluator  4 July 2012 
Vicky Davies  Ecotec 1 February 2012 
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